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Introduction 
 
 
One of the great engines of globalization is the expansion of companies 
across borders through mergers, acquisitions, joint venture and subsidiaries. 
You might have expected these link-ups to result in a sort of standardized 
corporate culture, an all-encompassing lingua franca of the global worker. But 
clashes of culture are persisting and even multiplying (Altman). 
 
For the past years, the world has looked on with astonishment as China became the 
fastest growing economy worldwide, the darling of multinational companies and the 
most promising market on earth.  An ever expanding economy with a gross domestic 
growth rate of 9.6 percent for the last 25 years (Anonymous, China GDP Grows at 
9.6% in Last 25 Years) and over 1 billion potential consumers represents one of the 
most lucrative markets for companies from all kinds of industries.  Furthermore, 
significantly lower labor costs in China compared to those in Western countries 
attracted additional billions of US Dollars of manufacturing investment.  Current 
management literature has tried to keep pace with the rapid economic development 
of China and produced a slew of research and papers on the development of China, 
the market entrance of Western companies onto the Chinese market and the 
difficulties of doing business in China due to legal restrictions, organizational 
problems and cultural differences and challenges.  But so far, little attention has 
been paid to the development of China and its enterprises away from solely focusing 
on manufacturing to the international development, production and sale of innovative 
and qualitative products and services.  This is because, at the moment, Mainland 
Chinese companies have neither mastered these changes convincingly nor do they 
play a significant role in global business.  However, recent developments have 
shown that Mainland Chinese companies are working hard to close the gap to 
Western companies in regard to, for example, technology, marketing and 
management skills.  Mainland Chinese companies are trying to catch up with 
Western multinational companies and are preparing to leap on the global stage by 
expanding internationally, engaging in the acquisition or merging with other 
companies, participating in joint ventures and taking on the challenges of being 
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globally active.  Until to the end of July, 2006, Mainland Chinese companies have 
been involved in $62 billion-worth of merging and acquisitions deals of which $9.3 
billion were spent on overseas acquisitions by Mainland Chinese businesses as 
compared to just $2.3 billion in 2005 (Anonymous, "Playing at Home" 61-62).  This 
dissertation argues and illustrates that the internationalization of Mainland Chinese 
businesses is accelerating. One can be certain that the economic power of China will 
increase in the coming years, and that Mainland Chinese businesses will play an 
ever increasing role in international business and their respective host countries.  
However, while current literature has been discussing the challenges of different 
cultures for the market entrance of foreign companies in China at length, little 
attention has been paid to whether and how Chinese companies will deal with 
cultural differences and subsequent challenges and problems in international 
business. 
     Therefore, this dissertation tries to shed light on the internationalization of 
Mainland Chinese companies, their choice of market entry modes and the 
significance of culture as a variable in market entry mode decision processes and 
subsequent business activities on a foreign market as demonstrated by the example 
of the German market.  Chapter 1 of the dissertation is concerned with explaining the 
theoretical foundation of current research and literature perspective on the 
internationalization of businesses and the choice of market entry mode.  Chapter 2 
defines culture and takes a closer look at specific characteristics of Chinese culture.  
Chapter 3 defines communication and examines specific characteristics of Chinese 
and German communication styles.  Chapter 4 illustrates the internationalization of 
Overseas Chinese businesses and discusses whether any conclusions or lessons 
can be drawn for the international expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses.   
     Chapter 5 describes and analyzes the expansion of Mainland Chinese 
businesses in the past years while Chapter 6 describes the German market and the 
investment of Mainland Chinese companies on the German market.  At the end of 
the chapter, hypotheses are proposed which are then discussed in Chapter 7.  
Additionally, Chapter 7 analyzes the results of the author’s own study and compares 
them with other available studies current literature.  Finally, Chapter 8 gives an 
outlook on the future development international expansion of Mainland Chinese 
companies, the significance of China’s growing global presence and what it means 
for other nations, especially for Germany. 
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1 Internationalization of the Firm 
1.1 Theoretical Approaches to the Internationalization of the Firm 
 
     Businesses are expanding internationally in the search for competitive 
advantages, following their customers and obtaining scale (Finkelstein 1).  According 
to Calof and Beamish, “Internationalization is the process of adapting exchange 
transaction modality to international markets.” (115-116)  Calof and Beamish’s 
definition encompasses multistep increases in foreign market commitment in the 
process of the firm’s internationalization (115-116).  In the context of the market 
entrance of a firm, two questions have to be answered.  The first is concerned with 
the motivation of the firm to expand internationally (Madhok 41) which is analyzed in 
Chapter 1.1.  The second question is concerned with the means by which the firm 
chooses to enter the foreign market (Madhok 41) and is analyzed in the Chapter 1.2 
to 1.4. 
     Hence, the dissertation evaluates and analyzes the different approaches to the 
motivations and steps in the internationalization of firms.  In general, when trying to 
explain the process of the internationalization of firms, three schools of thought are 
predominant. The first is concerned with the Uppsala model (internationalization 
theory), the second refers to the network model of internationalization and the third is 
the eclectic paradigm according to Dunning.  
 
1.1.1 The Uppsala Internationalization Model 
      The Uppsala model was developed in the mid 1970s at the Swedish University of 
Uppsala when researchers focused on the internationalization of Swedish 
manufacturers and is also known as the internationalization model.  The researchers 
developed a model of the firm’s choice of market and form of entry in order to explain 
the expansion of Swedish companies abroad.  The researchers conceptualized a 
model which distinguishes between four different stages of entering an international 
market and accompanying internationalization modes of the company.  Each 
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expansion stage is accompanied by a higher resource/capital commitment to the 
internationalization of the firm and the foreign market (Hollensen 47-48):  
Stage 1: No regular export activities (sporadic export) 
Stage 2: Export via independent representatives (export modes) 
Stage 3: Establishment of a foreign sales subsidiary 
Stage 4: Foreign product/manufacturing units 
     Thus, the Uppsala model describes the incremental approach firms take to 
internationalization.  The more experience is gained in the internationalization of the 
firm by moving from stage 1 to stage 4, the more resources are committed to a 
market and the higher is the resulting internationalization of the firm.  Thus, the 
internationalization of the firm can be outlined as a subsequence of phases with 
increasing market commitment as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Market…
Market D
Market C
Market B
Market A
Foreign 
production and 
sales subsidiary
Foreign sales 
subsidiary
Independent 
representatives 
(export modes)
No regular   
export     
(sporadic export)
Mode of      
operation
Market 
(country)
Increasing market commitment
Increasing internationalization
In
c
re
a
s
in
g
 g
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
 d
iv
e
s
ific
a
tio
n
FDI (foreign direct investment)
 
 
Figure 1:  Internationalization of the Firm: An Incremental Approach,  Svend Hollensen,  Global 
Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow, England:  Pearson Education 
Limited,  2001,  48. 
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     Figure 1 shows that a further commitment of resources to a market takes place in 
incremental steps.  The internationalization of the firm develops from sporadic 
exports to the actual commitment of FDI (foreign direct investment)1 to a 
market/country.  At the same time the firms diversifies into different geographical 
markets.  The process of geographical diversification and cumulative market 
commitment leads to the accretion in the internationalization of the firm (Hollensen 
49).  Eventually, firms tend to enter new markets with successively greater psychic 
distance [sic].  Johanson defines the psychic distance [sic] as “the sum of factors 
preventing the flow of information from and to the market. These include differences 
in language, education, business practices, culture and industrial development.” 
(Hansson, Sundell and Öhman 10)  Thus, the less knowledge and understanding a 
firm has of a market, the greater is the psychic distance [sic].  Consequently, the 
more knowledge a firm acquires of a market, the less the psychic distance [sic].  
     Johanson and Vahlne make a distinction between state and change aspects of 
internationalization.  While the state aspects of internationalization are market 
commitment and market knowledge, the change aspects are current business 
activities and commitment decisions.   State aspects and change aspects influence 
and affect each other since market commitment and market knowledge affect 
commitment decisions and business activities, and vice versa (Johanson and Vahlne 
11).  The results are causal cycles.  The model by Johanson and Vahlne described 
in Figure 2, therefore, helps to explain why companies entering markets tend to go 
through a process of 4 stages as described in Figure 1. Because of the 
interdependence between state and change aspects, the firm enters markets in 
                                            
 
1 Definitions:  
1. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the movement of capital across national frontiers in a manner 
that grants the investor control over the acquired asset. Thus it is distinct from portfolio investment 
which may cross borders, but does not offer such control. Firms which source FDI are known as 
‘multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) (Wikipedia, Foreign Direct Investment). 
2. [Foreign] Direct investment is a category of international investment made by a resident entity in 
one economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). ”Lasting interest” 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a 
significant degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the direct investment 
enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all 
subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated 
and unincorporated (OECD, Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions 2). 
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successive steps as postulated by the internationalization model of Johanson and 
Vahlne.  
 
Market
knowledge
Market
commitment
Commitment
decisions
Current
activities
State aspects Change aspects
 
 
Figure 2: The Internationalisation Process of the Firm,  Jan Johanson, and Jan-Erik Vahlne,  
"The Mechanism of Internationalism,"  International Marketing Review:  Emerald,  1990,  11, 
Vol. 7,  12. 
 
     The market commitment of a firm consists of the amount of resources the firm 
commits to the market and the degree of commitment to the market.  The resources 
can be the investment in the market (personnel, organization, marketing) while the 
commitment is the costs attached to finding a different market and transferring the 
resources there.  In other words, the more difficult it is to find alternative uses for the 
resources and the more specialized these resources are to a market, the higher the 
commitment is (Hansson, Sundell and Öhman 12). 
     Johanson and Vahlne differentiate between objective knowledge and experiential 
knowledge (12).  While objective knowledge can be taught and transferred from one 
person to another, experiential knowledge can only be acquired through personal 
experience.  Thus, experiential knowledge acquired in a market generates business 
opportunities and is, consequently, a driving force in the internationalization process 
of the firm as it is moving from one stage (as described above) to another one and, 
thus, commits more resources to the specific market.  But, as the experience is 
gained in one country, the acquired experience is country-specific and, therefore, is 
not easily transferable to other countries (Johanson and Vahlne 12).  Thus, the 
internationalization process of the firm takes place in incremental steps in each 
country. 
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     However, there are three exceptions to the assumption that further market 
commitment takes place in small steps (Johanson and Vahlne 12):   
(1) Firms with large resources are willingly to take larger internationalization steps 
as the consequences of further committing resources are small 
(2) Stable and homogenous market conditions allow market knowledge to be 
developed or acquired in other ways than through experience 
(3) Firms with extensive knowledge about similar markets and market conditions 
might be able to deduce the experience to apply it to the specific market. 
     One characteristic of the internationalization model is that the firm is viewed as “a 
loosely coupled system in which different actors in the firm have different interests 
and ideas concerning the development of the firm.” (Johanson and Vahlne 12)  
Hence, the actors who are actively engaged in the foreign market might see the 
problems and opportunities in the market and act on their own.  Johanson and 
Vahlne conclude, that “the internationalization process, once it has started, will tend 
to proceed regardless of whether strategic decisions in that direction are made or 
not.” (12) 
     In conclusion, the internationalization process model of Johanson and Vahlne can 
explain two patterns in the internationalization process of the firm.  First, it offers an 
assertion of how firms engage in a foreign market and walk through the different 
stages of committing more and more resources to the firm’s foreign activities.  Thus, 
the evolving of the specific country/market activities in a chain with subsequent 
increase of resources to the market can be illustrated.  Second, the model explains 
how firms increasingly enter markets with bigger psychic distance [sic].  Psychic 
distance [sic], as has been defined above, refers to the difference/distance between 
the foreign market and the home market in terms of difference in language, culture 
and business practices (Johanson and Vahlne 13). 
     The internationalization model of Johanson and Vahlne has been criticized for the 
deterministic nature of the model.  Reid asserts that the model is actually rigid and 
inflexible because according to the internationalization school, a firm can only enter a 
market in a sequence of market entry modes accelerating market commitment.  
Reid, Turnbull and Rosson assert that the firm still has the option of making a 
strategic choice as to modes of entry and expansion.  Reid states that market 
conditions influence the process, and that the transaction cost model is superior in 
explaining diversity and variations in the internationalization behavior of firms.  Also, 
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according to Forsgre, the model limits the focus on the early stages of the 
internationalization of the firm.  On the contrary, multinational firms with operations in 
several countries can respond to real market conditions and access previous 
experience and, therefore, do not have to cope with uncertainties and unknowns 
common to firms in the early internationalization stages (Johanson and Vahlne 14). 
     Further criticism is directed at the lack of considering the interdependences 
between different country markets.  Also, due to the globalization of the international 
markets and activities of the firms, Nordström states, “the world has become a much 
more homogeneous and that consequently psychic distance [sic] has decreased.” 
(Johanson and Vahlne 15)  Therefore, the value of psychic distance [sic] as a 
parameter of the internationalization process model would have decreased.   
     Mattsson argues that this “model leaves us without means to analyze a situation 
where the firm already is highly internationalized.” (Merger Waves)  As a result, the 
subsequent question of international integration of activities becomes critical for the 
firm’s internationalization process.  Further international integration takes place via 
mergers & acquisitions (M&A).  Greenfield investments and internal growth are not 
the preferred mode of internationalization anymore.  Finally, the internationalized firm 
can also undergo substantial internationalization processes in which situations, 
environments and actors change.  Consequently, an “embedded” approach as 
discussed by Johanson and Mattsson (“Internationalization in Industrial Systems”) 
and Mattsson (“Dynamics of Overlapping Networks”) is needed (Mattsson Merger 
Waves). 
     Hence, the criticism directed at the internationalization process model is mainly 
aimed at the lack of relevance for already internationalized firms due to the rigidness 
and inflexibility of the stage-based subsequent market entrance model.  The network 
model building upon the Uppsala school, described below, offers an alternative 
theoretical framework for the internationalization of the firm.   
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1.1.2 The Network Model 
     According to Johanson and Mattsson, “in industrial systems, firms are engaged in 
production, distribution, and use of goods and services. We describe such systems 
as networks of relationships among firms. There is a division of work in a network 
that means that firms are dependent on each other.” ("Interorganizational Relations“ 
34)  Each firm has relationships with customers, distributors, suppliers, etc. in this 
network and, through indirect relations, also with other firms which represent the 
supplier’s supplier, customer or competitor.  Networks are stable as well as changing 
since transactions tend to take place in the framework of established relationships, 
and new relationships are established by chance or old relationships are disrupted 
(Johanson and Mattsson, "Interorganizational Relations“ 35).  Thus, each firm is a 
member of a network in which transactions are conducted within the framework of 
established relationship and the firm has indirect access to other firm’s networks via 
the original firm’s network. 
     Complementarity of resources is important in networks since the firms depend on 
each other in the network and interfirm dependence is created.  Through the 
exchange of goods and services with other members of the firm’s network, the 
company is “operating in the network in which it is engaged.” (Johanson and 
Mattsson, "Interorganizational Relations“ 36)  One of the basic assumptions of the 
network model is that a firm is dependent on the external resources controlled by 
other firms and gets access to those external resources through the firm’s network 
position.  The position in the network determines the access of the firm to other firm’s 
internal assets. The access becomes a market asset to the firm and allows the firm 
to generate revenue (Johanson and Mattsson, "Interorganizational Relations“ 36).  
     Johanson and Vahlne assert that “foreign market or network entry of the firm may 
very well be the result of interaction initiatives taken by other firms which are insiders 
in the network in the specific country.” (19)  Because a network might be extended 
far beyond country borders, the “international extension of these networks has strong 
implication for the internationalization of the firm.” (Johanson and Vahlne 19)  Thus, 
in the framework of the network model, internationalization takes place due to the 
place of a firm in the firm’s network and the networks of other firms which are 
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participants of the firm’s original network.  These networks may extend beyond any 
national borders and, thus, accelerate the internationalization of the firm.  
    Coviello and Martin found support for the proposition by Johanson and Vahlne in a 
study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by determining that the major 
demand for internationalization of a firm stemmed from the networks of relationships.  
The formal and informal, technical and social networks the firm possesses and is 
able to access drove the internationalization of the SMEs.  The firms in the study did 
not undertake expansion in order to, for example, reap benefits of economies of 
scale.  On the contrary, “the choice of initial and subsequent market(s) was driven 
mainly by the location of clients and network contacts.” (Coviello and Martin 50,53)  
Furthermore, firms are more or less forced to follow their clients and competitors 
abroad (Finkelstein 1).  Thus, the internationalization and subsequent market entry in 
a foreign country is due to established contacts in the framework of the firm’s 
network and not traceable to managerial decisions about, for example, economies of 
scale or attractiveness of a certain market. 
     The network model helps to explain why firms do not follow-through the process-
model as posited by the internationalization school (Uppsala model) as described 
above in this chapter.  Firms increase the firm’s internationalization capabilities by 
hiring people with knowledge of foreign market and by maintaining relationships with 
other companies that are internationally active.  By using the networks and 
capabilities of the employees, the firm is able to leap-frog stages of the 
internationalization process.  The network model, thus, expands and partly rejects 
the internationalization model as postulated by Johanson and Vahlne (Coviello and 
Martin 58).  Coviello and Martin conclude that “networks of formal and informal 
relationships are a major influence on internationalization” and “[…]the choice of 
entry mode also is strongly influenced by network relationships in the form of client 
preferences and often, the formal client-service provider exchange relationship 
emerges from the firms’ informal and formal networks.” (Coviello and Martin 59) 
     The findings by Coviello and Martin are supported by Jones who found that in her 
study the firms usually acquired business from outside links.  The inward contacts, 
as Jones states, could come at random intervals with great varying breaks between 
them, but ultimately lead to the establishment of links between the home firm and the 
foreign firm; eventually accelerating the internationalization of the home firm.  Jones 
argues that the establishment of inward links with overseas firms is quite common 
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and that the firm has to identify the links which will most likely contribute to the 
international expansion of the firm.  The network links identified to contribute the 
most to the internationalization of the firm are accelerating the internationalization of 
the firm by offering business in foreign countries, on the international or global level.  
Networking is, thus, one of the most important tools and driving forces in the move of 
firms towards internationalization (Jones 27-28,37).  
     Bell also criticizes the linear internationalization model by Johanson and Vahlne 
as being inappropriate for SMEs and the dynamic, complex and frequently non-linear 
behavior regularly found among SMEs (Bell 72).  The network approach to 
internationalization puts the focus on exchanging transactions and gaining mutual 
knowledge and trust and the resulting commitment between the international actors 
(Bell 62).  A network model is, therefore, a more appropriate approach to the 
internationalization of SMEs. 
     In conclusion, “international expansion is a process by which network positions 
are established and changed” and, thus, the internationalization process of the firm 
towards a multinational company2 (MNC) enables the firm “to effectively ‘externalize’ 
some of its activities without losing control of its crucial intangible assets.” (Coviello 
and Martin 47) In effect, the network allows the company to choose from the whole 
range of possible entry modes without having to step through the different phases of 
the internationalization process first, as asserted by the Uppsala school.  The mutual 
reliance and trust of the network’s members towards other network members 
ensures stability in the network and minimizes possible risks for members when 
entering foreign markets by offering network members’ resources to the entering 
network member.  The network models, therefore, offers an explanation why some 
firms do not follow the stage-model of the Uppsala school and accommodates the 
criticism of the internationalization model voiced by Reid et al.  That is why “the 
concept of a network, both as a metaphor and in terms of the tools and techniques of 
analysis it provides, reflects the nature and complexity of the multinational 
                                            
 
2 Definition of a MNC: First, the firm must be significantly involved in international business having 
permanent operations in two or more countries; and second, the capacity for central control of foreign 
operations must exist (Fayerweather 2-3). The terms multinational corporation (MNC) or multinational 
enterprise (MNE) or transnational corporation (TNC) or multinational organization (MNO) are used 
interchangeably in this regard (Wikipedia, Multinational Corporation). 
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organization and can provide a useful lens through which to examine this entity.” 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett 79) 
 
1.1.3 The Eclectic Paradigm      
     The eclectic paradigm was first developed by Dunning in 1976.  The eclectic 
paradigm strives to offer a holistic framework for the identification and evaluation of 
the significance of the initial foreign production by firms and the growth of such 
productions.  The idea of the eclectic paradigm is to offer an explanation of 
transnational activities by drawing upon several strands of economic theory and to 
show that “foreign direct investment is just one of a number of possible channels of 
international economic involvement, each of which is determined by a number of 
common factors.” (Dunning 1)  The eclectic paradigm states that the extent, form 
and pattern of international production are determined by a set of three advantages 
as discerned by the firm.  In other words, the firm’s decision to expand and produce 
internationally is dependent on a set of three advantages available to the firm.  
Dunning differentiates between ownership-specific advantages, internationalization 
advantages and locational advantages (Dunning 2).  
     Ownership-specific advantages in regard to internationalization can be broken 
down into three different kinds of advantages.  First, advantages which derive from 
the exclusive possession or access to valuable assets.  Second, those deriving from 
being a branch plant of a multinational firm instead of being a totally new-set up 
business.  And third, from the geographical diversification, i.e. from being a 
multinational firm itself.   Dunning elaborates the ownership-specific advantages 
further to distinguish between asset and transaction advantages of multinational 
enterprises.  While advantages arising from proprietary access to assets refer to 
structural market distortions, transactional advantages stem from the skill of the 
enterprise to lessen transactional costs by a common governance of the assets from 
different countries.  The advantages stem out of structural on the one hand, and 
transactional market imperfections, on the other hand.  In conclusion, for a firm to 
compete internationally or produce in another country, the firm “must possess certain 
advantages specific to the nature and/or nationality of their ownership.” (Dunning 2) 
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     The second paradigm states that firms will produce internationally when they can 
transfer the firm’s ownership-specific advantages across national borders within their 
organization as opposed to selling it to the foreign market or license the ownership-
specific advantages to a foreign-based firm.  In other words, if the firm can use the 
advantages inherit to the firm in the home-country, transfer it to another country and 
generate a higher return on its investment compared to selling its products to the 
host market (export) or a local enterprise to resell it (license), the firm will choose to 
internationalize production.  The decision rests also on the perceived costs of 
transactional failures, such as protection of property rights and quality of products.  
The higher the perceived costs of transactional failure, the more probable the 
venturing firm is going to exploit its competitive advantages by internalizing the 
production versus a contractual arrangement with a foreign-based enterprise.  Thus, 
according to the eclectic paradigm, the firm will favor producing internationally as 
opposed to entering contractual arrangements when it is more profitable to 
internalize these advantages in international production than to sell or license the 
rights to these advantages to a foreign enterprise (Dunning 3). 
     Locational advantages are the third strand of the eclectic paradigm.  A firm will 
choose to produce internationally when the firm can combine its ownership-specific 
advantages with the immobile factors available in the host country.  The decision to 
produce internationally and take advantage of resources available in the host country 
is, thus, not independent of the ownership-specific advantages, structural or 
transactional, a firm enjoys.  It must be to the advantage of the firm to move the 
production (at least partially) to the host country to take advantage of the available 
resources.  Furthermore, transacting business internationally can even be seen as 
enhancing the ownership-specific advantages of the firm since not all firms can 
generate, transfer and sustain their advantages internationally (Dunning 4). 
     In conclusion, the eclectic paradigm of Dunning offers a possible explanation of 
the internationalization of firms.  The three parameters of the eclectic paradigm, 
ownership-specific, locational and internationalization advantages can be used to 
determine the merits of international production for a firm.  The interdependency of 
ownership-specific advantages, whether the advantages can be traced to structural 
or transactional market imperfections, with international and locational advances 
underlines the holistic approach of the eclectic paradigm.  Dunning offers an 
explanation of the internationalization of firms by stating that “a combination of the 
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resource requirements of particular economic activities, their geographical 
disposition, and the transfer costs of their output, helps to explain some of the 
operations of [multinational enterprises] MNEs.” (Dunning 6) 
     A comparison of the internationalization model of the Uppsala school and the 
eclectic paradigm shows that the approach of the two models is different.  The 
eclectic paradigm postulates the international production in countries where the firm 
can put it advantages to use.  The internationalization model predicts the entering of 
neighboring countries due to psychic distance [sic], and the future involvement 
extends to more distant countries.  The internationalization models, thus, postulates 
a market entry not based on the utilizing of advantages, but on physical and psychic 
distance [sic] (Johanson and Vahlne 17). 
      On the one hand, the internationalization model uses one variable for the 
explanation of the international expansion of the firm, i.e. the firm’s knowledge.  The 
eclectic paradigm, on the other hand, “has the objective of giving a full-fledged 
explanation of the firm’s foreign operation, thereby relying on all relevant explanatory 
factors.” (Johanson and Vahlne 17)  As has been discussed above, the 
internationalization models focuses on an incremental approach to 
internationalization and, thus, explains best the actions of the firm when the present 
internationalization of the firm is low.  The eclectic paradigm has is of high value for 
the analysis of firms that already gained experience in international markets 
(Johanson and Vahlne 17).   
     The main difference between the two models lies with the concept of transaction 
costs.  While the internationalization model recognizes the change of transaction 
costs over time (due to experience gained) through the incremental approach to 
internationalization, the eclectic paradigm assumes that “the decision makers 
involved are rational and well-informed right from the start of the internationalization 
process.” (Johanson and Vahlne 18)  In conclusion, the internationalization model is, 
thus, more dynamic in nature, while the eclectic paradigm is basically static 
(Johanson and Vahlne 18). 
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1.1.4 Dimensions of Internationalization 
     Based on the different models for the choice of internationalization, i.e. the 
eclectic paradigm, the Uppsala model, and the network model, the firm has to 
consider the dimensions of internationalization and their effect on the firm’s 
organizational capacity.  The organization of the firm has to adjust to the 
internationalization of its capacity and capabilities.  Figure 3 describes the different 
dimensions of internationalization.   
 
Foreign operation 
methods
Organizational capacity
Finance
PersonnelOrganizational 
structure
Sales objects Markets
International skills 
and experience; 
training
Export department, 
international division
Where:
Political/cultural/
physical distance 
differerences
What:
Goods, services, 
know-how, 
systems
How: Agents, subsidiaries,
franchising, management   
contracts
 
 
Figure 3:  Dimensions of Internationalization,  Svend Hollensen,  Global Marketing: A Market-
Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow, England:  Pearson Education Limited,  2001,  50. 
 
     Figure 3 illustrates that, for example, the personnel department has to add 
international skills and experience to its human resources, i.e. train its employees in 
doing business internationally.  The organizational structure should possibly include 
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an export department which is also determined by the foreign operation method, for 
example, subsidiaries or franchising.  The market has to be analyzed and the sales 
objectives and, thus, the goods and services to be sold as well as the price for the 
product in that market, have to be determined (Hollensen 50).  Consequently, the 
different dimensions of internalization affect the organization of the firm and lead to 
adjustment of organizational capabilities and capacities.  In conclusion, the 
internationalization of the firm according to the Uppsala-model takes place in 
incremental steps while the network model emphasizes the role of relationships in 
the internationalization of the firm.  The eclectic paradigm explains 
internationalization with the propensity of firms to use the firm’s unique set of 
advantages.  Regardless which internationalization theory is being considered, the 
different dimensions of internationalization of the firm affect the organizational 
structure and the choice of market entry mode.  The firm has to decide on the right 
market entrance form in order to successfully compete in international markets.  
Without choosing the right market entrance form, the company is not able to 
successfully compete in foreign markets and, therefore, the wrong choice might 
impede the expansion of the firm for years to come. 
 
 
1.2 An Introduction to the Choice of Market Entry Mode 
 
     The globalization of businesses has led to an increase in the entrance of foreign 
competitors into the home market of businesses.  In fact, foreign companies now 
account for a major part of the gross domestic product in all major industrialized 
countries (Bennett and Blythe 9).  While foreign companies might enter the home 
market of a firm, the internet and the internationalization of services, such as 
advertising and market research services, have at the same time made it easier for a 
firm to respond by also conducting business internationally and, thus, for the firm to 
“visit and examine foreign markets, to select the best locations for operations and 
thereafter to control international activities.” (Bennett and Blythe 9)  According to 
Bennet and Blythe, there a several reasons why a business would venture abroad 
and enter foreign markets (8-9): 
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 Economies of scale and scope3 
 Existence of lucrative markets abroad 
 Saturated markets in the home country 
 Response to incoming competitive activity 
 New product development can be extremely costly, thus, an international 
perspective on developing and selling products has to be adopted 
 Gain high turnover from international sales 
 Less competition in foreign market 
 Risk dispersion by investing in more than one country 
 More attractive consumer groups in foreign market than in home market  
     In general, foreign markets offer a business the opportunity to maximize profits or 
minimize/spread costs and risk by abandoning the sole dependence on the home 
market and take advantage of the growth of foreign markets and, therefore, 
strengthen the business’ competitiveness.  Furthermore, companies may go abroad 
“to match the international market entry of a domestic rival (the ’bandwagon effect’).” 
(Root 1)  Due to the increasing internationalization of firms and, thus, the 
globalization of whole industries, businesses nowadays have to plan for growth and 
survival in a world of global competition.  Therefore, Root states, “to prosper in the 
future, every firm will have to become competitive in global terms, whether it remains 
at home or goes abroad.”(2) 
     The foreign market entry strategy compromises of 5 decisions the company has 
to make. The decisions required are (Root 3): 
(1) Choice of target product/market 
(2) Objectives and goals in the target market 
(3) Choice of entry mode 
(4) Marketing plan 
(5) Control system 
      The company has to arrive at a decision in regard to each of the above 
mentioned points in order to have a comprehensive and elaborately planned 
international market entry strategy.  Depending on the chosen product and the 
                                            
 
3 Economies of scale are reductions in unit production costs resulting from large-scale operations. 
Economies of scope are unit cost reductions resulting from a firm undertaking a wide range of 
activities, and hence being able to provide common services and inputs useful for each activity 
(Bennet and Blythe 12). 
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objectives of the company in the target market, the company will choose a specific 
entry mode. The company will develop a suitable marketing plan and install a proper 
control system to evaluate the success in the foreign market and oversee the 
company’s operation (Root 3).  There are numerous aspects to be considered in 
regard to the international market entry strategy, but this dissertation chooses to 
focus on the choice of market entry mode for a foreign market as the single most 
important item of the international market entry strategy because of the disastrous 
consequences misconceived market entrances can have on the future international 
expansion of firms.  If a firm does not plan and execute the market entrance in the 
international markets properly, the firm will suffer from competitive disadvantages 
resulting from the choice of the wrong market entry mode, not be able to employ firm 
specific advantages and squander opportunities offered by doing business in 
international markets. 
      Root originally divides all market entry modes into two different categories.  The 
first category is export while the second category refers to the transfer of resources 
in technology, capital and human skills to the foreign market.  Resources available in 
the foreign market might be partially combined with firm’s resources to manufacture 
products for sale in the foreign markets.  The transfer entry mode is further 
differentiated into contractual and investment entry modes.  Root classifies the entry 
modes as illustrated in Table 1: 
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Sole venture: new 
establishment
Sole venture: acquisition
Joint Venture: new 
establishment/acquisition
Other
Licensing
Franchising
Technical Agreement
Service Contracts
Management Contracts
Construction/turnkey projects
Contract manufacture
Technical agreements
Service agreements
Co-production agreements
Other
Indirect
Direct agent/distributor
Direct branch/subsidiary
Other
Investment Entry ModesContractual Entry ModesExport Entry Modes
 
 
Table 1:  Classification of Entry Modes,  compiled from  Franklin R. Root,  Entry Strategies for 
International Markets,  Massachusetts:  Lexington Books,  1987,  6. 
     The transfer entry mode (contractual entry modes and investment entry modes) 
can consist of entry modes such as service contracts and contract manufacture with 
little or zero investment costs which, therefore, can be classified as contractual entry 
mode.  Additionally, the transfer market entry can also take place through an 
acquisition or the new establishment of a venture.  An acquisition or a new 
establishment requires the company to invest substantial sums into the foreign 
market and, hence, is classified as investment entry mode4. The choice of entry 
mode is a complex decision which is influenced by a number of often conflicting 
factors and also leads to a number of trade-offs between different options (Root 6-9). 
 
                                            
 
4 A comprehensive overview of the different market entry mode options is offered in chapter 1.4 
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1.2.1 Factors Influencing the Choice of Market Entry Mode 
     Each market entry strategy is influenced by internal and external factors.  
External factors include (Root 8-12; Bennett and Blythe 59, 195): 
 characteristics of the foreign market, for example, size of the market; local 
restrictions on setting up foreign-owned businesses 
 target country environmental factors, for example, geographic and cultural 
distance  
 target country production factors, for example, quality and amount of raw 
materials available and  
 home country characteristics, for example, the competitiveness of the 
business in the local market. 
Internal factors, such as 
 the chosen product and its specifics 
 the level of financial commitment and resources 
 intangible resources, for example, company’s experience and expertise in 
operating and selling abroad. 
 Internal and external factors play a significant and interdependent role when 
deciding which entry strategy to choose. 
     The environmental factors of the target country influence both the target country 
production factors as well as the target country market factors.  These three factors 
together with the home country factors are external factors while product 
characteristics and resource/commitment factors of the company are internal factors.  
The basic model of factors influencing the choice of entry modes by Root are 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4:  Factors in the Entry Mode Decision,  Franklin R. Root,  Entry Strategies for 
International Markets,  Massachusetts:  Lexington Books,  1987,  9. 
 
     The basic model by Root is expanded by Hollensen who adds another two factors 
that influence the entry mode decision.  The factors are desired mode characteristics 
and transaction-specific behavior (Hollensen 236).  Figure 5 displays the factors 
affecting the choice of foreign market entry mode taking into account the internal and 
external factors, as well as the desired mode characteristics and the transaction-
specific factors. 
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Figure 5:  Factors Affecting the Foreign Market Entry Mode Decision,  Svend Hollensen,  
Global Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow, England:  Pearson 
Education Limited,  2001,  236. 
 
     Figure 5 shows the interaction between the product, internal factors, desired 
mode characteristics, transaction-specific factors and external factors and the effect 
of these variables on the entry mode decision.  Each item of the variables influences 
the entry mode decision positively towards increasing the internationalization of the 
firm while a minus indicates the negative effect on the internationalization and leads 
to increasing externalization.  Internal and external factors have been illustrated at 
the beginning of this section.  Product variables include the complexity of the product 
and the product differentiation advantage.  If a market cannot provide the same 
product due to product complexity, the internationalization of the firm increases.  The 
same holds true for advantages gained from differentiating the product.  
     Desired mode characteristics compromise of the characteristics risk averse, 
control and flexibility.  If the company and its leaders show a risk-averse behavior, 
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then the company will probably choose export modes, such as direct and indirect 
exporting.  If the company considers the level of control over the operation to be 
important, then it will probably choose a mode with substantial commitment and 
control of resources, for example, a wholly-owned subsidiary.  Finally, the flexibility 
of the chosen mode of entry is to be considered. If the market is fast in nature, 
hierarchical modes, though the least costly of the available operating modes, are too 
inflexible.  Hierarchical modes, i.e. modes in which transactions are mainly 
conducted internally, incur low transaction costs.  Hierarchical modes are at 
disadvantages in fast-changing markets as hierarchical modes are too slow and 
inflexible to adapt to a changing market.  Intermediate modes, such as joint ventures 
restrict the options a company has when circumstances in the market are changing 
quickly (Hollensen 240).  Thus, other options such as contractual and exporting entry 
modes are recommended. 
     Transaction-specific factors include tacit nature of know-how which refers to the 
difficulty of transferring know-how when the transfer is tacitly transmitted.  The 
difficulty of transmitting tacit knowledge favors hierarchical modes for conducting 
transactions.  The frequency of the transaction, the uncertainty of the transaction and 
the specificity of the asset (to be transferred) and the danger of opportunistic 
behavior and, thus, of increasing transactions cost, all point towards internalization of 
the transactions (Hollensen 236).  Transaction cost economics (TCE) can also 
provide a framework for the choice of the modus operandi5of a firm as the firm is an 
organization in which regular transactions between different participants 
(departments, employees, functions) are conducted.  Thus, the following chapter 
discusses TCE as a framework for the modus operandi of the firm. 
 
                                            
 
5 Definition of the term modus operandi: manner of operating (Webster’s Online Dictionary) 
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1.2.2 The Transaction Cost Theory – based Approach to the Choice 
of Modus Operandi of the Firm 
     Each business has to decide in which manner the firm wants to conduct business 
and, eventually, weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each modus operandi 
and its characteristics with regard to the foreign market entry.  The transaction cost 
model can help in choosing the right entry and operating mode for the foreign market 
because the conceptual framework of TCE provides an adequate tool to describe 
and analyze business transactions by and within the firm.   
     The transaction cost model is based on the observations and findings of Coase.  
Coase asserts that “a firm will tend to expand until the cost of organizing an extra 
transaction within the firm will become equal to the cost of carrying out the same 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market.” (395)  The enterprise 
has to determine whether it is more efficient to organize the transaction/exchanges 
within the firm rather than outsourcing the transaction to the market.  In other words, 
when a firm can produce or transact business within the firm more cheaply, the firm 
internalizes those transactions.  If, on the other hand, the market can offer services 
and products at a lower price than would be possible by transacting business within 
the firm, then the firm will rely on the market to perform the transaction.  The 
described model only applies to the perfect world in which there is perfect 
competition and the costs of operating in the markets would be zero.  However, in 
the real world there are frictions between buyer and seller which result in transaction 
costs6.  Thus, transaction costs also inhibit costs for the failure of markets. In order to 
reduce transaction costs, the firm internalizes transactions, i.e. integrates 
transactions vertically.  Subsequently, a relation between transaction costs and 
structural decisions can be established (Dusage and Garette 35; Hollensen 53).   
                                            
 
6  A comprehensive definition of transaction cost is given by Webster’s Online Dictionary: 
     In economics and related disciplines, a transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic 
exchange. For example, most people, when buying or selling a stock, must pay a commission to their 
broker; that commission is a transaction cost of doing the stock deal. Or consider buying a banana 
from a store; to purchase the banana, your costs will be not only the price of the banana itself, but 
also the energy and effort it requires to travel from your house to the store and back, and the time 
waiting in line, and the effort of the paying itself; the costs above and beyond the cost of the banana 
as the transaction costs. When rationally evaluating a potential transaction, it is important not to 
neglect transaction costs that might prove significant (Definition of Transaction Cost). 
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      Transaction costs consist of different kinds of costs in relation to the relationship 
between buyer and seller.  The transaction cost analysis (TCA) framework gives the 
following equation for the composition of transaction costs (Hollensen 53): 
 
Transaction cost =  Ex ante costs + Ex post costs = (search costs + contracting  
costs) + (monitoring costs + enforcement costs). 
 
     Ex ante costs include search costs and contracting costs. Search costs are all 
costs relating to the cost of gathering information to identify and evaluate potential 
export intermediaries.  These search costs can be prohibitive for especially distant 
markets, for example, for China and Germany.  Other search costs, for example, for 
Germany and France, might be more acceptable.  Contracting costs refer to the 
costs incurred through negotiations and the writing of the contract between seller 
and buyer (Hollensen 53-54). 
     Ex post costs include the costs for monitoring the agreement and the 
enforcement cost for the actual enforcement of the contract.  The monitoring costs 
are all costs incurred by controlling and monitoring if the buyer and seller fulfill their 
contractual obligations.  The enforcement costs are costs associated with the 
punishment/sanctioning of the buyer or seller who does not fulfill its contractual 
obligations (Hollensen 54).  Here, an example for the equation is given.  
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Search costs for German company to find information for Chinese market: 1000
Search costs for German company to find information for French market: 150
Contracting costs with Chinese partner: 500 (due to barriers in culture and language)
Contracting costs with French partner: 200
Monitoring costs for the Chinese partner: 1500
Monitoring costs for the French partner: 500 (closer geographical proximity)
Enforcement costs for Chinese partner: 2000 (legal systems unreliable, thus, high costs for 
punishment and sanctioning to be expected)
Enforcement costs for French partner: 200 (EU legal system applies, easy to punish non-
fulfilling partner)
TCA-Equation: (Ex-ante costs) + (Ex-post costs) = transaction costs
(Search costs + contracting cost) + (monitoring costs + enforcement costs) = transaction costs
Germany-China: 1000 + 1500 + 500 + 2000 = 5000
Germany-France: 200 + 150 + 500 + 200 = 1050
 
 
Table 2:  Example for TCA Analysis for seller-buyer relationship Germany and China compared 
to Germany and France. 
 
     Hence, applying the TCA framework in the example given in Table 2, the 
transactions costs for the market entrance of a German business in France are 
significantly cheaper compared to a possible market entrance in China because of 
closer geographical and cultural proximity as well as common EU legal legislation. 
     The underlying principle of the TCA/TCE framework is that each enterprise strives 
to minimize the ex ante and ex post costs in order to minimize the transaction costs.  
Williamson argues that hierarchical (internal) organizations and the markets are 
alternatives for executing transactions while the “object is to assign transactions to 
markets and hierarchies so as to achieve a most preferred (usually least cost) result, 
where this is judged principally in terms of transactions costs.” (Williamson 369)  
Therefore, externalization (markets) and internalization can be, for example, equated 
with intermediaries, such as agents or contract partners who are market-instruments; 
and wholly-owned subsidiaries which are instruments for performing transactions 
internally.  Hence, Williamson provides a framework for the internationalization of the 
firm and the chosen mode of operation.  Figure 6 depicts the TCA model for the 
choice of the internationalization mode.  
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Figure 6:  The TCA Model for Choice of ‘Internationalization Mode’,  Svend Hollensen,  Global 
Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow, England:  Pearson Education 
Limited,  2001,  55. 
 
     Figure 6 shows the TCA model and requires some explanation in terms of 
definitions and meaning of the model.  The plus and minus symbols illustrate the 
correlation between each variable and ultimately between the variables and the 
internationalization mode of the firm.  Bounded rationality refers to the fact that the 
participants in a transaction have most of the time incomplete information due to the 
limited ability of human beings to process information (Williamson 370-371).  
Adverse selection and morale hazard are the result of bounded rationality which 
affects both participants in the transaction.  Adverse selection refers to the 
impossibility of making ex-ante decisions about the participant in the transaction and 
the fact that if the one of the participants in the transaction would be likely to, for 
example, fail to pay the agreed sum, the participant would not disclose so 
beforehand.  Moral hazard refers to costs incurring due to careless or negligent 
compliance of one party in regard to the object of the transaction or of willful 
misreporting of negligent behavior of the first party (Williamson 370-371). Thus, the 
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participants, in order to protect themselves from opportunistic behavior, take 
measures to safeguard themselves in the transaction.  The act of safeguarding 
results in an increase in transaction costs.  
     Small number bargaining is given whenever there is intense competition on either 
the buyer or the seller’s side and an oligopoly exists on the other side.  Small 
number bargaining increases the threat of opportunistic behavior by the oligopolist, 
thus, increasing transaction costs (Williamson 373-374, Hollensen 54-55).  The free-
riding potential concerns especially firms which invest heavily in brand promotion 
and whose brands are damaged by a new entrant’s brand.  The new entrant copies 
the firm’s brand closely and uses the firm’s brand popularity without sharing in the 
costs of brand-maintenance and, thus, profits from the established brand for free 
(Hollensen 55). 
     The transaction characteristics, includes the transaction frequency and the 
transaction specific assets.  Transaction specific assets are investments in assets 
which have been undertaken especially for this transaction, for example, training 
people or special equipment.  The transaction frequency refers to the total 
recurrence of the transaction in the same manner as at the first time. Transaction 
specific assets and the transaction frequency are key determinants of transactions 
costs.  The internal and external uncertainty surrounding the transaction bars the 
drafting of a comprehensive contract which includes all possible situations and 
events.  Therefore, the threat of opportunistic behavior from the transaction partner 
is imminent to the other side (Dusage and Garette 36; Hollensen 55-56).  
     Figure 6 shows that the firm has to protect itself against opportunistic behavior 
and, thus, determines the costs for the transaction by taking into account the 
transaction specific assets, the transaction frequency, external uncertainty, internal 
uncertainty and symmetrical information.  A positive relation (as illustrated by a plus-
sign) of the determinants of the TCA model means that, for example, an increase in 
safeguarding leads to an equal increase in transaction cost.  Based on the equation 
given at the beginning of this part of the section, the total transaction costs are then 
determined (as demonstrated in an example in Table 2) and the appropriate 
internationalization mode is chosen.  Table 3 gives an overview about the 
appropriate modes of market entry operation assigned to each possible combination 
of transaction frequency and asset/investment specificity. 
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Table 3:  The Characteristics of the Transaction Determine the International Governance 
Structure,  Svend Hollensen,  Global Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  
Harlow, England:  Pearson Education Limited,  2001,  57. 
 
     It is the organizational setting in which the transaction takes place that is relevant 
for the choice of the market entry mode of the company.  The organizational setting 
determines the extent of transactions taking place within and outside of the firm and, 
therefore, determines the transaction costs.  The organizational setting is ultimately 
the chosen mode of entry and operation in the foreign market.  Due to bounded 
rationality, resulting moral hazard and adverse selection, opportunism is a credible 
threat to the transaction which results in higher transaction costs.  Thus, the 
transaction has to be organized in such a way as to attenuate opportunism and 
promote a stable transaction.  The firm is a device for economizing on the 
transaction costs that are incurred by the opportunism and uncertainty of the 
transaction (Williamson 370).  Thus, “hierarchical modes of organization supplant 
market modes in each instance in the degree to which they serve to economize on 
bounded rationality and attenuate the exercise of opportunism.” (Williamson 371) 
     As has been shown above, the Transaction Cost theory makes a valuable 
contribution to the choice of the entry mode because it offers a possible framework 
for the choice of the modus operandi of the firm in a foreign market.  “The basic 
premise is that firms will internalize those activities that they can perform at a lower 
cost, but will subcontract those activities externally if other providers have a cost 
advantage.” (Pan and Tse)  In the framework of the entry mode selection, the 
objective of transaction analysis, according to Gatignon and Anderson, is “to 
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determine when high entry modes are worth their price to the entrant.” (Gannon 44)  
In markets where the transaction costs are high, entry modes with hierarchical 
governance models enhance efficiency, despite bureaucratic costs.  The choice of 
entry mode consists of a trade-off between the transaction costs associated with the 
market mode of the entry, the company’s need for control and the costs of the 
hierarchical model (Hoskisson et al. 254).  Accordingly, entry modes which offer high 
degrees of control (for example, wholly-owned subsidiaries) are appropriate entry 
modes for proprietary products or processes which are arising from know-how 
because the company wants to hold and protect the exclusive control of the 
proprietary product or process.  Lower control-modes, such as indirect and direct 
exporting are chosen for tangible products which can be valued more objectively 
(Gannon 45).  It should be noted that the transaction cost economics (TCE) has 
been criticized, for example, by Zajac and Olsen ("From Transaction Cost to 
Transactional Value Analysis") for over-emphasizing the cost minimization and 
neglecting the value creation aspect of a transaction.  The resource-based theory of 
the firm offers a solution to the problem of over-emphasis on cost-reduction and the 
neglecting of value creation of transactions by focusing on the resources and 
capabilities of the firm as first discussed by Penrose. 
 
1.2.3 The Resource-based View of the Firm Approach to the Choice 
of Modus Operandi of the Firm 
     The foundation for the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm was laid by Edith 
Penrose in 1959 who argued (24):  
A firm is more than an administrative unit; it is also a collection of productive 
resources the disposal of which between different uses and over time is 
determined by administrative decision. When we regard the function of the 
private business firm from this point of view, the size of the firm is best gauged 
by some measure of the productive resources it employs. 
     According to Barney, “a firm’s resources and capabilities include all of the 
financial, physical, human, and organizational assets used by the firm to develop, 
manufacture, and deliver products or services to its customers.” (Barney, 
"Competitive Advantage" 14)  Barney identifies 4 important indicators for the 
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resources and capabilities of the firm to generate sustained competitive advantages 
(Barney, "Competitive Advantage" 14-22): 
(1) Value 
(2) Rareness 
(3) Imperfectly Imitable 
(4) (Non) Substitutability 
     First, do the firm’s resources and capabilities add value by enabling it to exploit 
opportunities and/ or neutralize threats?  Second, how rare are the resources and 
capabilities amongst the competitors?  Third, does the firm without a resource of 
capability face a costs disadvantage in obtaining it compared to firms that already 
possess it?  Fourth, is the firm organized to exploit the full competitive potential of its 
resources and capabilities? (Barney, "Competitive Advantage" 14-22) 
     Four main differences to the transaction cost theory can be identified. First, TCE 
predicts entry modes because of failure in the external markets under the 
assumption of opportunism.  Hence, according to TCE a hierarchical entry mode is 
chosen because external markets fail to provide adequate services.  Thus, the 
company chooses to internalize the transaction in a hierarchical mode.  If the market 
can provide the desired services, the company capitalizes on the opportunity to 
externalize the transaction and let the market provide the service.  RBV attributes the 
different entry modes to the heterogeneity of resources and capabilities available to 
the firm.  Thus, the choice of an entry mode of a particular firm depends not on the 
costs and risks attached to the use of external markets and, therefore, the choice of 
hierarchical modes of entry in case of high risk, but rather on the differing resources 
and capabilities of the firm (Peng 813). 
      Second, the RBV takes a longitudinal view of the market entry process with 
multiple entries and dynamic environments in which the company learns from 
previous experiences and builds upon these experiences when deciding future 
market entry modes.  TCE rely on a relatively statistical set of conditions and focuses 
on the one-time entries in markets (Peng 813).   
     Third, TCE focuses solely on the minimization of cost in transactions while the 
RBV looks at the advantages of doing transactions with a partner.  Last but not least, 
transaction cost economics focuses on the exploitation of firm-specific advantages 
as opposed to the resource-based view which, besides focusing on the exploitation 
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of firm-specific advantages, also emphasizes the development of these resources 
through acquisitions or cooperative ventures (Madhok 48-49). 
     In regard to the resources and capabilities as competitive advantages, Barney 
differentiates between competitive advantages and sustained competitive 
advantages. A company wields a competitive advantage, “when it [the company] is 
implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by 
any current or potential competitors.” (Barney, "Firm Resources" 102)  A sustained 
competitive advantage is achieved “when it [the company] is implementing a value 
creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential 
competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this 
strategy.” (Barney, "Firm Resources" 102)  Therefore, the company has a sustained 
competitive advantage when other companies are unable to copy or implement the 
same value creating strategy, for example, a unique business process and the 
company can, thus, turn the competitive advantage into a decrease in costs, an 
increase in market share or in revenues. 
     The RBV of the firm calls on the company to seek out the resources and 
capabilities which are the company’s competitive advantages.  Grant states that 
“making money in business requires establishing and sustaining competitive 
advantage,” and that “the characteristics of a firm’s resources and capability are 
fundamental to strategic decision making and long-term success.” (192)  However, a 
competitive advantage of a firm is threatened by imitation, substitution or innovation 
through competitors and, therefore, is rather temporary than sustainable (Eschen 
and Bresser 6).  Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the resources and capabilities of 
competitors requires the firm even to generate new resources and capabilities in 
order to diminish resource deficits (Eschen and Bresser 7).  Heterogeneity of 
resources and temporary competitive advantages as well as entrepreneurial 
discovery, the ability of managers to discover resources and capabilities and turn it 
into a competitive advantage, can lead to a perceived resource gap in a firm (Eschen 
and Bresser 7-8).  Naturally, the business needs to fill the resource gap, possibly by 
entering a foreign market in order to stay competitive in both the host and the local 
market as well as to ensure the survival of the firm.  Thus, “a robust and sustainable 
advantage may require a firm to operate in different markets in order to develop 
various differing though associated capabilities, and thus benefit from the 
idiosyncratic skills rooted in the particular country.” (Madhok 42)  Therefore, the RBV 
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advocates the entrance in foreign markets if idiosyncratic resources and capabilities 
are available for the firm which can be utilized for sustained competitive advantages. 
     According to Hoffmann and Schaper-Rinkel, the “resource-based view 
recommends selecting the mode of organization that provides the best opportunity 
for sharing and transferring resources.” (134)  Applying Grant’s and Hoffmann and 
Schaper-Rinkel’s assessment to the market entry in a foreign market, it can be 
concluded that a particular entry decision cannot be viewed in isolation, but must be 
considered in relation to the overall strategic posture (Hill, Hwang and Kim 117), i.e. 
maximizing the competitive advantage of the firm’s resources and capabilities.  In the 
framework of the RBV, a company enters a market in order to access, enhance and 
develop its resources and capabilities (=close resource gap) and choose the market 
entry mode accordingly.  Therefore, “for firms seeking to enter foreign markets, a 
critical issue is whether they can apply their competitive advantages to those 
markets.” (Brown, Dev and Zhou 474)  If the firms cannot apply the competitive 
advantage to the market, then the firms have to consider whether the entrance into 
the market is justified or sensible. 
     Potential market entrants often lack knowledge about the market to turn their 
competitive advantages into an adequate return on their resources.  A collaboration 
with a local partner (whose resource is local knowledge) can fill the gap and give the 
local partner access to the entrant’s resources.  Both parties profit from their 
collaboration by increasing the likelihood of earning a greater return on their 
resources (Brown, Dev and Zhou 474).  Thus, “entrant firms choose entry modes to 
capitalize on the local partner’s capabilities.” (Brown, Dev and Zhou 475)  One of the 
disadvantages of collaboration is the diffusion of know-how that takes place in the 
collaboration.  If one business owns proprietary knowledge and the knowledge is 
diffused throughout the collaboration, then the competitive advantage is partially lost 
which leads to a decrease in the potential return on the firm’s resources.  
Furthermore, joint ventures are exposed to the high risk of conflict, for example, 
because of opportunism due to one of the partners taking advantage or exploiting 
the competitive advantages of the other partner.  Also, the different knowledge and 
resources lead to different expectations and judgment and, thus, to a much higher 
conflict potential as opposed to full integration (Eschen and Bresser 12).  The 
different resources and knowledge translate into different perceptions about the role 
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of each company in the venture as well as different goals of each company which 
sets the stage for possible escalating problems in the venture.   
     Another way to access resources and capabilities, according to the resource-
based view of the firm, is the acquisition or merger (M&A)7 with another business.  
Resources and capabilities can not easily be acquired on factor markets, are hard to 
develop internally and accessing resources through collaboration has distinctive 
disadvantages (as has been discussed above in this chapter), too.  Thus, the 
acquisition of or merging with another business gives the company the possibility to 
acquire comparatively easily entire knowledge systems with the transfer of specific, 
complex and tacit resources and capabilities.  The assets, resources and knowledge 
systems are integrated into the acquiring company and contribute to the resources 
and capabilities of the acquirer.  Of course, merging with or acquiring another 
business under the perspective of the RBV has also disadvantages. M&As are highly 
irreversible and, consequently, incur sunk costs.  Therefore, M&A are not suitable for 
transacting business or entering in a high-risk market and environment in order to 
gain access to resources because the probability of sunk costs8 is relatively high 
compared to normal markets (Eschen and Bresser 10-15).  Eschen and Bresser 
suggest 3 criterions for the appropriateness of M&A to close a resource gap (15): 
(1) These resources are of high strategic value and importance 
(2) Resources with a high distance to the existing resource-base have to be 
acquired and, last but not least 
(3) If only moderate or low environmental uncertainty exists. 
     Therefore, M&A should be used to close a perceived resource gap when the 
resources are of high strategic value to the company, and, thus essential for the 
long-term success of the company.  Additionally, resources which cannot be 
developed easily from the existing resources base are recommended to be made 
accessible through M&A.  Finally, M&A is only advisable if the risk of using M&A in 
                                            
 
7 A complete discussion on M&A is given in chapter 1.4 
8 In economics and in business decision-making, sunk costs are costs that have already been 
incurred and which cannot be recovered to any significant degree. For example, when you pre-order a 
movie ticket, the price of the ticket becomes a sunk cost. Even if you decide that you'd rather not go to 
the movie, there is no way to get back the money you originally paid and you have a sunk cost on 
your hands. This assumes, of course, that you can't simply return the movie ticket for a refund, and 
that the odds that you are able to resell the ticket are essentially zero (Dictionary.LaborLawTalk.com). 
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the certain environment is reasonable and there is a low degree of uncertainty of 
operating in that environment. 
     In conclusion, the RBV offers a possible explanation for the modus operandi of a 
firm and, thus, can be used as a framework for the choice of market entry mode.  
Overcoming the deficit of the transaction cost model which solely focuses on 
exploiting resources advances, the RBV encompasses the generation of 
advantages, too.  According to the resource-based view of the firm, a firm tries to 
leverage its resources and capabilities when entering a foreign market, possibly by 
entering a cooperation or acquiring a business.  In the next section the dissertation 
analyzes frameworks for the choice of the entry mode.  
 
 
1.3 Framework for the Choice of Entry Mode 
 
     The two theoretical approaches to the choice of market entry mode, transaction 
cost-approach and the resource-based view of the firm have been discussed above. 
Hence, a framework is needed to comprehensively and coherently integrate the 
different approaches to the internationalization and the modus operandi of a firm into 
a single outline for the decision about the right organizational mode for the foreign 
market entrance. 
 
1.3.1 The Decision Rule 
  Root suggests that there are 3 different decision rules for the selection of the right 
entry mode according to their complexity. The first is the naïve rule, the second is the 
pragmatic rule and the last is the strategy rule (159).  
     The naïve rule refers to the belief of a company and its managers that there is 
only one way to enter a market.  An example would be the statement “we only 
export” which means that the company only exports to each different market 
regardless of the specifics and characteristics of each market.  The naïve rule, thus, 
“ignores the heterogeneity of country markets and entry conditions.” (Root 159)  The 
result is that the company leaves promising markets or enters markets with an 
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inadequate kind of entry mode.  Despite learning that entering the market through 
just this one entry mode is probably not successful, the realization still does not lead 
to a change of choice in the entry mode.  Rather than adapting, the company prefers 
to leave the respective market.  The conclusion is, thus, that “the inflexibility of the 
naïve rule prevents a company from fully exploiting its foreign market opportunity.” 
(Root 160) 
     The second rule, the pragmatic rule, refers to a company starting its international 
expansion with a low-risk entry mode and continually increasing its risk exposure if 
the chosen entry mode is not workable.  Therefore, the company starts with 
exporting (low risk) and only if this entry mode is not feasible will the company 
choose another entry mode.  Because the company always keeps with the first 
workable solution, without gathering information about and evaluating other possible 
entry modes, the company receives a workable entry mode, but not the best entry 
mode for its company and the target market.  Thus, risk aversion still squanders 
opportunities because the first workable entry mode instead of the best one is 
chosen (Root 160).  
     The last decision rule is the strategy rule.  The rule calls for the choice of entry 
mode that best matches the capabilities and resources of the firm to the target 
market.  The strategy decision rule requires a systematic comparison of alternative 
modes (Root 160).  Root warns that “a comparison of alternative entry modes is also 
complicated by the need of managers to assess the advantages and disadvantages 
of each mode in terms of a company’s multiple objectives in the target market, 
objectives that are seldom fully consistent.” (161)  Such conflicting objectives can be, 
for example, growth in sales vs. profitability.  Root concludes: “Entry mode 
comparisons need to be made between projected benefits and costs over a future 
period. Managers are comparing therefore, expected benefits and costs of 
alternative entry modes, benefits and costs that are uncertain in some degree.” (161) 
     According to Root, the company should seek out to make the choice of entry 
mode by using the strategic decision rule.  The firm should compare different entry 
modes to each other that match the capabilities and resources of the firm.  
Adjacently, on the basis of the deliberations the most suitable market entry mode for 
the target country is chosen.  The decision for the manager is solely to be based on 
expected benefits and costs.  Strategic and organizational considerations are 
neglected.  Thus, a more comprehensive, descriptive and inclusive framework is 
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needed to integrate other variables beside costs and benefits into the deliberations 
for the right entry mode choice. 
 
1.3.2 The Hierarchical Model of Choice of Market Entry Mode 
     Based on the transaction cost theory by Williamson and the internationalization 
process as described in the Uppsala-model by Johanson and Vahlne in Chapter 
1.1.1, Pan and Tse develop a hierarchical model of choice of market entry modes.  
Pan and Tse argue that the choice of entry mode can be examined from a 
hierarchical perspective.  The hierarchical model by Pan and Tse builds upon two 
theories. The first one argues that the internationalization of the firm as postulated by 
Johanson and Vahlne can be described by a stage-model, using risk and 
(investment) commitment as indicators.  The other theory builds upon the strategy 
rule of Root as discussed above.  According to Pan and Tse, managers consider 
only a few factors at each level of the hierarchy, and even different factors at each 
level of the hierarchy.  Subsequently, managers make a distinct decision at each 
level of the hierarchy.  Basically, the whole hierarchical model of choice of entry 
mode centers on the question whether the company wants to make an equity 
investment or not.  Following that decision, the manager proceeds to make a 
decision at the lower level whether the company wants to export, enter a contractual 
agreement, an equity joint venture or push into the market with a wholly-owned 
subsidiary.  Further options of entry mode choices arise from each possible decision.  
The hierarchical model of the choice of possible entry modes is illustrated in Figure 7 
below. 
  38  
Choice of Entry Modes
Non-Equity
Modes
Equity
Modes
Contractual
Agreement
Wholly Owned
Subsidiary
Equity Joint 
Ventures
Direct Export
Indirect Export
Others
Licensing
R&D Contracts
Alliances
Minority EJV
50% share EJV
Majority EJV
Greenfield
Acquisition
Others
Export                                                          
Others
 
 
Figure 7:  A Hierarchical Model of Choice of Entry Modes,  Yigang Pan, and David K. Tse,  "The 
Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes,"  Journal of International Business Studies,  31.4,  
(2000):  538. 
 
     The conceptualization of the choice of entry mode in the hierarchical model is 
appealing for a number of reasons.  First of all, it recognizes the bounded rationality 
of human beings, managers, who have a limited analytical capacity and tend to 
decompose complex decision processes into small sets of critical variables.  Thus, 
the decision-making process is made easier.  The second argument considers the 
differences that exist between different entry modes and the choices to be made at 
each level.  For example, circumstances in which a greenfield investment is an 
option are dramatically different from those that would favor indirect export. The 
circumstances are too different to be compared at the same level.  Therefore, the 
splitting of entry mode decisions according to the hierarchical model by Pan and Tse 
proves useful.   
     Last but not least, equity and non-equity modes, the first level-differentiation, are 
significantly different in their call for the commitment of the company.  Equity modes, 
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such as wholly-owned subsidiaries and equity joint ventures require an active 
involvement of the top management, an investment of resources, careful screening 
of the market, the environment, investment risk and return, etc.  Non-equity modes 
are significantly different in their requirements as no investment is made, no 
extensive screening has to take place and the risk is lower (Pan and Tse 538-539).  
  Thus, a differentiation between equity and non-equity modes as proposed by Pan 
and Tse seems appropriate. 
      Based on the transaction cost theory and the Uppsala Internationalization Model, 
the hierarchical model of choice of entry mode by Pan and Tse offers a firm a 
coherent framework for the entry mode decision into a foreign market.  The eclectic 
framework by Kim and Hwang is another framework that is at least partly based on 
the transaction cost theory as well as environmental factors influencing the entry 
mode choice and global strategic considerations which a firm faces.  
 
1.3.3 An Eclectic Framework of the Market Entry Mode Choice 
     The eclectic framework has been developed by W. Kim and Peter Hwang.  Kim 
and Hwang aim to incorporate existing entry mode explanations (and 
internationalization theories) in a comprehensive framework.  As opposed to the 
hierarchical model by Pan and Tse, the eclectic framework integrates the 
environmental variables - as has been discussed above by Root in Chapter 1.2.1- 
the transaction cost theory/framework - based on Williamson’s work described in 
Chapter 1.2.2 - and the RBV of the firm - based on Penrose and Barney illustrated in 
Chapter 1.2.2 - and further applies global strategic considerations of the company to 
the eclectic framework (Kim and Hwang 30).  
     Global strategic variables include global concentration, global synergies and 
global strategic motivations.  Global concentration refers to the phenomena that ever 
more multinational companies (MNCs) find themselves in a number of different 
markets with a limited number of players of the same industries; the global industry 
has become highly concentrated.  Thus, due to the oligopolistic circumstances, 
actions in one market can spill over in another market because national boundaries 
cannot prevent such events from taking place in a globalized context.  The result is a 
competitive interdependence between the players.  Competitive interdependence 
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“implies that organizations can influence one another not only directly but also 
indirectly in any of the diverse national markets in which they compete.” (Kim and 
Hwang 32)  Thus, global concentration influences the choice of market entry modes 
as the company is trying to limit or expand the ramifications of the choice of entry 
mode in a foreign market.  Kim and Hwang posit that MNCs choose high control 
entry modes when there is a high concentration in the specific global industry (Kim 
and Hwang 34). 
     Global synergies arise, for example, from the deployment of one technology of 
one subsidiary or business division in for example, another business division or 
subsidiary in different countries.  Thus, the company realizes global synergies by 
deploying, for example, a proprietary technology in several markets, thus, saving 
costs and bringing competitive advantages to several markets.  Kim and Hwang 
propose that the higher the synergy between the home firm and its sister business 
divisions, the more probable is the choice of an entry mode with a high level of 
control for the foreign market entry (Kim and Hwang 34).   
     Kim and Hwang assert that “global strategic motivations can be defined as the 
motivation to fulfill strategic aims at the corporate level for the purpose of overall 
corporate efficiency maximization.” (35)  In other words, when companies enter a 
foreign market they may not choose the entry mode that is most suitable for the 
particular market but which suits the company’s strategic considerations best.  
Consequently, it can be proposed that MNCs that apply global strategic motivations 
favor high control entry modes when making the decision about the choice of entry 
mode in a foreign market (Kim and Hwang 35).  To summarize, global concentration, 
global synergies and global strategic motivations are global strategic variables that 
influence the entry mode decision. 
     Environmental factors include country risk, location unfamiliarity, demand 
uncertainty and intensity of competition.  The risk of doing business in the chosen 
market, the physical and cultural distance of the foreign market compared to the 
home market, the difficulty of estimating the planned demand and the intensity of 
competition in the host market: all these factors determine and influence the choice 
of market entry mode.  Kim and Hwang assert that the higher any of the 
environmental variables is, the lower the resource commitment of the market entrant 
will probably be (Kim and Hwang 35-36).  
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     The value of the firm-specific know-how refers to the competitive advantage 
gained by firm-specific knowledge as also postulated by the resource-based view of 
the firm (see Chapter 1.2.3).  Kim and Hwang propose that the higher the value of 
the firm-specific know-how, the more likely the business is to choose an entry mode 
with high control.  The second variable of transaction-specific variables is the tacit 
nature of know-how the firm possesses.  In other words, if a firm possess tacit know-
how, this know-how is naturally hard to articulate.  Kim and Hwang posit that the 
greater the share of tacit know-how of the firm’s know-how is, the more likely it is that 
the company favors a high control entry mode when entering the foreign market.  
The company will try to incorporate and transfer the tacit know-how within the market 
entry mode which can be best achieved in a hierarchical entry mode because 
hierarchical entry modes rely on internal transactions.  Figure 8 illustrates the 
eclectic framework of the choice of entry mode according to Kim and Hwang. 
 
 
 
Entry Mode 
Decision
Global 
Strategic 
Variables
Environmental 
Variables
Country Risk
Location Unfamiliarity
Demand Uncertainty
Competition Intensity
Transaction-Specific
Variables
Tacit Nature of 
Know-How
Value of Firm-Specific 
Know-How
Global Concentration
Global Synergies
Global Strategic 
Motivations
 
 
Figure 8:  An Eclectic Framework of the Entry Mode Choice,  W. Kim, and Peter Hwang,  
"Global Strategy and Multinationals' Entry Mode Choice,"  Journal of International Business 
Studies,  23.1,  (1992):  33. 
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     In conclusion, the eclectic framework by Kim and Hwang offers a comprehensive 
framework integrating environmental variables, transaction-specific variables and 
global strategic variables.  The framework uses the indicators of control and risk to 
assert which kind of entry mode to assign to which situation.  Thus, the eclectic 
framework offers some guidance towards the right choice of market entry mode 
based on risk and control.  The choice of market entry mode based on the eclectic 
framework combined with the hierarchical model of Pan and Tse can be modeled 
along a continuum of risk and extent of investment as illustrated in the next part of 
this chapter.  
 
 
1.4 Market Entry Modes 
 
     Previously, the different theories and views of the firm, which are integrated in the 
hierarchical model of Pan and Tse and in the eclectic framework of Kim and Hwang, 
were discussed.  The hierarchical model of Pan and Tse relies on the decision about 
whether to use equity and subsequent decisions about the level of equity and, thus, 
the extent of investment in the process of entering a market.  The eclectic framework 
of Kim and Hwang bases its choice of entry mode on the variables of global strategic 
considerations, environmental factors, especially risk, and transaction-specific 
characteristics.  If one combines the underlying principles of the two models, then 
the resulting choice of entry modes can be shown on a continuum of risk and 
investment as illustrated by Bennet and Blythe in Figure 9.  The illustration by 
Bennet and Blythe offers an overview about the different market entry modes 
according to degree of risk and investment.  Subsequently, a description and 
discussion of each market entry mode is pursued.  
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1.4.1 Exporting 
     Exporting is an entry mode associated with low risk.  Within the scope of this 
discussion, exporting through a consortium is neglected.  Hence, exporting is 
conducted either by indirect or direct means.  Indirect exporting occurs when the 
foreign merchant, buying house or the export management company actually buy the 
product from the exporting company (= distributors) and re-sell the product to the 
local market.  Direct exporting involves agents, salespeople, sales by mail order, in 
branch offices or in piggyback arrangements (where existing facilities of other 
products are also used) and the product is still sold by the exporting company 
through the above described means (Bennet and Blythe 197).  
     While the indirect export by means of distributors reduces credit risks, requires 
less supervision by the exporting company and even puts a local image on the 
product, using agents provides more control to the exporting company and leaves 
the exporter with more flexibility as it might withdraw from arrangements easily.  On 
the other hand, indirect exporting gives the exporting company less control, the 
distributor might distort the brand of the company and the distributor might easily go 
out of business or switch to the competition.  Disadvantages of using direct 
exporting, for example, by employing agents, are the possible multi-operation of the 
agents for a number of companies, the amount of support required by the agent from 
the exporter and the lack of incentive for the agent to sell the exporter’s product due 
to conflicts of interests or lack of commitment (Bennet and Blythe 198 – 199).  
Therefore, the company has to consider whether the advantages, for example, 
flexibility, exceed the disadvantages, for example, lack of incentive since the 
company has to heavily rely on foreign agents.   
1.4.2 Licensing 
     Licensing is defined as “a business practice involving a contractual agreement 
between two companies whereby one business provides a product, technology or 
knowledge in exchange for a fee from the other company.” (Trautmann) Licensing 
can include franchising, assignments of the licensee, exclusive and non-exclusive 
licensing and pure know-how licenses.  An assignment means that the licensor is 
handing over all the intellectual property rights to the licensee.  The licensee may 
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then use the rights as the licensee wishes as there are no restrictions put upon him.  
In this case, the foreign company hands over all its property right to the local 
company or individual.  A franchising license entitles the local company of the target 
market to adopt or copy the franchiser’s (=foreign company) entire business format 
in the local market.  The entire business format refers to the name of the product 
and/or business, the trade marks, the business methods, etc.  In turn, the franchisee 
pays a royalty and lump sum fee for the business formats as well as for additionally 
services, such as training, technical advice, stock control systems.  Thus, the 
franchisor keeps complete control of its business formats while the franchisee gains 
from the trademark rights, etc. and carries the financial and business risk in the local 
market.  Advantages are the spreading of the business format at relatively low cost 
and consistent corporate identity.  The disadvantages include the costs of monitoring 
the franchisee’s behavior and securing the business format against copy 
infringement as well as franchise agreement violations (Bennet and Blythe 205). 
 
1.4.3 Contract Manufacturing 
     The American Marketing Association (AMA) defines contract manufacturing as “a 
joint venture method by which work is contracted to a qualified manufacturer to 
produce the product(s) that the firm wishes to market.”  Contract manufacturing 
depends on local firms being able to fulfill the contracts, i.e. the local companies 
have the skills and capabilities to do the manufacturing.  On the one hand, contract 
manufacturing offers a chance to enter a market faster with less risk and being able 
to withdraw fast if risks are too high. Furthermore, the foreign company does not 
have to make a substantial investment in the local market.  On the other hand, 
maintaining and monitoring quality as well as protecting intellectual property and 
possibly training the local employees are disadvantages to be considered when 
opting for contract manufacturing (Marketing Association; Bennet and Blythe 212). 
 
1.4.4 Joint Venture 
     A joint venture operating in a foreign country can be defined as an international 
joint venture. The terms international joint venture (IJV), joint venture (JV) and equity 
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international joint venture (EIJV) are used interchangeably for the discussion.  In 
regard to EIJV, the foreign company makes a financial investment in a local JV.  
Thus, the definition of an EIJV is (Newburry and Zeira 89): 
An equity international joint venture (EIJV) is a separate legal organizational 
entity representing the partial holding of two or more parent firms, in which the 
headquarters of at least one is located outside the country of operation of the 
joint venture. This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent firms, each 
of which is economically and legally independent of the other. 
     According to Brooke there are 4 main reasons for the formation of JVs (103): 
(1) To acquire market knowledge/expertise/distribution channels in an unfamiliar 
market 
(2) To expand with limited capital by sharing costs with a (local) partner in order 
to minimize the risk of international expansion 
(3) To improve sales prospects, i.e. turnover and profit 
(4) To overcome governmental restrictions on the market entrance and gain 
access to the market. 
     Basically, there are 3 different types of JVs as identified by Killing.  First, the 
dominant-parent JVs which are entirely managed by one of the parent companies 
and display no actual difference to being a wholly-owned subsidiary.  The second 
type of JVs are shared-management JVs in which both parent companies collectively 
lead the JV.  These independent JVs are characterized by an extensive autonomy of 
the management towards the parent companies’ management.  However, it should 
be noted that independent JVs are mostly incompatible with the intent of JVs, i.e. the 
sharing of complementary resources and capabilities through collaboration of the two 
parent companies, due to the autonomy of the JV.  Thus, the parent companies are 
actually only investors or shareholders (Dusage and Garette 84). 
     Selecting the right JV partner is indispensable for the foreign company to succeed 
in the local market.  According to Bennet and Blythe, the JV-partner should (220): 
 have proven knowledge, expertise and experience of local business 
conditions and practices 
 be able to conduct or commission local market research 
 posses extensive contacts with local banks, businesses and providers of 
specialist services 
 be easy to contact  
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 provide precise and regular feedback on local market conditions 
 have resources sufficient to undertake the collaboration (staff, technical 
facilities, management systems, etc.) 
 have a successful track record and good business reputation. 
     Choosing the right partner for the local market is only the first step in ensuring the 
success of the market entrance of the foreign company.  The performance of IJVs 
can be disappointing, for example, because of the incompatibilities of goals between 
partners.  Since different factors influence the success of the JV, it can be 
ascertained that other variables beside the choice of the right JV partner have an 
effect the success of the JV depends.  A study undertaken by Robson, Leonidou and 
Katsikeas found that the following factors contribute to the success of IJVs (408):  
 Parent’s positive attitude toward collaborative forms of business 
 Avoiding partnerships with state-owned organizations 
 Simultaneous development of additional ties with the partner 
 Ensuring inter-partner goal congruence 
 Clarify objectives and contributions 
 Stress managerial adaptability 
 Inter-partner variables, for example, commitment, trust, cooperation, 
satisfaction with agreement 
 Product quality and strong distribution and sales network 
 Incentives to employees 
 Minimization of management turnover 
 Industry profitability and realization of economic/tax incentives 
     The advantages of EIJV include the sharing of knowledge and resources, 
substantial control over production and marketing, the instant access to local 
expertise and distribution networks and last, but not least, the shared risk of failure 
and administration cost (Bennet and Blythe 218).  
     Disadvantages of EIJVs include the cost for searching and identifying an 
appropriate partner in the market and integrating the assets of the local partner into 
the JV (Pan, Li and Tse).  Problems in regard to control and coordination, a lack of 
overall leadership and the need to share intellectual property may arise.  
Additionally, the local and the foreign partners may not have the same interests, 
targets and goals which leads to conflicts in the JV.  Problems may also arise due to 
different cultures and strategic objectives.  In general there is a high risk of failure 
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which is why both partners should have an exit strategy in case the partners fall out 
over operative or strategic issues (Bennet and Blythe 218; John et al. 255).  That is 
probably why most IJVs are unstable or perform unsatisfactorily (Sim and Ali 358). 
 
1.4.5 Wholly-owned Subsidiary 
     The market entry mode associated with the highest extent of investment and risk, 
according to Figure 9, is a wholly-owned subsidiary. A wholly-owned subsidiary 
(WOS) is “a company that is completely owned by another company. A wholly-
owned subsidiary is a registered company with board members who all represent 
one holding company or corporation.” (B. E. D. Economist.com, Wholly-Owned 
Subsidiary)  Because the WOS is established in a foreign country, the term wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) is also used.  A WFOE offers the foreign company 
full control over the establishment in the foreign country (Anonymous, "China 
Changes.").  A WOS can be established or acquired.  The investment in a newly-
established subsidiary in the local market by a foreign company can be defined as 
being an international greenfield investment.  An international greenfield investment 
(IGI) is “the establishment of a new affiliate in a foreign host country by a company 
headquartered outside the country where the investment is occurring for the purpose 
of producing a company’s product or providing a company’s service.” (Newburry and 
Zeira 89)  Table 4 illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of entering a foreign 
market by an IGI.  Therefore, the company has to decide whether it is willingly to 
accept the trade-off of higher control and faster access to the market for possible 
higher investment costs and a higher exposure to risk. 
 
  - 49 -  
Long payback period probable
Higher exposure to riskExercise close control over production, quality 
and marketing
DisadvantagesAdvantages
Substantial requirements in terms of company’s 
management and resources
Project local identity
Lack of local partner, and thus, of local 
knowledge
Possible to integrate state-of-the-art technology 
due to reduced risk of violation of property rights 
which results in increased operational efficiency
High investment costsPossible to build operation in an optimum 
format, i.e. in such a way that it fits best the 
interest of the parent firm (for example, 
integrating local production with home base 
production)
Slow entry of new markets (time-consuming 
process) 
Faster access to local market and lower 
operating costs
 
 
Table 4:  Advantages and Disadvantages of International Greenfield Investments, compiled 
from:  Svend Hollensen,  Global Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow, 
England:  Pearson Education Limited,  2001,  305;  and  Franklin R. Root,  Entry Strategies for 
International Markets,  Massachusetts:  Lexington Books,  1987,  124-125. 
 
The market entry by IGI is a sensible decision if a company wants to enter a market 
with proprietary technology and needs to protect the know-how as well as exploiting 
the competitive advantage on the company’s own. A WOS can also be 
established/acquired though the M&A of a local company. 
 
1.4.6 M&A 
     Another way of entering the market, although not described in Figure 9 by Bennet 
and Blythe, would be an international acquisition.  Newburry and Zeira define an 
international acquisition (IA) as (89): 
The purchase of the trade name and assets of one company (an acquiree) by 
another company (an acquirer), headquartered outside the country where the 
acquired company has been located. Following the acquisition, the acquired 
company is subject to managerial, economic, and legal control of the 
acquiring company. 
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  The acquisition may be defined as being horizontal when the product lines and the 
markets of the two companies are similar.  The transaction can be classified as 
being vertical when the acquired company becomes a supplier or customer of the 
acquirer.  Additionally, the transaction can be described as being concentric in which 
case the acquirer or the acquired company owns the same technology and serves a 
different market or vice versa (Root 143).   
     Closely related to the concept of acquisition is the concept of merger. A merger is 
(B. E. D. Economist.com, Merger):  
the union of two or more organizations under single ownership, through the 
direct acquisition by one organization of the net assets or liabilities of the 
other. A merger can be the result of a friendly takeover, which results in the 
combining of companies on an equal footing. After a merger, the legal 
existence of the acquired organization is terminated. 
     Thus, international acquisitions and mergers can be established in the concept of 
M&A.  Reasons for the market entry of businesses by M&A, according to Dunning, 
are (247): 
 Rising costs of innovation and of entry into unfamiliar markets 
 Competitive pressures to be cost effective 
 Growing need to tap into complementary technologies and to capture 
expected economies of scale and scope 
 Desire to protect or advance global markets vis-à-vis oligopolistic competitors 
 Need to encapsulate the time of the innovating or market entry process 
     Studies have shown that M&A perform disappointingly after the merger most of 
the time (Mattsson Merger Waves), destroy value (London 9) and that the majority of 
cross-border M&A fail (Finkelstein 1).  The literature suggests three main reasons for 
the purchase of foreign companies (London 9): 
(1) The purchase is a quicker and easier way to enter an overseas market than 
starting from scratch 
(2) International diversification can stabilize cash flows and make the acquiring 
company appear less risky to financially markets 
(3) Expanding into foreign markets increases on which companies can exploit 
intangible assets (for example, expertise and business processes) and 
technologies 
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     According to Root, “the success of an acquisition depends critically on the 
selection of the acquired company. A poor selection – for whatever reason – can run 
any advantage into a disadvantage for the unwary firm.” (143)  Besides the careful 
selection of the take-over target to turn the acquisition into an advantage for the 
acquirer, advantages and disadvantages of the market entry by M&A are to consider.  
The advantages and disadvantages for international M&A as an entry mode are 
shown in Table 5.   
 
DisadvantagesAdvantages
•Locating and evaluating possible acquisition or 
merger candidates can be difficult  danger 
of ending up with poor prospect due to lack of 
qualified candidates, differing accounting 
standards and false or deceptive financial 
records
•Increase scale on which the firm can exploit 
intangible assets and technologies
Possible threats:
•Lack of integration with current operation
•Communication and coordination problems 
between acquirer and acquired firm
•Shorter payback period for the investor by 
creating immediate income
•Stabilise cash flows
High risk due to:
•National interest of the host country and  
resulting resentment if take-over is seen 
as foreign absorption
•National interests of the home country
Gaining quick access to:
•Distribution channels
•New product lines
•Technology
•A qualified workforce
•Existing management experience
•Local knowledge
•Contacts with local market and government
•Established brand names and reputations
•Usually expensive option•Rapid entry into new markets
 
 
Table 5:  Advantages and Disadvantages of International M&A, compiled from:  Svend 
Hollensen,  Global Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow,  England:  
Pearson Education Limited,  2001,  305;  Simon London,  "Why Most Cross-Border Deals End 
in Tears."  Financial Times  30. May 2005:  9;  and  Franklin R. Root,  Entry Strategies for 
International Markets,  Massachusetts:  Lexington Books,  1987,  143-144. 
 
     Therefore, M&A are useful for a fast access to new markets and resources 
(technology, knowledge) but the advantages have to be considered against the 
disadvantages, for example, high risks and communication/coordination problems.   
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2 Culture 
 
 
This chapter defines and describes the term culture and analyzes cultural 
dimensions suggested and illustrated, on the one hand, by Hofstede, Trompenaars 
and Wooliams, and on the other hand, by Barth.  The chapter determines the model 
best suited for differentiated analysis of cultural differences between Germans and 
Chinese and, subsequently, describes the difference between the German and 
Chinese culture along the appropriate cultural dimension model. 
 
 
2.1 Definition of Culture 
 
     A comprehensive and adequate definition of culture is needed for the further 
evaluation of cultural differences between Germans and Chinese. Lustig and Koester 
state that culture is “a learned set of shared interpretations about beliefs, values, and 
norms, which affect the behaviors of a relatively large group of people.” (30) 
     Samovar, Porter and Stefani define culture as “the deposit of knowledge, 
experience, beliefs, values, actions, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, 
notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and artifacts 
acquired by a group of people in the course of generation through individual and 
group striving.” (36) 
     Milton J. Bennett differentiates between objective and subjective culture.  
Objective culture encompasses social, economic, political and linguistics aspects of 
culture, i.e. institutions through which culture is expressed.  Social culture refers to 
the “learned and shared patterns of beliefs, behaviors, and values of groups of 
people.” (3)  
    According to Jandt, culture is the “sum total of ways of living including behavioral 
norms, linguistic expression styles of communication, patterns of thinking, and 
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beliefs and values of a group large enough to be self-sustaining transmitted over the 
course of generations.” (499) 
     Culture has several distinct characteristics.  According to Samovar, Porter and 
Stefani, culture is (8-11): 
 Not innate, but learned.  Culture is learned through observation and 
interaction with one’s parents, family, friends and other people in one’s 
society. 
 Transmitted from generation to generation.  The content and messages of a 
culture are communicated and passed from one generation to another 
generation and, thus, culture exists, endures and perpetuates one’s 
generation. 
 Based on symbols.  Language, whether verbal or non-verbal, images or icons, 
allows one to package, transmit and store symbols and, therefore, to 
communicate and preserve culture to one another. 
 Subject to change.  Cultures are highly adaptive in order to help members 
cope with current problems and situations.  But, the deep structure of culture, 
for example, values, attitudes towards gender and age as well as religious 
practices, are deeply entrenched into a culture, resist major alteration and are 
passed on from one generation to another.  
 Ethnocentric9.  One can only observe, interpret and judge other people and 
culture through one’s own cultural perspective.  
     Lang observes that “culture is a system of widely accepted beliefs and 
internalized values that determine the actions and behavior of people.  Culture – at 
the national level - reflects the socio-cultural background, the historical evolution and 
the ideological concepts of a country.” (5)  Figure 10 illustrates the different factors 
described by Lang that shape culture, i.e. the historical evolution of the particular 
nation/culture, the sociological background of the specific group of people and the 
ideological concepts underlying the society.  The interplay of these factors creates a 
specific culture. 
 
                                            
 
9 Definition of Ethnocentrism:  “The belief or feeling that a group’s way of life, values and patterns of 
adaptation are superior to those of other groups. It may manifest itself in attitudes of superiority or 
hostility toward members of other groups and is sometimes expressed in discrimination, proselytizing, 
or violence.” (TheFreeDictionary.com Ethnocentrism) 
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CULTURE 
=
System of widely accepted beliefs and internalized values that 
determine the actions and behavior of people
Socio-cultural
background
Ideological
concepts
Historical
evolution
 
 
Figure 10:  Definition of Culture,  Nikolaus Lang,  Intercultural Management in China, 
Wiesbaden:  Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag,  1998,  5. 
 
     To conclude, culture is: 
A system of beliefs and values which is learned through/within a group 
that affects/determines the behavior of the group members and is 
passed on from one generation to another. 
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2.2 Adequate Means for the Analysis of Culture  
 
     The part of the chapter above gave several definitions of culture.  For the analysis 
of cultural differences in actions, behavior and values it is necessary to find the 
means to ultimately identify and analyze cultural differences between Chinese and 
Germans.  First, this chapter-section describes the frameworks of cultural 
dimensions developed by Hofstede and Trompenaars and Wooliams and the 
relational approach favored by Barth.  Subsequently, this chapter-section analyzes 
and compares these frameworks and decides which framework is used for further 
analysis of German and Chinese cultural differences. 
 
2.2.1 Hofstede’s 5 Cultural Dimensions 
     According to Hofstede, “culture is the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.” (5)  
One is a member of a given culture and grows up in a certain environment which is, 
together with one’s own experiences, the cause and source of one’s mental 
programming.  Hofstede refers to this mental programming as “culture.”(4)  The 
programming is shared with and amongst other people who also grew up in the 
same environment.  Thus, “culture is learned, not inherited,” since it is acquired 
through one’s social environment, as opposed through genetic inheritance (Hofstede 
5).  But, one’s own personality is not shared with other members of a culture as 
one’s personality is a unique set of mental programming (Hofstede 6). 
     Hofstede states that each human being belongs to several different groups and 
categories, i.e. one is associated with, and has a mental programming for, each 
different layer of culture.  These layers or levels can be, for example (Hofstede 10): 
 national 
 regional 
 generational 
 social class 
 ethnic or 
 organizational 
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     In order to describe and illustrate cultural differences, Hofstede proposes the use 
of cultural dimensions.  A dimension identifies and classifies a group of phenomena 
which are found to empirically emerge in combination.  According to Hofstede, “a 
dimension is an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures.” 
(14)  Based on this premise, Hofstede identifies 5 different cultural dimensions that 
are relevant to all societies worldwide. (14): 
(1) Power distance 
(2) Individualism vs. Collectivism 
(3) Masculinity vs. Feminity 
(4) Uncertainty Avoidance 
(5) Confucianism or long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation 
     The first four cultural dimensions were found using data obtained from employee 
attitude surveys conducted at IBM subsidiaries in forty countries and did not include 
Confucianism.  Together with Bond, Hofstede developed a second instrument to 
alleviate concerns about Western bias in research.  The study was conducted in 
twenty-two countries.  Subsequently, Hofstede found a fifth dimensions which he 
initially labeled Confucian dynamism and later changed to “long-term orientation.” 
(Yeh and Lawrence 656)  These five cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede are 
now explained further.  
     Hofstede defines power distance “as the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that 
power is distributed unequally.” (28)  Inequality is inherent in society as there is 
always a person who is stronger or has more power.  Some societies do accept this 
as being something good and natural while other societies reject this construct and 
emphasize the thought of equality among all of its members (Hofstede 24-25).  
Consequently, one can expect countries with a high power distance ranking to 
emphasize the role of status as well as the power and influence one wields.  
Cultures in countries with a low power distance ranking accordingly emphasize the 
equality of all and disregard status and power differences.  
     In regard to the individualism vs. collectivism cultural dimension Hofstede writes 
that (51): 
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Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are 
loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her 
immediate family.  Collectivism as is opposite pertains to societies in which 
people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, 
which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for 
their unquestioningly loyalty. 
     Societies with a high individualism score are, therefore, characterized by 
individuals having loose relationships with other members of the same culture.  In 
contrast, collectivist cultures with a low ranking on the individualism score are 
consequently characterized by people looking after each other while taking 
responsibility for fellow members of their group. 
     The cultural dimension masculinity vs. feminity refers to the desirability of 
assertive behavior vs. desirability of modest behavior (Hofstede 80).  In masculine 
societies gender roles are distinct and reinforced with the male focusing on material 
success and showing an assertive behavior.  In feminine societies the gender roles 
tend to overlap and both genders are expected to be modest, tender and concerned 
with the quality of life (Hofstede 82-83).  Thus, societies with a high masculinity score 
are denoted by clear and distinct gender roles with the male dominating and 
controlling the female.  Countries with a low score are denoted by the overlapping of 
gender roles and the equal treatment of females and males.    
     According to Hofstede, uncertainty avoidance is “the extent to which the members 
of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (113).  The resulting 
effect is a need for predictability, expressed through the establishment of written and 
unwritten rules (Hofstede 113).  A high uncertainty avoidance ranking reflects the low 
tolerance of members of the specific country for uncertainty and ambiguity.  In such 
a country, tight rules are established and deviant ideas are not tolerated.  Weak 
uncertainty cultures are characterized by a tolerance for deviation and generally are 
comfortable with ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks (Hofstede 125).   
    Confucianism, also described as long-term vs. short term orientation, refers to 
values such as persistence, thrift, having a sense of shame vs. personal steadiness, 
protecting your face, respect for tradition (Hofstede 165-166).  To Western people 
these values either do not really make sense or puzzle them (Hofstede 168). The 
attributes actually refer to the way a society deals with virtue.  The underlying survey 
has been developed by Eastern researchers; predictably, Asian countries generally 
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score higher compared to Western countries (Hofstede 166).  A possible explanation 
is the lack of appropriate concepts in the language of each country and the culture 
gap between Western and Eastern countries/cultures. The language differences and 
cultural gaps between Western and Eastern people may cause inconsistent and 
conflicting translations for the terms used and the questions asked in regard to the 
cultural dimension Confucianism and, thus, distort the results of this survey.  
 
2.2.2 Trompenaars’ and Wooliams' 7 Dimensions Model of Culture 
     Trompenaars and Wooliams compare culture to an onion with different layers 
which can be peeled off.  There are three main layers.  The outer layer of culture is 
the one most visible, for example, behavior, food, language, clothes, and is the 
explicit level of culture, i.e. the expressed manifestation of culture (Trompenaars and 
Wooliams 24).  The middle layer consists of the norms and values of a culture. 
According to Trompenaars and Wooliams, “values are shared orientations of a group 
of people of what people define as the things they like and desire. Norms are shared 
orientations of what people believe should be done.” (25)  The deepest layer of 
culture consists of the unquestioned and implicit culture.  The core of the onion 
refers to basic assumptions, routines and methods developed to deal with problems 
that regularly arise.  The elements of the onion core are so basic that one is not 
aware of these elements, but nonetheless it affects all of one’s actions and thoughts 
unconsciously (Trompenaars and Wooliams 27).  Figure 22 illustrates the concept of 
culture as an onion as described by Trompenaars and Wooliams.  
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Explicit level: artifacts,
products
Middle level: norms 
and values
Core assumptions
 
 
Figure 11:  Trompenaars’ Model of Culture,  Alessandra Marinetti, and Patrick Dunn,  
Designing Culturally Sensitive Elearning,  Brussels:  European Foundation for Quality in 
eLearning (EFQUEL),  2005. 
 
     Trompenaars and Wooliams develop a 7 dimensions model that is meant to elicit, 
describe, and frame the resulting problems and dilemmas when people from different 
cultures deal with each other.  The 7 dilemmas identified by Trompenaars and 
Wooliams (31): 
(1) Universalism vs. Particularism.  Do people in the organization tend to follow 
standardized rules or do they prefer a flexible approach to unique situations? 
(2) Individualism vs. Communitarism.  Does the culture foster individual 
performance and creativity or is the focus on the larger group leading to 
cohesion and consensus? 
(3) Neutral vs. Affective.  Are emotions controlled or do people display emotions 
overtly? 
(4) Specific vs. Diffuse.  What is the degree of involvement in personal 
relationships (high = diffuse, low = specific)? Does a specific business project 
come easily, out of which a more diffuse relationship may develop or do you 
have to get to know your business partners before you can do any business 
with them? 
(5) Achievement vs. Ascription.  Is status and power based on your performance 
or it is more determined by which school you went or your age, gender, and 
family background? 
(6) Sequential vs. Synchronic.  Do you organize time in a sequential manner, 
doing one task at a time, or in parallel, keeping many things active at once? 
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(7) Internal vs. External control.  Are you stimulated by your inner drive and 
sense of control or are you adaptive to external events that are beyond your 
control? 
     One can observe that two of Trompenaars’ and Wooliams’ cultural dimensions 
are linked to Hofstede cultural dimensions.  Individualism vs. Communitarism seems 
to be nearly identical to Hofstede’s Individualism vs. Collectivism while Achievement 
vs. Ascription is linked to Hofstede’s Power Distance, “at least if one accepts that 
status is accorded by nature rather than achievement, and that this reflects a greater 
willingness to accept power distances.” (Dahl 15)  In comparison, Hofstede designed 
and carried out his research with the focus on the evaluation of work values.  
Trompenaars’ and Woolliams’ work focuses more on preferred behavior in both work 
and private situations.  Both researchers aim at discovering, analyzing and 
evaluating people’s underlying values by asking questions about the outer layer of 
culture. 
 
2.2.3 Frederik Barth’s relational approach 
     Frederik Barth argues that the reality of people is socially constructed.  Reality is 
reality because people by mutual consent agree that things are the way things are.  
The consent is embodied in collective representations:  language, categories, 
symbols, rituals and institutions.  Therefore, “cultural patterns are […] the result of 
social processes, understood as ongoing activity that constantly creates, upholds 
and transforms reality.” (Gertsen, Soderberg and Torp 32)  Barth emphasizes that 
the focus of the study of cultures should be on the subjectively experienced 
boundaries of the group, not on objective cultural content.  Therefore, Barth suggests 
a relational and process-oriented approach to cultural analysis (Gertsen, Soderberg 
and Torp 32-33).   
     Hence, while Hofstede and Trompenaars stress the need for clear differentiation 
of cultures through national borders and the further differentiation of cultural 
characteristics through the introduction of cultural dimensions, Barth focuses on a 
relational and process-oriented approach to the analysis of culture.  The relational 
and process-oriented approach by Barth belongs to the social constructivist concept 
of culture and criticizes the mainstream culture research which focuses on identifying 
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and allocating culture classes.  But social constructive concepts of culture are neither 
normative nor prognostic approaches, thus, are inadequate to be applied to certain 
cases or situations.  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion  
     This dissertation focuses on evaluating, analyzing and predicting the behavior of 
German and Chinese businesses and individuals in business relationships and 
situations.  The choice of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as an adequate tool seems 
appropriate because, first, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions focus on the national level 
and the values and norms distinctly derivable from a national culture.  “Culture level 
analysis always reflects central tendencies (…) for the country; it does not predict 
individual behavior.” (Dahl 8)  The analysis of the dissertation focuses on the cultural 
distinctions between Chinese and German nationals.  Therefore, Hofstede’s work is 
most adequate because it focuses on cultural differences on a national level such as 
between Chinese and Germans.  Barth’s relational approach of the social 
constructivist school has some kind of merit in regard to plausibility but is inadequate 
in being applied to cases and situations and, therefore, for the purpose of this 
dissertation. 
     Second, data for a wide number of countries is available, including China and 
Germany.  Hofstede notes that “the usefulness of country scores is not for describing 
individuals, but for describing the social systems these individuals are likely to have 
built.” (Hofstede 253)  Thus, while the analysis of individuals and their behavior 
based on cultural dimensions for countries might be inaccurate or even wrong, the 
analysis of organizations coming from a certain culture and people acting within 
these organizations with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions is to a large extent accurate.  
It should be noted that Trompenaars and Wooliams cultural dimensions are also 
useful for the analysis of cultural differences, but without noteworthy empirical data 
adequate for further analysis in the context of this dissertation, the adequateness for 
the proposed research is not present. 
     Third, Hofstede’s theory about cultural dimensions has been applied by numerous 
researchers for a wide range of research interests.  For example, Dywer, Mesak and 
Hsu used Hofstede to evaluate the influence of national culture on the cross-national 
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product diffusion while van Everdingen and Waarts analyzed the influence of 
national culture on the adoption of innovation.  Pan Fan and Zhang Zigang took a 
close look at the cultural challenges of doing business in China and relied on 
Hofstede’s work.  Huang, Lu and Wong analyzed the impact of power distance on 
the acceptance of e-mail.  Numerous other studies could be named here, but the 
above mentioned examples underline the significance of Hofstede’s findings and 
work for numerous research fields and especially for business economics.  
Therefore, this dissertation is following in the tradition of research by basing the 
research about the international expansion of Mainland Chinese business within the 
context of intercultural communication aspects on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
work.   
 
 
2.3 German and Chinese values on Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions index 
 
     Hofstede developed 5 different cultural dimensions which can be measured on an 
index.  The following cultural dimensions indexes can be ascertained: Power 
Distance Index (PDI), Individualism Index (IDV), Masculinity Index (MAS), 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) and the Long-Term Orientation.  Table 8 shows 
the scores for China and Germany on the different cultural dimensions. 
 
3165666735Score for 
Germany
11860502080Score for China
LTOUAIMASIDVPDIDimension
 
 
Table 6:  Comparison of German and Chinese Scores on Hofstede’s 5 Cultural Dimensions,  
Gillian Oakenfull,  Categorizing Countries Using Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions: Cultural 
Dimension Scores for 10 Countries,  2001,  Available: 
http://www.sba.muohio.edu/oakenfg/homepage/Fall%202001/MKT%20471/Cultural%20Anlaysis
/Countries%20scores.htm#CULTURAL%20DIMENSION%20SCORES%20FOR%20TEN%20COU
NTRIES,  2 June 2004.  
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     Chinese culture seems to be marked by a high power distance between those 
that hold power and those that do not.  Privileges and status symbols for those 
ranking higher in status as well as unquestioning subordinance to the hierarchy by 
those ranking lower are expected by the members of the Chinese culture.  The 
German score of 35 on the PDI illustrates that Germany is characterized by a 
relatively small power distance culture.  The German culture stresses the need for 
providing all people with the same opportunities and access to goods.  Inequality is 
not tolerated.  Hierarchies are a means to get business done conveniently; otherwise 
the boss and subordinates are equal.  Privileges and status symbols are not 
desirable, as are high gaps between the salaries of top and bottom employees of a 
company (Hofstede 35-37). 
     China is a strong collectivist society as the score of 20 implies.  One belongs to a 
group, mostly through birth, which protects its members in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty.  Harmony and achieving goals in the group are the preferable 
order.  Relationships are more important than tasks as one’s identity is based on the 
social status in the group one belongs to.  Germany’s score of 67 is significantly 
higher on the individualism index compared to the Chinese which implies that 
German people do look after themselves and stress their own identity.  Businesses 
manage individual people, not groups.  The worth of the individual is stressed as are 
individual skills and achievements.  In Germany, one speaks his/her mind and is not 
afraid of conflict, thus, self-expression is encouraged (Hofstede 67). 
     The Chinese Masculinity Index-score of 50 is a medium value.  Thus, gender 
roles in the Chinese society are not strongly distinct.  Because of the collectivist 
element in the Chinese society, one can expect the resolution of conflicts through 
negotiation and compromise.  To Chinese, a consensus among all members of the 
group is preferable.  Relationships are important, but so are success, personal 
progress and achievement.  The relatively high German Masculinity Index-score 
asserts that German culture stresses the need for performance, material success 
and personal progress.  Gender roles are clearly distinct with the man earning the 
money and the woman looking after the household and the children.  In Germany, 
conflicts are fought out, competition is desired and there is an emphasis on working 
in life (Hofstede 96). 
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     The Chinese Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) score of 60 shows a medium 
value for uncertainty avoidance.  The score implies that the Chinese stress the 
importance of not showing aggressions and feelings in public.  Chinese people are 
motivated by belonging to a group.  Lectures and teachings given by ‘wise men,’ 
such as teachers, are seen as superior and pupils do not question them.  
Furthermore, deviant ideas, ideas which differ from those held by the group, are 
dangerous and intolerable.  Germany scores medium to high on the UAI which 
illustrates the German preference for written and unwritten rules.  The emotional 
need for guidelines and rules results from the desire to prevent uncertainty and risk 
in life.  Germans emphasize punctuality and precision (Hofstede 134). 
     China is ranked number 1 on the LTO index.  The score of 118 displays the high 
value Chinese place on long-term commitment.  Traditions within a changing society 
are adapted to a modern context.  The Chinese have a high savings rate and are apt 
at subordinating themselves to a cause, for example, a group goal.  The German 
LTO - score of 31 implies a rather medium to low commitment to long-term 
orientation.  Thus, Germans tend to stick to their traditions, even in a rapidly 
changing society.  Germans do expect quick results and believe in the “one” truth 
which leads to the conscious effort to preserve one’s face and social status 
(Hofstede 173). 
     In conclusion, comparing the scores for China and Germany on the different 
cultural dimensions allows one to make several assumptions in regard to problems 
and conflicts that might arise between both parties.  China scores significantly higher 
on the Power Distance Index than Germany.  Thus, it can be expected that there 
might be conflicts caused by the different approaches Chinese and Germans tend to 
take toward power distribution and inequality.  While Chinese may emphasize their 
role and status when dealing with Germans, the Germans may feel that the Chinese 
are overemphasizing their social and political status and try to defuse the inequality 
between members of different organizational and social status.   
     A sharp contrast between Chinese and Germans can be observed in regard to 
individualism vs. collectivism.  While the Chinese society is distinctively collectivist, 
Germans value individualism.  Chinese need to belong to a group which contrasts 
starkly to the German quest for self-fulfillment.  It is reasonable to expect conflicts 
between Chinese and Germans when working and discussing topics in teams.  
While Germans speak their mind in the group, Chinese are likely to go with group 
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opinion and not openly challenge the opinion of others.  However, that does not 
mean that the Chinese agree with the opinion of the group, but that a Chinese might 
voice her/his doubts in talks with close colleagues after the meeting.  This indirect 
approach might confuse and irritate the Germans.  The example shows that there 
are numerous possibilities for serious conflicts between Chinese and Germans due 
to their different cultural imprint.  
       The Chinese Masculinity Index (MAS) –score of 50 is a medium value, while the 
German value with 66 is significantly higher.  Gender roles are more distinct in 
Germany than in China.  The medium value for China could be a side effect of the 
predominant collectivism in the Chinese culture.  Thus, collectivist behavior results in 
the part-taking in jobs with no regard to gender.  Although Germans and Chinese 
seem to have different values regarding the distinction of gender roles, the 
differences should prove to be not too significant when dealing with each other. 
     China and Germany have a medium value on the Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
(UAI).  Both countries, therefore, stress the need for preventing uncertainty and risk.  
Due to different characteristics of China and Germany on the PDI, each takes a 
different approach to resolve problems arising from uncertainty and risk.  Chinese 
tend to stress the importance of authority while Germans, with their focus on 
equality, emphasize the need for rules and processes to deal with uncertainty and 
risk. Therefore, considerable differences exist which can result in frictions and 
conflict between the Chinese and the Germans.  
     The Chinese score the highest on the Long-Term-Orientation Index (LTO).  In 
contrast, German culture is relatively short-term orientated.  The significant different 
scores lead to conflicting values and strategies.  For example, the Chinese might 
focus more strongly on long-term results vs. the German’s desire for quick results.  
Furthermore, while Chinese emphasize the need for harmony in the group and the 
adherence of its members to this standard, German stress the search for “one truth” 
and the preservation of one’s face and social status. These conflicting values can 
lead to considerable frictions when dealing with business strategies as well in team 
discussions.  
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2.4 Distinct Chinese Culture Characteristics 
 
2.4.1 Fundamental Beliefs and Values  
     To understand Chinese culture and communication, one has to understand the 
importance of the philosophical teachings of Taoism and Confucianism for Chinese 
culture.  In the Chinese culture, there is no individual as in the Western concept of 
the individual.  Rather, in the Chinese culture, the individual, i.e. the self, is 
incomplete.  Redding observes that (The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 95):  
life in a collectivist and group-dominated society means that the Chinese self 
is not isolated in the same sense as the Western one.  Other people are 
bound up into the identity of any single Chinese person, and the relationships 
are carried round as part of the person.  He or she is inextricable from that 
network and not really understandable in isolation. 
     Thus, the Chinese self, and, therefore, the cultural and communicative behavior, 
cannot be understood by analyzing the Chinese self alone, but rather by describing 
and analyzing the determinants of Chinese society.  One has to understand the 
cultural matrix in which the Chinese self is embedded.  The determinants are 
fundamental beliefs and values, social structures, relationship rules for dealing with 
in- and outsiders and the rules for action, particularly in business context.   Figure 12 
shows the cultural determinants of individual Chinese values according to Redding. 
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Figure 12:  Cultural Determinants of Individual Chinese Values,  S. Gordon Redding,  The Spirit 
of Chinese Capitalism,  De Gruyter Studies in Organization,  Ed. Stewart Clegg,  Vol. 22.  
Berlin; New York:  Walter de Gruyter,  1990,  43. 
 
     In Taoism, the self is part of nature and together, self and nature, form a 
harmonious relationship.  In the Confucian sense, the self is defined by the relations 
one has with others.  For example, the relations one has with one’s parents (G. Gao 
83).  G. Gao and Ting-Toomey observe that “Confucianism asserts that individuality 
and the true self do not belong together; rather, social and ethical responsibilities 
define the self.” (8-9)  The concept of the self in relations to others is supported by 
cultural values such as filial piety, loyalty, dignity and integrity.  Thus, a Chinese is 
sensitive to his position as being above, below or equal to others in his/her 
relationship network (G. Gao 83).  Confucius’ fundamental teachings can be 
summarized into 4 lessons (Hofstede 165): 
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(1) The stability of society is based on unequal relationships between people 
(2) The family is the prototype of all social organizations 
(3) Virtuous behavior towards other consists of not treating others as one would 
not like to be treated oneself 
(4) Virtue with regard to one’s tasks in life consists of trying to acquire skills and 
education, working hard, not spending more than necessary, being patient 
and persevering. 
     Buddhism has been incorporated relatively easily into Confucianism since 
Buddhism is a wider philosophy of man’s relation to the world and is complimentary 
to Confucian’s thinking in regard to the practical ethics of daily life.  Buddhism does 
not worship a god, but is more concerned about how one lives with his nature and 
seeks harmony of all nature’s things (Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 50-
51). 
     The social structures which include the family, networks and ethnicity are also 
important to the Chinese self.  A family is the basic survival unit and is basically 
focused on “protecting and enhancing the family resources on which they are in turn 
highly dependent.” (Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 53)  In regard to the 
notion that Chinese self only exists in relational terms and that one is nothing without 
one’s family, Redding notes that (The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 53):  
One can see from this the way in which the person is perceived to exist only in 
terms of his immediate family network, and by extension that society is seen 
as comprising not individuals – who in themselves have no legitimate place – 
but families, around which life is formed.  
     Networks are useful when family’s resources are inadequate and networks 
beyond family or kinship are utilized.  The four main characteristics along which 
these networks form are those, first, based on kinship, second, defined by regional 
origin, third, based on dialect and fourth, derived from occupation or craft.  These 
networks are especially significant and have proven useful for Chinese operations 
outside China where cooperation among Chinese is needed.  Further social 
structures are based upon ethnicity which can also mean that Chinese communities 
deliberately isolate themselves from the native citizens in their new host countries in 
order to maintain group identity and solidarity.  The Chinese language serves as a 
further deterrence against outsiders  (Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 56-
58).  
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     Chinese emphasize the skill of being able to deal with and conform to horizontal 
and vertical relationships.  Filial piety is a cornerstone of the Chinese understanding 
of relationships.  One has to obey the head of the organization or family.  
Challenging the formal authority is rare and not desirable.  The Chinese individual 
understands and respects the superior-subordinate relationship which is taught to 
him by cultivation of filial piety in the family in which total obedience to the family 
head is paid.  Collectivism has been discussed by Hofstede above in Chapter 3.2.1 
and refers to the inextricable embedment of the self in relationships; ultimately the 
Chinese individual self cannot exist without the group.  Face refers to the standing of 
the individual self in the group.  The value or worth of the self is constructed by the 
group and expresses itself through the worth of the face (Redding, The Spirit of 
Chinese Capitalism 59-63).  The concept of face is elaborated in detail in Chapter 
3.3.2. 
     Limited and bounded trust is exercised by Chinese individuals as one only trusts 
someone else to the extent to which the person is a family member, a friend or 
otherwise connected.  There is a limited amount of trust in others and, thus, non-
cooperation is more likely than cooperation.  In order for Chinese society to work, 
individuals form connections in order to be able do business or deal with each other 
(Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 66-67).  The Chinese term for 
establishing and maintaining connections is guanxi; the concept of guanxi is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
     The rules for individual Chinese economic behavior are work ethic, money and 
frugality and pragmatism.  Chinese people are generally seen as hard-working which 
seems to be a direct result of filial piety turned into practice through one’s fulfilling of 
duty of working hard for one’s superiors.  Chinese people know how to achieve and 
deal with money as illustrated by the success of Overseas Chinese businesses.  But 
money has to be spent frugally.  But the frugally generally tends to be rather self-
directed and towards the own family than in terms of hospitality towards friends and 
business partners.  Money-mindness and frugality can be seen as subsets of 
pragmatism as one does not feel obligation towards others except for money.  The 
Chinese live in a network society which encourages the use of reciprocity.  Thus, 
“the network society is designed for mutual exploitation,” (Redding, The Spirit of 
Chinese Capitalism 72) and one acts pragmatically, not ideological in order to secure 
one’s own and one’s family survival.  
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     The four cultural determinants, fundamental beliefs and values, social structures, 
relationships and rules for actions as described in Figure 23 illustrate the radical 
difference of Chinese thinking and culture from other, especially Western, culture.  
Chinese tend to perceive situations as a whole.  If one looks at the various 
determinants one can conclude that “cause for the Chinese is a matter of 
‘connectedness,’ of understanding the mutual, reciprocal interplays between a large 
array of forces.” (Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 76).  Thus, Chinese 
culture is not focused on the individual issue or person, but on the interplay between 
persons and issues and the ultimate harmony between all forces. 
 
2.4.2 Guanxi 
     Guanxi translates literally with “connections”, but refers to a relationship based on 
mutual obligation and reciprocity (M.-J. Chen 46).  The connection or guanxi “can be 
based on family or place of origin, as in the past, or on other associations, for 
example, working together in a particular organization in the past.” (Lockett 489)  
Guanxi is “a relationship between two people who are expected, more or less, to 
give as good as they get.” (Seligman 34)  “Guanxi relationships are defined by a 
strict ethic of reciprocity and obligation” (Vanhonacker “When Good Guanxi Turns 
Bad” 18).  The use of guanxi is one of the possibilities to come to terms with the 
highly personal and noncodified nature of Chinese culture (Ng 37). 
     Davis states that “there is a very broad and deep meaning in Chinese culture to 
guanxi that goes beyond just the definitions of relationships or friendships.  It really 
goes deeper into the issue of trust, respect, care and [the] human relationships that 
relate to business.” (McClenahen 45)  Vanhonacker adds, “guanxi is part of the 
fabric of Chinese society.  Personal relationships are central to every aspect of 
Chinese society, including business.” ("Guanxi Networks,"49)  Furthermore, “to most 
Chinese, guanxi has its own moral code and serves a necessary social function.” 
(Vanhonacker "Guanxi Networks,"45)  For business, guanxi is “a form of social 
capital.”  (McClenahen 40) 
     Guanxi can pave the way for individuals and organizations in various instances 
such as the fast issuance of a business license.  Guanxi can make things possible 
which beforehand seemed to be impossible when dealing with Chinese.  Guanxi can 
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also offer protection and is the key to getting things accomplished within the 
complicated legal system of China (Seligman 34-35).  One of the most important 
features of guanxi in the context of culture and communication is the ability of guanxi 
to be face-enhancing.  The more guanxi one has and the more powerful the people 
are that one has guanxi with, the more face one has (Luo 14).   
     Luo summarizes the concept of guanxi by writing that guanxi (2):  
refers to the concept of drawing on connections in order to secure favors in 
personal relations.  It forms an intricate, pervasive relational network which 
the Chinese cultivate energetically, subtly, and imaginatively.  It contains 
implicit mutual obligations, assurances, and understanding, and governs 
Chinese attitudes toward long-term social and business relationships.  
Broadly, guanxi means interpersonal linkage with the implication of continued 
exchange of favors. […] What is special about guanxi is the fact that it is 
ubiquitous and plays a fundamental role in daily life.  The Chinese have 
turned guanxi into a carefully calculated science.  Constructing and 
maintaining guanxi is a common preoccupation for entrepreneurs, managers, 
officials, and even college students. 
     Luo also asserts that guanxi is (10-11): 
 Transferable 
 Reciprocal 
 Intangible 
 Essentially utilitarian 
 Contextual 
 Long-term oriented 
 Personal 
     Guanxi is transferable since A can have a friend B and C and introduce B to C or 
vice versa.  Guanxi is reciprocal, because favors are exchanged between A and B in 
order to establish and maintain guanxi.  If the favor by A is not returned by B, B loses 
face which serves as a deterrent to opportunistic behavior by B.  Guanxi is 
intangible, because it is an unspoken commitment of A to B by an invisible and 
unwritten code of reciprocity.  Guanxi bonds through the exchange of favors and not 
through friendship which makes guanxi utilitarian and not emotion-related.  Guanxi is 
contextual because giving the right and appropriate gift in the situation calls for a 
context-sensitive approach.  Since every guanxi relationship is regarded as a kind of 
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stock to be used when needed and not immediately, guanxi relationships are long-
term oriented.  Lastly, guanxi is personal; it cannot be attached to organizations but 
to a certain person in an organization which means that if the person leaves the 
organization, the guanxi leaves the organization with this person as well (Luo 12-13). 
     In conclusion, guanxi is a relationship between two persons who reciprocate 
favors and are obliged to each other.  The guanxi between these two persons might 
have been established by common dialect, work, family- or clan network.  Guanxi is 
transferable, long-term oriented and can help individuals to achieve results they 
would otherwise not have been able to achieve.  Also, guanxi can be face-
enhancing.  Hence, guanxi is part of the fabric of Chinese society and plays an 
imminent role in daily Chinese life.  
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3 Communication 
 
 
3.1 Definition of Communication 
 
N. J. Adler observes (73): 
All business activity involves communicating.  Within global businesses, 
activities such as leading, negotiating, decision making, problem solving, and 
exchanging information and ideas are all based on the ability of mangers and 
employees from one culture to communicate successfully with colleagues, 
clients, and suppliers from other cultures. 
     Thus, in order to be globally active and successful, it is necessary for one to 
understand what communication is and how to utilize it appropriately.  Trying to 
define communication is harder than it might seem at first glance since more than 
126 different definitions of the word communication have been found.  Frey defines 
communication as “the processes by which verbal and nonverbal messages are 
used to create and share meaning.” (28)  The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
defines communication as “the activity or process of expressing ideas and feelings or 
of giving people information.” (243)  Jandt defines communication as the “process of 
intentionally stimulating meaning in other humans through the use of symbols” (498).  
Lustig and Koester define communication as “a symbolic process in which people 
create shared meaning.” (25)  Samovar, Porter and Stefani state that communication 
“is a dynamic, systematic process in which meanings are created and reflected in 
human interaction with symbols.” (24)   
     Thus, drawing on all presented definitions, communication is 
A process in which symbols are used in verbal and nonverbal 
messages to convey information and create shared meaning. 
     Shannon and Weaver developed the first model of communication which is 
illustrated in Figure 13.  The model is linear and can be best understood by 
imagining that the communication process is similar to a movie.  If one stops the film 
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for a moment, one sees a frame with the communication taking place between the 
sender and the receiver.  In fact, communication is more dynamic with a continuous 
flow of messages and changing roles of sender and receiver as is shown later in the 
transactional communication model. 
INFORMATION 
SOURCE
TRANSMITTER DESTINATIONRECEIVER
MESSAGE
SIGNAL RECEIVED 
SIGNAL
MESSAGE
NOISE SOURCE
 
Figure 13:  Model of Communication,  Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver,  The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication,  Urbana:  University of Illinois Press,  1949,  7. 
 
     A source formulates a message and uses the transmitter to send it.  The 
transmitter generates a signal.  The signal might be influenced or distorted by a 
noise source.  Thus, the receiver receives the (distorted) signal and converts it into a 
message. The message is passed on to the destination by the receiver10.  The model 
developed by Weaver and Shannon is a basic description of the communication 
process.  It laid the foundation for the development of more enhanced models of the 
communication process.   
     Figure 14 displays the communication process in consideration of a more precise 
description of the several steps in the communication process.  Figure 14 also allows 
for the introduction of the feedback process back from the receiver to the sender and 
the influence of context on both the sender and the receiver.  
                                            
 
10 A more detailed definition and descriptions of the terms used in the communication models follows 
later in this chapter. 
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Figure 14:  The Components of Communication,  Fred E. Jandt,  Intercultural 
Communication: An Introduction,  3rd ed.,  Thousand Oaks:  Sage Publications,  2001,  29. 
 
     The source in the communication model refers to “some person or group of 
person with a purpose, a reason for engaging in communication” (Berlo 30).  By 
encoding ideas and thoughts into symbols and words, the receiver translates the 
ideas and thoughts into a message.  The message is created to supply information 
to the receiver and can be transmitted verbally and nonverbally (Heath and Bryant 
70). 
     The term “message” can be defined further. Messages, according to McQuail, are 
“symbolic constructs that have a meaningful reference to sender, receiver, or 
environment.” (330)  Complementing, a message can be seen as a stimulus whose 
meaning is defined by the receiver (Heath and Bryant 76).  Thus, message and 
meaning are connected; a message creates a meaning for a person.  Heath and 
Bryant observe that “meaning is the product that results as a person interprets 
behavior – verbal and nonverbal – of another.” (77)  Therefore, the receiver deducts 
the meaning of a message from interpreting the encoded information in the message 
which has been transmitted through a channel.     
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     The channel is the means by which the message is sent from the source to the 
receiver.  The channel can be a letter, a speech or a TV commercial, for example.  
Some researchers have challenged the thought that a channel is only transmitting 
the message.  Rather, these researchers allege that the channel – the medium – is 
the message.  Due to the different kinds of channels, for example, TV and texts, the 
channel may influence or convey messages differently.  Children are able to store 
and remember information more easily if they have obtained the information by 
watching it on TV, compared to receiving the same information by reading a book.  
Thus, a channel may enrich or amplify the message (Heath and Bryant 80-82).  
     The receiver in due time releases a response to indicate that he/she received 
(and possibly) understood the message.  The feedback refers to the response of the 
receiver and of which the source has knowledge and can assign meaning (Jandt 32).  
To be more precise, feedback is the “information a person (or machine) receives and 
interprets that allows him or her to determine whether his or her action (such as 
message) had the desired effect to achieve a goal, such as to inform a receiver.” 
(Heath and Bryant 75)  Thus, the feedback is not receiver-centered, but source-
centered.  The source decides on the feedback received from the receiver whether 
the receiver understood the message, whether the source has to modify the 
messages or whether the source has to change the goal it was pursuing, such as 
persuading the receiver, for example.     
     The communication process may be disturbed or distorted by noise.  According to 
DeVito noise can be “anything that distorts the message, anything that prevents the 
receiver from receiving the message.” (Essentials of Human Communication 14)  
DeVito differentiates between 4 different types of noise (Essentials of Human 
Communication 15):  
(1) Physical, i.e. external interference, for example, loud background noise during 
a conversation 
(2) Physiological, i.e. physical barriers within the speaker or listener, for example, 
a hearing impairment of the listener 
(3) Psychological, i.e. mental interferences or stereotypes, for example, a 
prejudice against the speaker 
(4) Semantic, i.e. speaker and listener assigning different meanings, for example, 
speaker and listener speak different languages. 
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     The last component of communication is context.  One can distinguish between 
physical context (e.g. tangible or concrete environment), the cultural context (e.g. 
lifestyle, values, belief), the social-psychological context (e.g. status relationship 
among the speakers) and the temporal context (e.g. how does the message fit into 
the sequence of events?) (DeVito, Essentials of Human Communication 7).  The 
context of a communication process also shapes the communication, its symbols, 
the message and the expected response (Jandt 32). 
     Singer offers a conclusive summary of the communication process (107): 
[…] communication is a process. As such it is continually operating, through 
feedback, which the environment and with everyone and everything in that 
environment. It is an ongoing process […]. It is applicable regardless of the 
level analysis. The same process operates whether one considers intra-or 
interpersonal communication, intra-or intergroup communication, or intra-or 
international communication. Of course, the specifics of how that process 
operates change as one changes the actors and settings, but the process 
remains constant. 
     The transactional communication model in Figure 15 illustrates Singer’s 
statement.  Both participants continuously send and receive messages which are 
decoded and to which feedback is sent through one or more channels.  A and B’s 
environments overlap and noise is present at all stages of the communication 
process which influences the communication process between both participants.  
What has been labeled context in the Figure 15 is in fact the environment which in 
communication theory includes setting, cultural background, experiences, etc. that 
influence a person’s communication behavior (Adler and Rodman 12). 
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Figure 15:  Transactional Communication Model, adapted from:  Ronald B. Adler, and George 
Rodman.  Understanding Human Communication,  Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  2003,  14. 
 
     Communication is not an activity that is used at certain times or at special 
occasions.  It is an act that all human beings do all the time.  Singer states that “it is 
simply not possible not to communicate.” (103)  This is because “all of us [human 
beings] are engaged in communication 100 percent of the time, twenty-four hours of 
every day.” (Singer 103-104) 
     One does not necessarily have to be consciously communicating.  Singer offers 
the example of a person walking down a crowded street.  Because the person 
receives the messages sent by the people where they are headed and gives 
feedback through sending a message where he/she will walk, the person and the 
other people will not bump into each other.  This communication happens without 
explicit and conscious thought or effort.  Without being consciously aware of the 
communication, both the person and the people on the street have communicated 
with each other.  Therefore, one is consciously unaware of the communication 
action, because one is not directly focus on sending and receiving the messages, but 
one does it without even being fully aware of it (Singer 104).  
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      As seen, context in the communication process has been defined as the 
environment in which the communication process takes place.  The concept of 
context needs to be elaborated further as it refers to more than just the environment 
in which the communication takes place.  Borisoff and Victor observe that contexting 
is “the way in which one communicates and especially the circumstances 
surrounding that communication” (140).  Thus, communication relies on the context 
in which that communication takes place.  Therefore, if two people communicating 
share knowledge and experience, the need for extensively expressing what they 
want to convey decreases.  
     The case of shared knowledge and experience most likely occurs when both 
persons belong to the same culture.  Victor states that “contexting is to a large 
degree culturally learned behavior” (138).  Therefore, members of the same culture 
seldom have to make a conscious effort to bring forth the right level of contexting.  
From childhood to adulthood, the members of a culture subconsciously and 
effortlessly learn the appropriate level of contexting at the same as they learn 
language (Victor 138).  Thus, it seems logical that members of one culture are nearly 
always able to access and grasp the meaning of the message communicated and 
react accordingly.  Because the meaning of communication is always dependent on 
the context, Hall concludes that “the level of context determines everything about the 
nature of the communication and is the foundation on which all subsequent behavior 
rests.” (92) 
 
 
3.2 Hall’s Low-Context and High-Context Communication Model 
 
     Hall differentiates between high- and low-context cultures.  High-context cultures 
are characterized by the fact that most of the information is already in the receiver 
and in the setting.  Only minimal information is transmitted in the course of the 
communication process (101).  Victor complements Hall’s explanation by stating that 
“in highly contexted communication, what individuals choose not to put into words is 
essential to understanding the actual message intended.” (139)  High-context 
cultures require an intensive programming of the individual to connect the sender 
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and receiver at the same cultural level.  High context cultures, even when the 
amount of information grows bigger, are becoming more predictable if one is familiar 
with the system (Hall 53).  High-context communication is, therefore, once the 
individual is programmed over a long period of time, economical, fast and efficient 
(Hall 101).  In high-context cultures authorities feel personally and truly responsible 
for their subordinates as opposed to low-context cultures (Hall 113).  Also, actions in 
high-context cultures are rooted in the past, are highly stable and are slow to 
change.  Therefore, a high-context culture can absorb activism without a threat to its 
institutions and foundations (Hall 93-94).   Tubbs observes that (300): 
Members of high-context cultures are more skilled in reading nonverbal 
behaviors; and they assume that other people will also be able to do so.  
Thus, they speak less than members of low-context cultures and they listen 
more; in general, their communication tends to be indirect and less explicit. 
     In low-context cultures most of the information to be transmitted is in the 
message.  There is not much context in either the receiver or the environment; 
therefore, any provided information has to be detailed to make up for the missing 
context (Hall, Beyond Culture, 101).  Tubbs writes that “members of low-context 
cultures […] stress direct and explicit communication.  They emphasize verbal 
messages and the shared information they encode.” (300)  DeVito contrasts the 
communication behavior of low-context and high-context cultures and finds that 
(Human Communication: The Basic Course 42): 
Members of high-context cultures spend lots of time getting to know one 
another interpersonally and socially before any important transactions take 
place.  Because of this prior personal knowledge, a great deal of information 
is shared by the members and therefore does not have to be explicitly stated.  
Members of low-context cultures spend a great deal less time getting to know 
one another and hence don’t have that shared knowledge.  As a result 
everything has to be stated explicitly. 
     Low-context cultures are highly individualized, fragmented and characterized by 
relatively little involvement with people (Hall 39).  Because the bonds are more 
fragile between the people, it is easier to see trouble or confrontations building up 
because people withdraw or move away.  This contrasts with a high-context culture 
where, due to the strong bonds between members of the same group, problems and 
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conflicts are suppressed and the system is bent until it explodes without warning 
(Hall 127).  Furthermore, low-context cultures do not distinguish as clearly between 
insiders and outsiders as high-context cultures do.  Because responsibility is diffused 
in low-context cultures, in case something goes wrong, the lowest-ranking official or 
member of the group is held responsible for what went wrong (Hall 108-113). 
     Table 7 shows the main differences between low- and high-context cultures. 
 
Direct; explicitIndirect; inferential
Communication approach
LowHigh
Attention to intention
HighLow
Attention to detail
LowHigh
Reliance on nonverbal 
communication
HighLow
Reliance on words to 
communicate
BindingNot binding
Agreements based on written 
words (contracts)
Not bindingBinding
Agreements based on personal 
promises
Governed by external rules and 
regulations
Governed by individual perception
Governance of interpersonal 
behavior
StrongWeakEmphasis on written word
Low ContextHigh Context
 
 
Table 7:  Summary of Main Differences Between High- and Low-Context Cultures in 
Communication,  based on:  David A. Victor,  International Business Communication,  New 
York:  HarperCollins Publishers,  1992,  149, 153. 
 
     The Chinese culture, on the one hand, ranks very high on the high-context culture 
scale.  Evidence can be found in the fact that in order to understand the Chinese 
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language, one has to understand context as there are over 214 radicals11 in the 
Chinese language.  Furthermore, the Chinese language can only be understood 
when being literate in Chinese culture, as well as knowing the right pronunciation 
due to the different meanings of words when emphasizing certain parts (Hall 91-92).  
Thus, one needs to do a significant amount of contexting in order to decipher and 
understand the Chinese language and the meaning being transmitted.  Germany, on 
the other hand, ranks at the lower end of the high-low-context scale, along with 
Scandinavia and the German-Swiss culture (Hall 91).  Figure 16 illustrates the gap in 
contexting between China and Germany on the contextual continuum.   
                                            
 
11 A radical (from Latin radix, meaning "root") is a basic identifiable component of every Chinese 
character. The name is an English translation of the characters  (bù shǒu), literally meaning 
"partial head", where "head" means "the most important (part)."  Radicals are used in Chinese 
dictionaries, Kanji-Japanese dictionaries, and Hanja-Korean dictionaries to order characters in sets by 
the number of stroke s they contain.  Full characters are ordered according to their initial radicals, 
which fall into roughly 214 types. Then these are subcategorised by their total number of strokes 
(TheFreeDictionary.com Chinese Radicals). 
  - 83 -  
Swiss
Germans
Scandinavians
North Americans
English
Italians/Spanish
Latin Americans
Chinese
Arabs
Japanese
Explicit Implicit
Low
High
Context
Messages
 
Figure 16:  The Contextual Continuum of Differing Cultures,  based on:  Svend Hollensen, 
Global Marketing: A Market-Responsive Approach,  2nd ed.,  Harlow, England:  Pearson 
Education Limited,  2001,  162;  and  Edward T. Hall,  Beyond Culture,  New York:  Anchor 
Books,  1976,  91. 
 
     When looking at Figure 16, one can see that Germany ranks at the lower bottom 
of the contextual continuum while China ranks at the top.  Thus, different 
communication behavior and ensuing communication problems between Chinese 
and German individuals can be expected.  For example, Chinese might perceive the 
Germans as being too direct and too outspoken while Germans might view Chinese 
as being too indirect, close-lipped and vague.  Therefore, Chinese and Germans 
should anticipate problems in their communication with each other and try to be 
aware of potential problems and misunderstandings that could arise.  
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3.3 Distinct Chinese Characteristics in Communication 
 
     G. Gao and Ting-Toomey assert that in Chinese, communication is a foreign 
concept as there is no single word that adequately translates the term 
“communication”. (5)  Thus, “the Chinese way of communicating can only be 
understood, explained and interpreted only in its cultural context.” (G. Gao and Ting-
Toomey 36)  Consequently, “the primary functions of communication in the Chinese 
culture are to maintain existing relationships among individuals […] and to preserve 
harmony within the group.” (G.Gao 96) 
 
3.3.1 Insider vs. Outsider Communication Approach 
     As G. Gao observes, “Chinese make clear distinctions between insiders and 
outsiders, and this distinction exists on all levels of interpersonal interactions.” (87)  
To become a zi ji ren (insider) one has to has to show the 5 characteristics niceness, 
trustworthiness, caring, helpfulness and empathy.  Chinese seldom disclose 
personal information to wai ren (outsider), but tend to have honest and truthful 
conversations with insiders (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 15).  Thus, “the nature of a 
relationship determines what is communicated and how information should be 
communicated.” (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 50)   
     Transforming one’s relationship from outsider to insider is a time-consuming and 
arduous process because in the Chinese context the development of personal 
relationship usually takes a long time (G. Gao 88).  The Chinese insider vs. outsider 
communication concept identified by G. Gao and G. Gao and Ting-Toomey is also 
closely related to the concept of collectivist cultures as identified by Hofstede in his 
individualism vs. collectivism cultural dimension.  The different treatment of insiders 
and outsiders in communication as well as in everyday life complicates the 
interaction of Chinese people with unknown strangers.  Subsequently, Chinese 
intermediaries are chosen to introduce people to each other as well as to mediate 
between different parties to avoid the loss of face and preserve interpersonal 
harmony between the parties (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 49,64).  G. Gao concludes 
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that “intermediaries both formal and informal play a very important role in Chinese 
personal relationships.” (97)   
 
3.3.2 Mian Zi (Face) 
     Ho defines face as “the recognition by others of one’s social standing and 
position, and thus must be seen as situationally defined rather than part of 
personality.” (Lockett 488)  Most cultures know the concept of face as “an intangible 
resource that is vital to a person’s reputation, dignity and prestige.” (Seligman 37)  
People in all cultures engage in communicative acts to maintain, negotiate and enact 
self-face, uphold, support or challenge other people’s face.  The conceptualization of 
face includes (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 56): 
 A sense of one’s social self-worth or other’s assessments of our social 
“worthiness” or both and 
 A vulnerable resource in social interactions given that it can be threatened, 
attacked, maintained, and enhanced. 
     In the context of Chinese culture, two concepts represent the notion of face.  Lian, 
on the hand, means “face” and refers to the moral dimension of face and is 
internalized.  Mian or mian zi, on the other hand, refers to the social and positional 
image and is externalized (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 55)  G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 
observe that “mian zi influences how we [the Chinese] perceive ourselves, how we 
relate to others, and how we speak to others.  It is central to the Chinese self-
conception and relational development.” (57)  “Facework management hence is 
essential to various aspects of personal and interpersonal relationship development 
in the Chinese culture.” (G. Gao 96) 
     Seligman adds that (37): 
 Mian zi, money and power are the three key motivators in China 
 An affront to personal dignity causes a loss of face 
 Chinese spend a lot of time thinking about face and put more relevance upon 
it 
 Things that make others look up to you or envy you confer face on you 
     According to G. Gao, mian zi has at least three significant implications for 
Chinese’s everyday life.  First, face and the fear of face-loss lead to the regulation of 
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one’s behavior. Second, due to the concern about face, one consciously decides 
what to disclose and not to disclose in personal relationships.  Finally, face is a not 
only a personal concern, but also a group concern because face-loss also reflects on 
one’s own family (G. Gao 95-96).  Additionally, “how much face an individual has 
depends partly on his or her guanxi network.  The larger one’s guanxi network and 
the more powerful the people connected with it are, the more face on has.” (Luo 14) 
     To preserve face, Chinese engage among other approaches in the following 
communication strategies (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 60): 
 Nonconfrontation 
 Compliance strategies 
 Provisional responses 
 Using intermediaries 
     Chinese prefer the nonconfrontational communication style as Chinese see 
conflict and confrontation as unpleasant and undesirable as conflict and 
confrontation are contradictory to harmony.  Subsequently, “Chinese cherish and 
nurture the belief that conflict should be approached with self-control and self-
restraint “ because “to construct and present criticism in a nonthreatening, face-
saving and gentle manner is a highly desirable interpersonal skill.” (G. Gao and Ting-
Toomey 61-62)  G. Gao and Ting-Toomey explain that (62): 
Concern for other face often leads to nonconfrontational style of conflict 
management, such as avoiding obliging and compromising. […] The relational 
self either avoids face-threatening situations or seeks some type of 
compromise so as not to make the interdependent parties lose face.  This 
strategy of conflict management not only enables both parties to preserve 
harmony but also helps affirm the relational identity of the self. 
     Compliance strategies are also used in the Chinese cultural context to preserve 
and give face.  Subsequently, Chinese do not argue or disagree overtly with one in 
public and, thus, do not negotiate the meaning of messages in public communication 
because negotiating messages would threaten interpersonal harmony and the 
authority of the communication partner.  Therefore, “Chinese tend to adopt an 
unassertive style of communication in interpersonal interactions.” (G. Gao and Ting-
Toomey 63)  Rather, the indirect and unassertive communication manners allow 
negotiations in private.  “This style of communication enables them to accomplish 
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their own agenda but also creates an amicable climate for future cooperation and 
negotiation.” (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 63)   
     Directly related to the unassertive communication style used in compliance 
strategies are the provisional responses given by Chinese in conversations.  Without 
ever saying directly “no,” Chinese label requests to be “inconvenient” and the 
implementation of requested tasks “to be difficult.”  Even when agreeing, Chinese 
leave room for retreat to make allowance for unforeseen developments.  Thus, 
“Chinese communication is inherently negotiable.  Compromise, intervention and 
mediation are an integral part of Chinese communication processes.” (G. Gao and 
Ting-Toomey 65)  Consequently, to preserve face, Chinese also use intermediaries 
to negotiate with other’s in case of conflicts to avoid confrontation and loss of face of 
either party (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 65).  A nonconfrontational and unassertive 
communication style, thus, ensures the preservation of face and harmony amongst 
the Chinese communicators. 
     Table 8 illustrates the main distinctions between low and high face-saving 
cultures.  One can observe that due to the opposite behavior of low and high face-
saving cultures, Germans and Chinese who rank at the lower and top part of the 
face-saving continuum respectively might face serious problems in communicating 
with each other. For example, when communicating in a business situation, Chinese 
people probably favor an indirect communication approach to problems while 
Germans might rather forcefully push the topic in the conversation.  This opposite 
type of communication behavior is probably going to cause irritation, frustration and 
mistrust on both sides. 
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UntoleratedToleratedVagueness
HighLow
Amount of verbal disclosure
Dishonest; offensiveCivil; considerate; honestView of indirectness
Honest; inoffensive
Uncivil; inconsiderate; 
offensive
View of directness
Confrontation strategy; direct 
plan
Politeness strategy; indirect plan
Favored business 
communication approach
Low Face-saving High Face-saving
 
 
Table 8:  Characteristics of High and Low Face-saving Cultures,  David A. Victor,  International 
Business Communication,  New York:  HarperCollins Publishers,  1992,  160. 
 
     Jia writes that “communication is also a fundamental part of face. […] Whatever 
happens to face and however it happens, whether it is lost, regained, hurt, and torn 
apart, it happens in communication; it is an inseparable part of communication, a 
product of communication, and a motive and means for communication.” (50)  Thus, 
face without communication is not possible and one can only gain, lose or give face 
by communicating with someone else.  The concept of face is closely interrelated 
with the concept of contexting in communication.  According to Victor, “the more 
highly contexted a culture is, the more importance its members attach to face-
saving.” (160)  Figure 17 shows the ranking of different countries on a continuum of 
contexting in communication.  As one expects, the Chinese with a high degree of 
contextualization in communication (see Hall earlier in this chapter) rank at the top of 
the continuum.  The Germans rank at the lower bottom of the continuum with low 
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contexting skills and a low emphasis on face-saving.  The profound contrasting 
values for both cultures might cause serious problems when Chinese and Germans 
deal with each.  For example, Germans might inadvertly cause a loss of face to their 
Chinese counterpart by being too explicit in the communication process.   
 
Swiss
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Chinese
Arabs
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Face-Saving
Cultures
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Face-Saving
Cultures
Sender
Information
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Figure 17:  Face-saving Ranking of Cultures in Consideration of Cultural Contexting,  based 
on:  David A. Victor,  International Business Communication,  New York:  HarperCollins 
Publishers,  1992,  160.   
 
     In conclusion, mian zi is the face; the external and social image of a Chinese 
person and can be gained, lost or given.  To engage in facework, i.e. improve one’s 
face or give face, one has to engage in communication.  Thus, communication is an 
integral part of mian zi.  The concept of face or mian zi is an essential part of 
interpersonal relationship of Chinese people and influences the way Chinese people 
think and act.  Nonconfrontational communication and compliance strategies, as well 
as provisional responses and intermediaries are used to prevent conflict, preserve 
harmony and maintain mian zi for all parties engaged in the communication act. 
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3.4 Synthesis Chinese Culture & Communication 
 
     Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism lie at the heart of Chinese culture 
fundamental beliefs and values.  The fundamental beliefs and values in turn 
influence the social structure of Chinese society, i.e. family, networks and ethnicity.  
To understand Chinese culture, one has to understand the interdependence of these 
different philosophies and their effects on Chinese behavior and communication.   
     In Chapter 3.2.1 the different cultural dimensions according to Hofstede were 
analyzed.  The cultural dimensions power distance, uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism vs. collectivism are chosen for further analysis because these cultural 
dimensions are able to make a significant contribution in regard to the subsequent 
analysis of the role of culture in the understanding of the uniqueness of Chinese 
culture as well as the choice of market entry mode.   
     By combining the positions of China and Germany on the cultural dimensions 
power distance12 and uncertainty avoidance13 with the configurations of 
organizations according to Mintzberg, one can observe the differences between 
China and Germany in their approach to organizational models in Figure 18.  The 
difference is significant despite the relative similarity of both countries scores on the 
uncertainty avoidance index.  The Chinese model of organization stresses the need 
for a simple structure with one supervisor at the top of the hierarchy.  The supervisor 
gives the orders and expects subordinance by those who rank lower than the 
supervisor.  By practicing direct supervision over all levels and processes of the 
organization, the strategic apex of the organization becomes the most important part 
of the organization.  The organizational model is a direct result of the Chinese 
cultural characteristic/preference for a large power distance and the need for clear 
and decisive leadership in ambiguous situations as exercised by a leader on top of 
the organization (Hoecklin 67).  
                                            
 
12 Power Distance Index (PDI):  China:  80 and Germany:  39 
13 Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI):  China:  60 and Germany:  65 
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Figure 18:  Preferred Organizational Configuration and Coordination Mechanisms,  adapted 
from:  Lisa Hoecklin,  Managing Cultural Differences: Strategies for Comparative Advantages,  
Harlow, England,  Pearson Education Limited,  1995,  67. 
 
     In contrast, German culture prefers the organizational model of a professional 
bureaucracy.  The cultural preference for equality among members of the German 
culture expresses itself through the standardization of skills among the members of 
the organization.  As opposed to the Chinese culture, the sole direct supervision by 
one person is undesired.  The emphasis lies on the standardization of skills; resulting 
in the operating core of the company as being the key part of the organization.  The 
focus of the German model of organization does not lie on the personal level, as is 
the case in China, but on the impersonal performing of organizational tasks and 
processes by a highly trained and professional bureaucracy.  The bureaucracy is 
supported by detailed and explicit guidelines and rules for processes in the 
organization. Other countries, such as France, the USA and Great Britain have 
different organization forms due to differing power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance index values (Hoecklin 67). 
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      The highly differing values of Chinese and Germans on the individualism vs. 
collectivism index (IDV)14  are liable to disrupt interactions between Chinese and 
Germans.  Collective societies place the welfare of the group above the welfare of 
the individual and group members look after each other and individual, from the 
group opinion dissenting beliefs are not tolerated.  Germans express their opinions 
openly in a discussion and thereby reach group consensus.  The declination of 
Chinese to speak out in the group and in presence of the superior is due to the need 
to preserve the harmony within the group and the authority of the group leader.  The 
respect for the authority of the group leader is related to the powerful status ascribed 
to authorities in high power distance culture. 
     Indeed, Hofstede notes that there is a negative correlation between IDV and PDI, 
i.e. a country that scores high on the IDV has a low score on the PDI and vice versa.  
Adds Redding, “those culture with high power distance also exhibit high levels of 
collectivism, those with low power distance are characterized normally by 
individualism.” (The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 62)  The assertions by Hofstede 
and Redding apply for China (high power distance; collectivistic) and Germany (low 
power distance; individualistic) as can be observed by their rankings on the PDI and 
IDV.  Hofstede writes that “in cultures in which people are dependent on ingroups 
these people are usually also dependent on power figures.  Most extended families 
have patriarchal structures with the head of the family exercising strong moral 
authority.” (55)   
      Another relation exists between the cultural dimensions power distance by 
Hofstede and filial piety as taught by Confucius.  The filial piety concept as discussed 
in Chapter 3.4.1 shows that the “individual has a built in sense of the legitimacy of 
the superior-subordinate relationship,” (Redding The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 61) 
that the superior is to be obeyed at all times and an open challenge of authority is 
discouraged.  The definition is nearly identical to the one given by Hofstede for the 
cultural dimension power distance (Redding The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism 61).  
Thus, it seems appropriate to view these cultural determinants as one.   
     Chinese communicate differently with insiders and outsiders as they usually are 
conscious about what to disclose to outsiders as opposed to relative honesty 
                                            
 
14 IDV:  China:  20 and Germany:  67 
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towards insiders.  Whoever is in the ingroup has access to resources and 
information and can expect a truthful and honest communication style as well as 
limited and bounded trust by other members of the group.  Whoever is outside the 
group cannot expect to obtain the same treatment of amount of information or trust 
as an insider.  The differential treatment of insiders and outsiders is akin to the 
loyalty, respect and trust group members place on other group members in 
collectivist societies as identified by Hofstede.  
     The concept of guanxi, connection or relationship, is closely connected to the 
concepts of and collectivism and the insider vs. outsider communication approach.  
In collectivist cultures, people belong to groups and are taught the values and goals 
of the group which creates a bond between the members.  Guanxi is established 
within the closed group (collectivism) through the sharing of confidential information 
(insider vs. outsider communication approach).  The pervasiveness of guanxi in 
Chinese society is rooted in the fact that Chinese do not trust outsiders and only trust 
those they know or have been introduced to.  The same holds true for the 
establishment of networks outside of China which are founded upon Chinese 
ethnicity and networks of friend- or kinship. 
    Face or “mian zi,” is central to the Chinese concept of communication and social 
status derived from the group.  The more face one has, the higher one’s status and 
role within the group is.  Therefore, one’s status depends on the group, on the 
guanxi and the communication one shares with other group members.  Thus, face is 
an essential part of a collectivist society since face can only be of great significance 
if the judgment or opinion of the group is of vital important to one’s self and social 
status as is the case in China.   
     China is a high-context culture while Germany ranks at the lower end of the 
context scale.  According to Victor, “the more highly contexted a culture is, the more 
importance its members attach to face-saving.” (160)  The need for face-giving or -
saving results, for example, in the obedience of superiors or the group leader, a 
characteristic also known in high power distance and collectivist cultures.  The 
relationship between face and contexting has been illustrated in Figure 17 and 
shows that China ranks at the top of the contextual continuum while Germany ranks 
at the lower bottom of the continuum.  Because contexting is high in Chinese culture, 
the need to establish, preserve and increase face is more pronounced in Chinese 
society.  In contrast, German culture is characterized by a low degree of contexting 
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and, subsequently, a low need to preserve face.  Thus, it is important to recognize 
that Chinese individuals place great emphasis on one’s status in the group and the 
proper flow of information through shared codes embedded in contexting and 
differentiating communication behavior towards in- and outsiders. 
       Consequently, If in a communication setting both persons are from a high-
context culture and share the same background, information flows smoothly and 
efficiently and helps to establish a connection, guanxi, between both parties.  Also, 
they are more likely to be able to trust each other; using an insider communication 
approach when communicating with each other.  High-context cultures can be 
expected to be collectivist cultures since one has to interact and spend a significant 
amount of time within in the group to achieve the necessary level of contexting to be 
able to exchange information and meanings with other members of the high-context 
communication culture.   
     Figure 19 shows the three different dimension levels of Chinese communication 
and culture.  The fundamental beliefs of Chinese culture are Confucianism, Taoism 
and Buddhism.  These fundamental beliefs influence the social structures of Chinese 
society, i.e. family, networks and ethnicity.  The area in which these three social 
structures overlap form the core cultural and communicative behavioral 
characteristics of the Chinese individual.  The communicative and cultural 
variables/dimensions guanxi, high contexting, insider vs. outsider communicative 
approach, collectivism, face, and filial piety/PDI influence each other.   
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Figure 19:  Dimensions of Chinese Cultural and Communicative Characteristics 
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     Insider vs. Outsider communication means the different treatment of people 
known and unknown in the communicative behavior of the Chinese speaker.  The 
different treatment of outsiders is also a distinctive feature of groups and collectivist 
societies.  Collectivism requires a shared language and behavior; hence, it is 
anticipatable that high-context communication is a feature of the collectivist Chinese 
society.  Collectivism expressed through high-context communication also leads to 
or is a result of guanxi; the establishment and maintaining of reciprocity-connections.  
By giving as good as one can give, one enhances the face of the other person.   
     The concept of face is especially important in highly contexted cultures as well as 
in collectivist societies since it relates to the worth of one’s self.  Face can be gained 
through guanxi but it is also to be maintained through the strict adherence to 
subordinance towards superiors and the family head, i.e. filial piety and the related 
cultural dimension of power distance.  Each of the listed Chinese communicative 
cultural behavioral features is interdependent or related to another Chinese 
behavioral feature or characteristic.  These variables and determinants illustrate and 
explain the Chinese individual behavior.  This behavior is rooted and demonstrated 
in the social structures of family, networks and organizational structures based on 
ethnicity (for example, Chinese trade chamber).  The underlying forces for the social 
structures and the behavior of Chinese are the beliefs and values conveyed by 
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.   
     This chapter has shed light on the underlying principles and values that govern 
Chinese cultural and communicative behavior.  As one can see in the following 
chapters, these principles and values guide ethnic Chinese business behavior; from 
the management style over to organizational features to the utilization of networks in 
the process of the internationalization of ethnic Chinese businesses. 
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4 Internationalization of Ethnic Chinese Business 
 
 
     When looking at the international expansion of Chinese businesses, one has to 
distinguish between the expansion of ethnic Chinese businesses from outside 
Mainland China, e.g. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, etc., also called Overseas 
Chinese, and the expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses.  This chapter 
analyzes the international expansion of ethnic Chinese businesses from outside 
China.  The analysis might be able to offer valuable explanations, insights and 
suggestions for the expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses which is addressed 
in Chapter 6 because Mainland Chinese businesses are likely to emulate the 
expansion behavior of overseas ethnic Chinese businesses in the 
internationalization process.  
 
 
4.1 Origins and the Internationalization of Ethnic Chinese 
Business 
 
     The expansion of Chinese abroad looks back at a long history.  In the 10th century 
the first Chinese emigrated to the Indian Ocean region.  In the following centuries the 
Chinese established themselves as merchants between the colonial administrators 
from Europe and the local economies.  The first, real emigration wave setting the 
foundation for the worldwide spread of Chinese business was due to political factors.  
During and after the civil war in China that resulted in the communist revolution 
1949, thousands of well-to-do Chinese families sought refuge in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.  Approximately 50,000 families fled and brought with them the equivalent of 
$8 billion to their new host countries.  After World War II and the subsequent 
abandonment of the colonies by the European powers, Chinese businesses filled the 
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gap left by the former colonial powers and extended the Chinese operations in 
Southeast Asia (M.-J. Chen 7-8). 
     For the purpose of the discussion of overseas and ethnic Chinese people the 
terms Overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese are used interchangeably in this 
dissertation and refer to all persons of Chinese ancestry, including Chinese who 
adopted the citizenship of a host country, Chinese who still hold the Chinese 
nationality and those Chinese who are descendants of Chinese parents. (Dudley L. 
Poston).  As of today, more than 90 percent of ethnic Chinese are adopted citizen of 
their chosen country. However, the attachment of Overseas Chinese to the mainland 
is still strong.  Most Overseas Chinese consider themselves more Chinese in terms 
of traditional Confucian values than Mainland Chinese (M.-J. Chen 9).  Lai Tjin Tong 
is an example of the strong bond ethnic Chinese feel toward Mainland China.  Lai 
Tjin Tong was born in Jakarta in 1914 and spent altogether more than 31 years in 
Indonesia, lived in Hong Kong for 11 years and in Singapore for 14 years, and finally 
died in Jakarta in 1995.  Altogether, Lai Tjin Tong lived only approximately 15 years 
in Chinese Meixan, the hometown of his family.  Although Lai Tjin Tong was born in 
Jakarta and his family lived in Hong Kong; nonetheless, a shrine was erected in 
Meixan to honor Lai Tjin Tong and to celebrate Meixan as the place of origin of his 
family (Krüger and Kwok 122-123). 
     Today, approximately 50 million ethnic Chinese live abroad.  Although ethnic 
Chinese are a minority in their adopted home countries, Chinese control a 
disproportionate share of the corresponding economy.  For example, ethnic Chinese 
own up to 80 percent of Indonesia’s corporate assets and run 160 of the 200 largest 
companies.  Ethnic Chinese control 90 percent of all manufacturing in Thailand.  
Also in Thailand, Chinese represent only 1 percent of the population, but control over 
80 percent of the listed firms by market capitalization.  Ethnic Chinese who live and 
conduct business overseas account for an annual output of about $500 billion 
(Yeung, "Globalization of Chinese Business Firms" 8; Ahlstrom et al. 264).  Thus, “as 
a group, Overseas Chinese businesses are a major economic force around East 
Asia.” (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan 521) 
     When venturing abroad, Chinese were often discriminated against in their new 
home countries and were isolated in the local community.  The isolation laid the 
foundation for closely-knit networks of Overseas Chinese communities.  These 
networks, observes M.-J. Chen, “extended to friends and relatives in other regions of 
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the world, creating a globally interconnected social and business community of 
Chinese – both on and off the mainland.” (9)  These business communities are 
based on networks developed and maintained by trade organizations, unions, family 
names, birth place and secret societies (Krüger and Kwok 123).  Overseas Chinese 
developed business networks in order to cope with the hurdles and challenges in 
host societies.  A business network is (Yeung, Transnational Corporations 65): 
An integrated and coordinated structure of ongoing economic and non-
economic relations embedded within, among and outside business firms.  
Actors in business networks are motivated by both economic goals (e.g. profit, 
market share, market control) and non-economic goals (e.g. power, 
socialibility, approval, status, recognition, moral justification). 
     Another definition is offered by Chen and Chang who state that “a business 
network encompasses the set of relationships of a firm – both horizontal and vertical, 
including strategic alliances, joint ventures, long-term buyer-supplier partnerships 
and similarly collaborative relationships.” (237)  Edith Penrose (1996, XX) ascertains 
in regard to the characteristics and analysis of business networks that:  
[A] business network is very different from a cartel of independent firms in its 
structure, organization and purpose.  It is clear that this type of organization is 
likely to spread for some time and continue to engage in a competition very 
different from that analyzed between firms in so-called free markets.  
     A business network is different from a simple accumulation of firms because a 
business network consists of actors who pursue economic and non-economic goals 
and are in relationships with each other.  Ethnic Chinese business networks, thus, 
encompass ethnic Chinese who through relationships try to pursue business 
opportunities as well as try to enhance their social reputation.  Ethnic Chinese 
business networks, for example, help overcome bureaucratic barriers and trade 
protection when a business expands into foreign markets.  Furthermore, ethnic 
Chinese business networks reduce risks by making the expansion into different 
countries possible, thus, business networks make hedging against negative 
developments in host countries possible.  Also, transaction costs of doing business 
are lowered by the informal and trust-based conduction of business (Peng 239).  
Carney even claims that “networks are cost-efficient relative to managerial hierarchy 
because they provide costless coordination.” (142) 
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     Complementary business networks tying entrepreneurs, business executives, 
trades and financiers together across national boundaries result in, as Weidenbaum 
and Murray describe it, a “bamboo network.” (69)15  These bamboo networks 
connect the Chinese community across nations and continents and enhance the 
cohesion of the ethnic Chinese community.  The expatriate Chinese rely on kinship, 
dialect or common origin – clan, village or county – to build mutual trust and engage 
in business transactions regardless of distance (Weidenbaum and Hughes 69). 
     Kao uses the term “Chinese commonwealth” (24) to describe the networks of 
ethnic Chinese based on family and clans links connecting businesses and 
individuals across national borders.  The Chinese commonwealth is primarily a web 
of entrepreneurial relationships and consists of many individual enterprises that 
share a common culture.  These networks and relationships are private and informal 
capital markets which Chinese entrepreneurs can access without the need for 
commercial banks, professional venture capital companies or government 
investment agencies.  Furthermore, the Chinese commonwealth provides the 
members of the network with local resources, e.g. information, business 
connections, raw materials, low labor cost, etc. in different environments (Kao 24).  
Thus, the international network of Chinese, the Chinese commonwealth, provides 
Overseas Chinese businesses with the means and support to expand internationally.     
     The role of culture in the establishment and maintaining of these business and 
social networks is evident.  As has been discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, Chinese 
cultural determinants such as Confucian teachings, face, high-contexting, guanxi, 
insider vs. outsider communication approach and collectivism have a profound effect 
on the behavior and communication of ethnic Chinese and, eventually, on the 
engagement of Chinese in networks. Networks are one of the three social structures 
of Chinese society, the other ones being family and ethnicity.  Hence, Overseas 
Chinese networks are founded upon ethnicity, upon guanxi and networks established 
in the host or home country. 
 
 
                                            
 
15 “Bamboo is the Chinese symbol for durability; it is flexible and constantly developing. In the words 
of the old [Chinese] saying, ‘Bamboo bends; it does not break.’” (Weidenbaum and Hughes 69) 
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4.2 A Definition of Ethnic Overseas Chinese Business 
 
4.2.1 Organizational features of Overseas Chinese Business 
     Peng writes that Chinese “tend to develop their businesses among family lines 
and expand business networks based on personal connections.” (230)  
Consequently, according to Ahlstrom et al., Overseas Chinese businesses display 
six main characteristics (266): 
(1) Family control 
(2) Simple organizational structures, networks and information control 
(3) Centralized governance and decision making 
(4) Internal financing 
(5) Lack of advertising and branding 
(6) Little or no Research and Development (R&D)  
     Following the definition given by Ahlstrom et. al., Chinese businesses are usually 
family-owned and operated; even if the company is publicly traded and large in size.  
The Chinese business is typically centered on a family patriarch and, thus, relatively 
simply organized around the ruling head of the business.  Authority is centralized at 
the top; delegation of authority is minimal and most transactions are informal.  The 
Overseas Chinese business relies on friends and family members in the business’ 
network to staff key positions and to finance ventures.  Also, Overseas Chinese 
focus on the supply of goods and services to others and shun promotion and 
advertising in order to maintain a low profile and keep the value chain maintainable 
and controllable.  Additionally, the Overseas Chinese tend spend only limited 
amounts on R&D and instead concentrate on the core-functions of their operations in 
order to stay competitive and minimize costs (Ahlstrom et. al 266). 
     Overseas Chinese take high risk by entering and opening up new and developing 
markets which in turn enables them to earn high profits.  The Overseas Chinese 
businesses concentrate on low cost factors in order to be competitive.  The focus on 
low-costs neglects spending on brand names and high technology.  The decision to 
neglect technology does not mean that Overseas Chinese businesses do not 
understand the importance of technology.  Rather, O
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focus on offering complimentary services to multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
entering countries in Southeast Asia, for example as original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM).  By combining the technology and the brands of the MNEs with 
the low-cost production factors of Overseas Chinese business, both the MNEs and 
the Overseas Chinese businesses win.  The win-win situation applies not only for the 
market entrance in Southeast Asia but for the general outsourcing of production to 
Chinese business by MNEs in different countries (D. Long and Han).   
     Overseas Chinese businesses show their adaptiveness by finding business 
niches and specializing in them.  Also, Overseas Chinese businesses are skilled in 
seeking out local demands and satisfying the demand (M.-J. Chen 10).  The owner 
and the family members often decide to diversify the business into unrelated 
business activities by establishing subsidiaries with trusted friends or family 
members at the top; the diversification is characterized by opportunism and imitation.  
The reliance on personal authority and trust in the Chinese family business leads to 
elaborate networks of personal obligation and interdependent networks with other 
firms (Whitley 59).  These networks ensure the diversification of risks and the 
integration of family members and friends into the Chinese family business  
      To conclude, Ahlstrom et. al. and Whitley assert that Chinese businesses are 
family-run with a central planning and execution system in a relative simple 
organization being led by the family head.  In general, a family-business is 
characterized by the fact that the chief officer is also the owner, family members are 
employed in key positions, the business strategy lies within the family, networks of 
obligation and interdependence are existent, a low formalization within the enterprise 
and a transition problem between generations.  M.-J. Chen even states that Chinese 
actually have a “family business.”  The difference to a business family being “that 
family, not business, is the focus: family concerns drive business decisions.  This 
paradigm holds true in Chinese businesses of all sizes, from small retail stores to 
massive multinational organizations, in all Chinese overseas communities.” (M.-J. 
Chen 29)   
     There are three distinct qualitative features to the family business which are the 
managerial dedication of the family to the business (which relies on the success of 
business for the family’s security), the efficiency in decision making and the lower 
transaction cost when dealing within a network of family businesses with less 
contractual and formalized needs (Redding, "Chinese Family Business” 36-37).  In 
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the above mentioned characteristics, Chinese businesses do not differ from other 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in other parts of the world, for example, 
German SMEs.  So what makes Chinese businesses unique? 
     Redding identifies two characteristics which make Chinese family-businesses 
distinct from those of Western family-businesses ("Chinese Family Business” 37): 
 The Chinese family enterprise has not so far entered the transition to 
professionalism and public ownership which is such a common feature of 
Western economic evolution, even though arguably it has had plenty of time to 
do so 
 The personalism used in cementing stable market relations between 
enterprises, in general conditions of mistrust, seems to reflect norms and 
values about co-operation that are distinctly Chinese and highly developed in 
the secular culture of Confucianism.  
     Redding elaborates his findings by writing that “the distinctiveness of the Chinese 
family business lies in the combination of internal features and external 
circumstances” and that “in its development towards modern forms of Chinese 
capitalism, it has learned how to grow and still retain family control; it has also 
developed the art of alliance building to an unusually high level.” ("Chinese Family 
Business” 38)  According to Whitley, “the firm is typically regarded as a family 
possession and its major function is to increase family wealth and prestige.” (59)  
Western family businesses raise money in the public equity markets as the business 
grows larger and, consequently, the management of the business becomes 
consistent with the management of other publicly listed firms.  The change to 
professional management leads to a decreasing role of the family in the business.  
“Overseas Chinese firms, however, […] function essentially as family business, 
whether they are publicly listed or no.” (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan)  Hence, Chinese 
business displays and retains its key characteristics, for example, remaining family-
run, even when growing organizationally very large (Yeung, Transnational 
Corporations 135).   
     The organization of Overseas Chinese businesses into family businesses can 
also prove to be disadvantageous.  The limitations of the Overseas Chinese 
business lie within the restriction of the management of the business to family 
members and trusted friends.  The restriction to family and clan limits the access to 
human resources, capital, business information and marketing webs.  Subsequently, 
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bright managers may leave the business to start a new enterprise themselves, due 
to lack of loyalty towards and occupational perspectives in the Chinese family-led 
business.  The diversification of the family business in unrelated activities with small 
subsidiaries run and headed by the head business can also prove unfavorable.  The 
small scale of each business, furthermore, prevents the building of world-level 
companies and brands to compete internationally.  Another danger is the inherent 
intransparency of the business with its numerous subsidiaries which opens the door 
to bribery and corruption and which is commonly perceived as “crony capitalism.” 
(Peng 245; D. Long and Han)  Table 9 gives an overview about the strengths and 
weaknesses of Chinese family business organizational form according to Redding. 
 
Danger of non-rational 
opportunist leaps
Possible diffraction of 
organization
Lack of creative tension and 
debate on strategic issues
Strategic flexibility
Speed of response
Personal vision can be 
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professionalism
Goal displacement possible 
when control is unclear
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lower down
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relationships
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Table 9:  Strengths and Weaknesses of the Chinese Family Form of Organization;  S. Gordon 
Redding,  The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism,  De Gruyter Studies in Organization,  Ed. Stewart 
Clegg,  Vol. 22,  Berlin; New York:  Walter de Gruyter,  1990,  207. 
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     The regular up-breaking of firms and conglomerates to divide the parts between 
heirs of the family business is another feature of Chinese family businesses and 
keeps the size of the company small.  Redding states that if the Chinese family 
business is compared with the typical Western enterprise according to textbooks, the 
Chinese family-business probably does not look ideal, but because of the embedding 
of the family-business into a network of other firms, the flexibility, efficiency and 
dynamism of the Chinese enterprise model persists in being competitive ("Chinese 
Family Business” 45).  
    Redding asserted that due to the constant break-up of the firm, family-run 
businesses cannot grow large and tend to be small-scale.  Hamilton challenges 
Redding’s view and states that “Chinese family-owned firms do grow very large, that 
they do undertake sizeable and serious projects” and that “there is a gap between 
theory and fact.” (Hamilton 56)  When the business grows, ownership is spread, 
management is segment and control is centralized.  While an owner of a business 
might hold the total nominal capital of the business, a shared model is more 
common.  According to the shared model, the owner holds a little more than half the 
capital of the Chinese business, while the rest of the stake in the business is spread 
among family members, friends and distant kinsmen.  The ownership of the Chinese 
enterprise is, thus, spread among the social landscape and is based on the norms of 
reciprocity and leads to the founding of networks based on mutual indebtness.  
Networks develop due to the mutual reciprocity of conducting transactions and the 
establishment of trust among the network’s members. (Hamilton 64-65).  The 
conclusion in regard to ownership and control of Chinese businesses is that 
ownership does not result in property right, but that it lays “the relational foundation 
for creating very complex networks that are themselves useful for other business 
purposes.” (Hamilton 66)  Whitley cautions that these “networks of interdependent 
firms […] are based on personal contacts and reputations, and so these are crucial 
to [Chinese family business] survival, but are not very stable and often change.” (59) 
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4.2.2 Business Expansion & Decision Making 
       The expansion of Chinese businesses in interwoven networks as described 
above is akin to the building of separate conglomerations; although one might call it 
more appropriately “opportunistic diversification” (Hamilton 70) of each Chinese 
family business.  Overseas Chinese businesses take advantage of the personal and 
informal networks and start new firms and form new alliances when opportunities by 
means of personal contacts and information arise.  Because the investment is 
usually done by personal investment and transacted by the business owner, the 
owner’s family or close friends of the family, the development of very large family 
holdings is possible.  The web of subsidiaries consists of stakes and investments in 
numerous other companies through the alliances and networks among Overseas 
Chinese businesses and is controlled centrally by the holding company.  The owner 
of the family-business, i.e. the holding company, is likely to pursue a strategy of 
investment diversification by investing in different projects in different locations.  The 
owner’s investment strategy resembles the careful management of a portfolio of 
distinct investments (Hamilton 70-73).  By integrating all critical resources and 
activities under the authoritative control of the family head or owner of the holding 
company, and furthermore diversifying into unrelated business activities, the 
business deals with the threat of uncertainty and reduces its exposure to risk 
(Whitley 68).  Figure 20 illustrates the development of a Chinese business from 
being a trade company to diversified conglomerate. 
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Figure 20:  Typical Development of an Overseas Chinese Conglomerate,  Hellmut Schütte, and 
Philippe Lassere,  Management-Strategien für Asien-Pazifik,  Stuttgart:  Schäffel-Poeschel 
Verlag,  1996,  85. 
 
     Overseas Chinese businesses have tended to follow diversification by starting as 
merchants, moving to the assembly of low-tech products and later on to the 
production of goods.  Further expansion aims at the entrance in the banking, real 
estate and industrial production markets which Schütte coined “the golden diamond” 
(Schütte and Lassere, 85-86).  Overseas Chinese businesses expand from trade to 
real estate and then into any business which seems to offer substantial profits.  The 
Overseas Chinese focus on service industries, such as real estates, hotels, financial 
services and trade since these industries do not require brand names and 
technological knowledge.  The investment in real estates, hotels, financial services 
and industrial product leads to the establishment of diversified enterprise groups or 
conglomerates (D. Long and Han).  The main characteristics of successful, 
diversified conglomerates and business networks are (Haley 587): 
 The companies appear highly diversified with unrelated diversification, thus 
contravening Western theoretical notions about synergy-generating 
diversification into related branches and activities 
 Sustain good relationships with the public sectors in the country 
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 Possess strong familial and informal networks 
 Use subjective information as inputs to decision making. 
     The characteristics of these Overseas Chinese businesses contravene common 
Western notions of corporate governance.  Overseas Chinese businesses place a 
strong emphasis on the informal side of business by involving friends and family 
members and maintaining ties to the public sector as well as trying to minimize 
business risks by diversification as opposed to the Western notions of objective 
management and synergy creation.   
     The decision making in the Chinese businesses relies heavily on the input of 
personal, thus, subjective information, i.e. managers/owners of Overseas Chinese 
businesses use information from friends, business associates, government officials 
and trusted sources to make their decisions because Overseas Chinese managers 
prefer to trust personal sources as opposed to neutral information, for example, 
statistics (Haley 589).  Peng offers a good summary of the decision making in 
Chinese businesses and the according organization structure of Chinese businesses 
(232): 
The decision making of the family is centralized. In many ethnic Chinese 
enterprise groups, a core parent company controls the main subsidiaries 
through shareholding. Those subsidiaries in turn control other peripheral 
subsidiaries through loans and personnel arrangements. The leading circle 
and the top management are all family members and close relatives. 
 
4.2.3 The Role of Guanxi Networks 
     The sustaining of good relationship with the public sector, the establishment of 
informal networks with friend and formal networks with other firms require the use of 
guanxi.  Guanxi, as has been discussed in Chapter 2.4.2, translates literally with 
“connections”, but refers to a relationship based on mutual obligation and reciprocity.  
Guanxi emphasizes family ties and shared experiences and is the basis for Chinese 
to do business with each other.  Thus, the Chinese commit significant efforts to 
establish and maintain relationships with people they find respectable.  Guanxi, for 
example, in the People’s Republic of China, was and is used to go around the 
bureaucracy.  Guanxi, therefore, can open doors, but guanxi can also protect from 
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uncertainties and threats in risky environments.  Consequently, “for the Overseas 
Chinese, guanxi has provided a safety net in their host societies where, although 
citizens, they are treated as outsiders and often regarded with suspicion.” (M.-J. 
Chen, 46-47) 
     According to Luo, “a guanxi business network is an organizational form that is 
neither a market nor a hierarchical and formal inter-organizational alliance.” (44)  It is 
a loosely structured network established through interpersonal relationships based 
on trust and favor exchange (Luo 44).  Guanxi is a form of value-added social 
capital16 which means that guanxi is an intangible asset based on social transactions 
which can create value.  The economic benefits of a guanxi network include the 
lowering of transactions costs, information costs and competitive threats as well as 
reducing uncertainty in the operation.  Guanxi enhances the institutional support 
(through other members in the network), adds a strategic capability to the firm and, 
thus, enhances the economic return (higher revenues) as well as increasing the 
business effectiveness and the organizational legitimacy of the operation.  Figure 21 
summarizes the economic benefit of guanxi. 
 
                                            
 
16 Definition of social capital: The value of social networks that people can draw on to solve common 
problems. The benefits of social capital flow from the trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation 
associated with social networks (AGTRADE.ORG). 
. 
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Value-Added 
Social Capital
Reducing:
1. Transaction Costs
2. Operation Uncertainty
3. Information Costs
4. Contextual Hazards
5. Competitive Threats
Enhancing:
1. Institutional Support
2. Econcomic Return
3. Business Effectiveness
4. Organizational Legitimacy
5. Strategic Capability
 
 
Figure 21:  Economic Benefits of Guanxi,  Yadong Luo,  Guanxi and Business,  Asia-Pacific 
Business Series,  Eds. Richard Brislin and Lane Kelley,  Vol. 1,  Singapore:  World Scientific,  
2000,  48. 
 
     As described above in Figure 21, Guanxi networks enhance, for example, the 
institutional support and reduce, for example, transaction costs of the participating 
parties.  In regard to organizational structure and firm performance, Luo writes (81): 
The guanxi network is more than just a symbolic representation of personal 
and organizational ties.  It is a utilitarian mechanism for Chinese firm; 
resource exchanges occur independently of the active, conscious participation 
of the organizations and individuals involved.  […]  As organizations continue 
their interactions with other firms and government officials through the guanxi 
network, there is a deliberate diffusion of information and accumulation of 
resources and capabilities.  Cooperative firms in the guanxi network basically 
act as resources to each other, contributing to enhanced survival and growth 
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through planned and unplanned exchanges of personnel, market information, 
money, facilities and political favors. 
     Therefore, firm in a guanxi network are able to access other firm’s resources and 
share information and resources with each other.  The exchange is based solely on 
utilitarian resources in order to enhance each firm’s strategic capabilities and lower 
costs, thus, enhancing the firm’s ultimate performance. 
     The previous paragraph shows that the establishment and maintenance of ethnic 
Chinese networks based on guanxi can be used as a competitive advantage for 
ethnic Chinese businesses.  In general, competitive advantages of ethnic Chinese 
businesses are two-fold; the obvious, for example, quality of products, and the 
hidden competitive advantages, for example, lower transaction costs because of 
trust and mutual reciprocity.  Here, these two differentiating advantages are 
demonstrated at the example of ethnic Chinese enterprises from Hong Kong.  A 
survey among multinational ethnic Chinese businesses from Hong Kong revealed 
that these ethnic Chinese businesses enjoyed obvious competitive advantages in 
regard to the quality of products and the reputation of services, the integrated 
networks of operations and the possession of specialized materials and resources 
(Yeung, Transnational Corporations 206).   
     Hidden competitive advantages result from the embedding in networks of 
personal and business relationships which help ethnic Chinese companies to 
generate sustainable advantages.  The networks help to protect members against 
encroachment by outsiders as well as providing members with organizational 
capabilities to enter foreign markets.  The mutual reciprocity and trust lower 
uncertainty transaction costs within the network.  Information resources are made 
available to all members and business opportunities are maximized through giving 
network members exclusive access to bidding or participation in projects.  Access to 
capital is easy as each member in the network is willingly to provide and access 
resources to other members of the network.  Finally, networks tend to emphasize the 
membership of its actors and, therefore, create a closeness of the network system 
which guards and continues to serve the interests the interests of its members 
(Yeung, Transnational Corporations 214-218).  Yeung concludes that “the inherent 
competitive advantage of HKTNCs [Hong Kong Transnational Corporations] is not 
technology or capital or even products/services per se [original italics], but their 
intangible network relationships and cooperative synergy.” (219) 
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4.2.4 Conclusion 
     In conclusion, according to Yeung, Chinese family firms’ distinctive organizational 
characteristics are ("Globalization of Chinese Business Firms" 79-80): 
  Strong personal owner control 
 Managerial specialization and entrepreneurial diversification 
 Risk management by minimizing commitments and maximizing  flexibility 
 Limited inter-firm commitments, for example, limited or no supplier-buyer 
relationships between firms at all 
 Personal links between firms 
 Highly personal authority and low formalization of procedures 
 Limited commitment to, and low mutual dependence on, employees 
 Centralized decision-making and control, and weak middle management 
 Paternalistic and aloof management roles 
     Furthermore, Overseas Chinese businesses are embedded in informal and 
familial networks.  These networks work on a mutual basis of reciprocity and trust.  
The embedment provides ethnic Chinese with competitive advantages through the 
access to material resources, for example, capital and immaterial resources such as, 
for example, information. Overseas Chinese businesses pursue a strategy of asset 
diversification in regard to their investment strategy when the business grows larger.  
Furthermore, the Overseas Chinese businesses rely heavily on the family to conduct 
business and make decisions.  The business is led autocratically and decisions are 
based on subjective information gathered from friends and family because Chinese 
prefer information from trusted sources.  Subsequently, Overseas Chinese establish 
and rely on guanxi to explore new business opportunities, extend the network and 
survive in the host environment because Overseas Chinese benefit from the 
employment of guanxi networks as these networks protect and serve its members.   
     The conclusions made in this chapter follow the findings established in Chapter 3 
and 4.  In chapters 3 and 4 it was shown that Chinese cultural is minted by a clear 
understanding of the subordinate-superior relationship due to the Confucian ideal of 
filial piety.  The finding is supported by Hofstede’s assessment of China as a high 
power distance culture, i.e. people know their place in life, pay respect to superiors 
and do not challenge authority openly.  If one applies the findings on these cultural 
determinants and variables in a business specific context, it becomes clear that 
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these cultural determinants and variables are the reason why ethnic Chinese 
businesses are lead by a head of the firm who commands authority and 
subordinance by its employees.  Likewise, the use of networks and guanxi by ethnic 
Chinese businesses can be explained as typical features of the Chinese collectivist 
society as well as the need for trust which is mirrored in the different attitudes and 
communication approaches towards insiders and outsiders.  The above mentioned 
different cultural determinants and variables are evident in Chinese culture and 
explain why ethnic Chinese businesses behave and expand the way they do as well 
as why Overseas Chinese businesses are structured and managed the way they 
are.  Thus, Chinese cultural determinants and variables are able to offer 
explanations for the characteristics of ethnic Chinese businesses.  
 
 
4.3 The International Expansion of Ethnic Chinese Business  
 
     As has been written at the beginning of Chapter 4, the economic success of 
ethnic Overseas Chinese business is being illustrated, for example, by the fact ethnic 
Chinese own up to 80 percent of Indonesia’s corporate assets and run 160 of the 
200 largest companies.  Overseas Chinese control 90 percent of all manufacturing in 
Thailand while Chinese represent only 1 percent of the population of Thailand, but 
also control over 80 percent of the listed firms by market capitalization.  Finally, 
ethnic Chinese who live and conduct business overseas account for an annual 
output of about $500 billion (Yeung, "Globalization of Chinese Business Firms" 8; 
Ahlstrom et al. 264).  Therefore, the success of the internationalization of Overseas 
Chinese businesses their economic power, especially in Southeast Asia, is evident.   
     The globalization and internationalization of Overseas Chinese businesses has 
accelerated in recent years.  Overseas Chinese businesses have become major 
regional forces in Southeast Asia and are preparing to become global players.  
Chinese overseas businesses have consolidated their presence in Asia and are 
beginning to penetrate North America and Western Europe by investment and 
international production rather than trading (Yeung, "Globalization of Chinese 
Business Firms" 77-78).  Table 10 shows a selection of internationally active 
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Overseas Chinese Family businesses and leaders with the appropriate country in 
which they are most active. 
 
Agri-business, real estate, telecommunications
Real estate, transport, finance
Cement, banking, telecommunications
Banking, real estate, investments
Banking, real estate
Thailand
Chearavanont family
Kanjanapas family
Ratanarak family
Sophonpanich family
Lamsam family
Real estate, hotels, financial services
Banking, plantations
Singapore
Kwek Leng Beng
Lee family
Beer, tobacco, banking, investments
Retailing, cement, investments
Banking, insurance
Telecommunications, real estate
Real estate, diversified investments
Philippines
Lucio Tan
Henry Sy
Alfonso Yuchengco
Antonio Cojuangco
John Gokongwei
Plantations, sugar and wood processing, media, hotels
Finance, diversified
Casinos, real estate
Leisure, manufacturing investments
Malaysia
Robert Kuok
Quek Leng Chan
Lim Goh Tong
Vincent Tan
Cement, processed foods, flour milling, steel, banking, 
real estate, investments
Diversified
Beer, tires, consumer products
Property, banking, insurance
Agri-industries, property
Timber, car assembly
Indonesia
Liem Sioe Liong
Eka Tjipta Widjaja
Oei Hong Leong
Mochat Riaddy
Suhargo Gondokusumo
Prajogo Pangestu
Ports and infrastructure, retailing, manufacturing, 
telecommunications, property development, energy, 
finance and investment
Real estate, cable television, infrastructural 
development, transportation
Hong Kong
Li Kai Shang
Peter Woo/Pao family
Primary businessesFamily/leader
 
 
Table 10:  Some Families and Businesses in the Overseas Chinese Business Networks,  Haley, 
George T., et al.,  "Boxing with Shadows: Competing Effectively with the Overseas Chinese 
and Overseas Indian Business Networks in the Asian Arena,"  Journal of Organizational 
Change Management:  Emerald,  1998,  Vol. 11,  304. 
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     The most recent spectacular move of an Overseas Chinese business was the 
take-over of the mobile phone business unit of German technology conglomerate 
Siemens by Taiwanese BENQ in June 2005.  The deal gives BENQ the Siemens 
mobile phone trademark for the next 5 years as well as key technology and patents.  
The deal exemplifies the drive of Overseas Chinese businesses to move from the 
role of an OEM supplier to an independent producer and provider of high-technology 
consumer electronics.  Companies such as BENQ utilize the cost advantages of 
producing, among other things, in China and strive to become a leading global 
consumer brand like Samsung (Deckstein, Kerbusk and Wagner). 
     Another kind of business, original design manufacturers (ODMs), is also trying to 
expand internationally by developing their own brand.  ODM use the cash flow from 
the work as contract manufacturer and designer to build their own brand and pay for 
the marketing expenses.  Examples for ODMs are TSMC, Acer, Hon Hai Precision 
Industry, ASUSTEK Computer or BENQ.  These ODMs face the challenge of 
reducing their costs by making their processes ever leaner and lower labor costs.  
The ODMS try to fight declining profits from their businesses by building their own 
brands and, thus, create another revenue stream.  However, these efforts can cause 
trouble as the ODM work for customers can interfere with one’s own brands if 
products overlap too much.  A point in case is BENQ which lost a supplier contract to 
Motorola when it began to compete head-to-head in the mobile phone market with 
Motorola after buying the mobile phone unit from Siemens.  Finally, it is not clear if 
Overseas Chinese possess the ability to make the mental shift from cost-control to 
marketing and brand-building (Anonymous, "The Man with Two Daggers" 52). 
     In the domestic development of Chinese business firms, business networks were 
the predominant form of organization.  When expanding abroad, guanxi and 
networks become the institutional foundation for the internationalization of Overseas 
Chinese business firms because these networks help Overseas Chinese businesses 
when expanding abroad through various means by the local Chinese community 
(Yeung, „Globalization of Chinese Business Firms" 80). 
     However, in the global context, outside the Asian region, the role of guanxi and 
networks may decrease because here the focus lays on the cooperation with 
Western multinational enterprises which results in the increasing incorporation of 
Western management practices and organizational structures.  The Overseas 
Chinese businesses can help Western corporations by providing business contacts, 
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the reduction of economic risk and uncertainty, and easing the market entrance of 
the Western businesses by employing the Chinese’s guanxi and business networks.  
Due to saturated home markets, the growth of the businesses to a considerable size 
and related government regulations, Overseas Chinese businesses begin to expand 
from their home countries.  As Yeung observes, these “leading Chinese business 
firms have outgrown their domestic economies.” ("Globalization of Chinese Business 
Firms" 81-82) 
     Weidenbaum and Murray developed a 3 stage model of the expansion of Chinese 
businesses in China.  Because the model is only applied to Overseas Chinese 
investing in China, Yeung proposes to add another 2 stages in order to make the 
model more comprehensive, coherent and applicable for the expansion of Chinese 
businesses worldwide.  Table 11 shows the stage model as postulated by Yeung. 
 
Emergence of global networks of Chinese business firms with 
integrated operations in sophisticated networks. Financing through 
the global network of Chinese business networks. Decision-making 
lies not anymore with the patriarch of business, but is made by the 
consensus of global executives from the network. 
Stage 5
Beginning of globalization of Chinese businesses beyond the Asia
Pacific Region. Integration of various network operations and 
activities on low-scale. Utilizing of home country advantages and 
cooperation with Western MNEs.
Stage 4
Engagement of Chinese businesses in Greater China by extending 
investments and penetrating the market more forcefully than 
competitors from the West.
Stage 3
Internationalization of Chinese business firms through duplication of 
business in the region on common grounds in family ties, lanuage, 
culture and ethnicity.
Stage 2
Phase of firm formation and expansion. Chinese businesses go „from 
rags to riches“.
Stage 1
DevelopmentStage
 
 
Table 11:  The Internationalization Stage Model of Overseas Chinese Businesses,  compiled 
from:  Henry Wai-chung Yeung,   "The Dynamics of the Globalization of Chinese Business 
Firms,"  Globalization of Chinese Business Firms,  Eds. Henry Wai-chung Yeung and Kris 
Olds,  London:  Macmillan Press,  2000,  85-86. 
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      Yeung cautions that only a small number of ethnic Chinese operations have yet 
reached stage 4 of the internationalization process of Overseas Chinese businesses.  
Yeung does not expect the evolution of ethnic Chinese business to the final stage 5 
to be easily achieved and anticipates several more years of globalization processes 
by Overseas Chinese enterprises until ethnic Chinese businesses have truly 
globalized their operations because so far ethnic Chinese business lack the 
experience and skills to act globally (Yeung, „Globalization of Chinese Business 
Firms" 87). 
     The most chosen entry modes for the market entry into international markets and 
international production are JVs and acquisitions.  Other modes used  extensively 
are informal networks and alliances.  Figure 22 shows a network spectrum of 
different market entry modes available to Overseas Chinese business wishing to 
enter international markets.   
 
Licensing Alliances Joint ventures Family business
Franchising Co-operative Subcontracting Conglomerates
agreements
Markets Hierarchies
 
 
Figure 22:  A Network Spectrum of Different Forms of Organizing International Production,  
Henry Wai-chung Yeung,  "The Dynamics of the Globalization of Chinese Business Firms,"  
Globalization of Chinese Business Firms,  Eds. Henry Wai-chung Yeung and Kris Olds,  
London:  Macmillan Press,  2000,  97. 
 
     In the institutional context, Chinese businesses prefer to enter international 
markets by acquisitions rather than greenfield investments, i.e. family-led business-
subsidiaries, due to speed and risk factors.  The discrimination in some host 
countries forces Overseas Chinese businesses to act decisively and forcefully.  In 
the Western hemisphere, due to an open business environment, acquisitions are 
also preferred because of the competitive nature of the market and the need to 
acquire local knowledge and market access quickly.  In the firm-specific context, the 
acquisition of a foreign business gives the business a competitive advantage which it 
might lack.  If the competitive advantage is already present, then Overseas Chinese 
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businesses are likely to engage in JVs and cooperative agreements in order to gain 
market information and prepare the grounds for an eventual establishment of the 
Chinese parent firm.  Thus, alliances and informal networks are utilized in the 
framework of the market entrance of the ethnic Chinese business in order to gain 
market access and knowledge as well as competitive advantages quickly (Yeung, 
„Globalization of Chinese Business Firms" 97-101).  Table 12 gives an appropriate 
summary and overview about the aspects and characteristics of the globalization of 
Chinese business firms according to H. Zhang and Bulcke. 
 
• wholly-owned subsidiary or majority joint-
ventures
• dualism in organizational structure and control 
system
• highly centralized decision-making
• tight financial control
• promotion of kinship for top and key 
management positions
Ownership and control
• low degree of multinationalization
• no clear sequence in overseas operations
• low physical integration between parent 
company and subsidiaries
• special business arrangements with low    
transaction costs
Business strategies and production structure
• existence of ethnic connections and networks
• preference of kinship or friendship
Location and partner selection
• risk diversification
• production cost driven
• following customers
FDI motivation
CharacteristicsAspects of globalization
 
 
Table 12:  Characteristics of Chinese Business Firms in Their Globalization Process,  Daniel H. 
Zhang and Van Den Bulcke,  in:  Henry Wai-chung Yeung,  "The Dynamics of the Globalization 
of Chinese Business Firms,"  Globalization of Chinese Business Firms,  Eds. Henry Wai-chung 
Yeung and Kris Olds,  London:  Macmillan Press,  2000,  98. 
 
     As Table 12 shows, ethnic Chinese businesses choose to invest overseas in 
order to diversify risks, to lower production costs or to follow customers.  When 
selecting the location and partner of the investment, ethnic Chinese prefer to select 
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partners which they already know or are kin or friends with.  Although these ethnic 
Chinese businesses expand internationally, the true degree of internationalization or 
multinationality is restricted.  One cannot discern a clear pattern in the 
internationalization process as the choice of investment is driven by opportunism in 
the search for lower transaction costs.  A low integration between subsidiaries and 
headquarters underlines the minor importance and focus on a coherent 
internationalization strategy but rather on minimizing costs and opportunistic 
diversification. 
     Ethnic Chinese businesses strive for the control of their operations in foreign 
countries and prefer wholly-owned subsidiaries or JVs with a controlling majority.  
The quest for control is also visible in the high centralization of decision-making in 
their operations and the tight control of financial matters.  The organizational 
structure is identically to the structure of the control systems.  Finally, family 
members are posted and promoted to key positions in the operation in order to have 
managers which are reliable. 
     In conclusion, overseas Chinese have become a major economic force, 
especially in Southeast Asia.  The overseas Chinese business is family-led and 
centered around the head of the family.  Ethnic Chinese businesses internationalize 
in order to diversify risks, lower costs and follow customers.  The choice of location 
and business partners is dependent on personal connections, kinship or friendships.  
Still, although the ethnic Chinese businesses operate globally, they choose not to 
integrate the various subsidiaries with the headquarters.  Control of the subsidiaries 
takes place through the installment of family members in key management positions, 
a tight control of decision-making and finance as well as the choice of wholly-owned 
subsidiaries and majority-owned JVs.   
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4.4 A Framework for the International Expansion of Ethnic 
Chinese Business – Chinese Business Networks 
 
How can the Chinese business network, also known as the bamboo network (Murray 
and Weidenbaum) or the Chinese commonwealth (Kao), be integrated into a 
comprehensive (theoretical) framework in order to understand the 
internationalization of ethnic/Overseas Chinese in Asia and worldwide? 
     Transaction cost economics (TCE) (as discussed in Chapter 1.2.2) is a popular 
approach to the internationalization of the firm.  The transaction cost model as 
postulated by Williamson relies on the premise that transaction costs, costs incurred 
by using the market instead of internalization, force the firm to choose the 
corresponding modus operandi.  Thus, the “difference between relative benefits and 
costs leads firms to choose either a market approach or internal vertical integration, 
or possibly horizontal diversification.” (G. R. Jones and Hill 160)  H. Zhang and 
Bulcke identify three critical limitations of the TCE based theory in regard to the 
internationalization of the firm.  First, the limitation of the firm’s choice to the 
selection of either markets or internalization for a transaction is too constricting.  
Other hybrid modes of organizing transactions are possible; for example, co-
operative supply and production are not adequately explained by the TCE theory.  
Networks across national boundaries that encompass both market transactions and 
hierarchical administrations are also hybrid forms of organization and are becoming 
more and more common among international companies (H. Zhang and Bulcke 128).  
     Second, as has been argued by the RBV of the firm, the TCE theory neglects the 
value-generation process of the transaction (Madhok 49).  Applied to the 
internationalization of the firm, competitive advantages that result from conducting 
transnational business are not considered by the TCE theory.  Therefore, TCE 
theory is inadequately equipped to explain transitional ownership advantages as 
opposed to asset-based ownership advantages (H. Zhang and Bulcke 128).  Third, 
as H. Zhang and Bulcke observe, “[TCE] does not sufficiently appreciate the social 
context and cultural dimensions that could affect international business transactions. 
A link between the cultural context and the technical concept of transaction cost is 
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generally absent in TCE.” (128)  Therefore, TCE neglects the aspects of social and 
cultural interaction taking place between the actors of a transaction.  Because 
networks are formal, informal and socially constructed webs of relationships and are 
significant for the internationalization of firms (Coviello and Martin 59), the 
internationalization of Overseas Chinese business networks can not be adequately 
explained and analyzed by the TCE theory.  TCE theory does not offer a 
comprehensive and suitable tool for the analysis of network relationships (Johanson 
and Mattsson “Interorganizational Relations” 43-48) as required for the analysis of 
Overseas Chinese business networks.  Castells concludes that “the market- and 
firm-based TCE is too limited to explain the business networks of Asian corporations, 
because it is too strongly rooted in the Anglo-Saxon experience.” (190)  
Subsequently, a network-based approach to the internationalization of Overseas 
Chinese businesses is chosen because as has been shown in Chapter 4.2, Chinese 
businesses prefer networks and guanxi for the internationalization of ethnic Chinese 
firms. 
     In a market economy, economic activity can be organized by price or hierarchy 
and take place in three possible institutions: the market, the network and the firm. 
From an institutional point of view, wholly-owned subsidiaries as well as JVs together 
with the parent firm can form a network (Yang 189).  According to the network model 
posited by Johanson and Mattsson (Chapter 1.1.2), firms can access not only the 
internal resources of the firm, for example, product technology, but also external 
resources, i.e. resources that other companies in the network possess, for example, 
market information and local distribution networks.  Although becoming a member in 
the network and gaining access requires a significant amount of time and investment 
in terms of cooperation, the final embedment in the network justifies the efforts 
because being a member of a business network creates a value for the company in 
that the resources of other network members are also available to the firm.  The 
emergence of a co-operative network is a value-generation process because it 
enhances the resources of the firm with the accessible resources of other firms.  
Additionally, the network approach, as opposed to the TCE theory, allows for the 
encompassing of hybrid modes of organization, for example, co-operative 
agreements such as JVs and licensing.  A network does not function solely on 
hierarchy and market transactions, but considers trust and reciprocity norms as 
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important factors in the development and facilitating of the network (H. Zhang and 
Bulcke 130).   
     In the context of network theory, internationalizing businesses deal with three 
different sets of relationships.  The first set of relationships is at the intra-firm level 
where the company deals with the operations in different countries, for example, 
choosing a location or country for a subsidiary.  The second set of relationships can 
be found on the inter-firm level in which the company engages with competitors, for 
example, in joint research and development of products on a global or local scale.  
This cooperation with competitors in inter-firm networks can enable companies to 
finance and carry out expensive R&D projects as well as to produce expensive 
goods.  Extra-firm networks relate to relationships between the firm and the 
nation/state or local institutions.  For example, a nation can support local companies 
to go abroad with financial subsidies and streamline governmental procedures and 
regulations (Yeung, Transnational Corporations 60-62).  Thus, a company can and 
should employ, use and control all three sets of relationships in the 
internationalization process in order to achieve the most ideal entrance into the 
international markets. 
     A firm’s participation in networks is a dynamic process and can significantly 
explain the internationalization of businesses, especially for SMEs because networks 
can provide SMEs in the internationalization process with resources which they, due 
to their size, lack (Bell 62).  Furthermore, business and social networks can help in 
overcoming informal trade barriers between countries as long as these networks 
operate across national borders, for example, if they are based on ethnicity (Rauch 
1177).  Drawing on the findings of Johanson and Vahlne in regard to the gradual 
internationalization of firms (see Chapter 1.1.1) and the network model by Johanson 
and Mattson (see also Chapter 1.1.2), T.-J. Chen elaborates the importance of 
networks for the internationalization process of firms further (1108): 
We find that internationalization propelled by the leverage of external 
resources is typically a gradual process in which the investor slowly expands 
its network reach from the home base.  The investor often chooses a location 
close to the home base before gradually moving to more distant locations. 
Wherever it goes, the investment location is always in the areas where 
network resources are abundant. In the process of internationalization, the 
investor makes maximum use of network resources that it can access, 
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including human skills, financial resources, market opportunities, technological 
capabilities and so on. 
     Relevant network relationships can be preserved, strengthened and enhanced 
through FDI.  FDI alters the network relationships between members of the network 
by introducing new activities and actors to the network.  However, in order to ensure 
integration and minimize possible failure and adversarial effects such as losing one’s 
own network relationships, one has to be careful with the integration of foreign 
network relationships into one’s domestic network.  A network enables even small 
and weak companies to expand abroad.  But, “internationalization is possible only if 
the investor accumulates new and distinct network resources during the process of 
FDI.” (T.-J. Chen 1109-1111)   
      FDI is undertaken in order to establish a lasting presence in the country and is 
characterized by the influence of the investor in the management of the operation set 
up through FDI in the host country.  According to T.-J. Chen, “from a network 
perspective, FDI is viewed as an effort by investors to forge linkages with foreign 
networks by establishing a presence in the foreign country.” (1107)  Furthermore, the 
FDI improves an investor’s position in the network by offering “a broader range of 
products, at a lower cost, in a more flexible fashion, and from a location closer to 
consumers than before.” (T.-J. Chen 1108)  Furthermore, the FDI ties not only 
different networks of the firm’s global operations together, but also connects the 
firm’s networks with market networks of the country (Yang 163). 
     Tong analyzed bilateral FDI in 54 economies using a standard gravity model to 
analyze the role of ethnic Chinese networks in promoting FDI.  Tong found that 
ethnic Chinese networks facilitate FDI between different economies.  The ethnic 
Chinese networks facilitated the FDI between countries from developing as well as of 
developed/industrial countries.  In countries which are characterized by weak 
institutions, networks can ensure the threat of enforcement of sanctions against 
other members in order to prevent fraud of business partners.  Furthermore, 
networks can be utilized to promote investment in the local economy.  Ethnic 
Chinese networks help network members to overcome informational barriers in 
countries with strong institutions where the rule of law is respected (Tong 28).  
     Wu and Choi analyzed the role of synergy and synergy creation in the context of 
networks for the success of Overseas Chinese businesses.  Repeated transactions 
between partners (which are members of the same network) lead to the creation of 
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synergy; hence, managers should try to maintain long-term relationship with key 
business partners.  Further synergy creation, directly and indirectly, can be achieved 
by establishing and maintaining close ties to host governments and financial 
institutions as the government and institutions can facilitate additional business 
through proving opportunities and integrating the Chinese business in the local 
network through referral to other network members (Wu and Choi 339-340).  Wu and 
Choi conclude that “Synergy creation achieved through networking may be an 
alternative explanation for the success of Overseas Chinese businesses.” (340) 
     The concept developed by H. Zhang and Bulcke tries to provide a framework for 
the internationalization of the Overseas Chinese business firm by integrating the 
characteristics and features of Overseas Chinese business within the network 
theory.  According to H. Zhang and Bulcke, Chinese businesses can be classified 
into 4 different categories in regard to their organizational form and market 
orientation (H. Zhang and Bulcke 134-135): 
(1) Paternalistic firms 
(2) Mobile exporters 
(3) Entrepreneurial alliances 
(4) Global networking 
     The first organizational form is defined by the paternalistic management of the 
firm and the focus on the local market and is the dominant form of Overseas Chinese 
businesses.  The Chinese businesses invest heavily in creating mutual obligations, 
developing personal ties and extending their networks.  Therefore, the business is 
creating a network that helps the Overseas Chinese business to access cheap 
capital and local information.  These paternalistic Chinese firms are hindered in the 
internationalization process by a lack of specific ownership advantages and rely 
mostly on the comparative advantages provided by the host country (H. Zhang and 
Bulcke 134-135).   
     The second type of enterprise is the entrepreneurial Chinese conglomerate and 
an enhanced version of the paternalistic organization.  The leveraging of resources 
provided by the network in which these Overseas Chinese businesses are 
embedded facilitates the internationalization.  The entrepreneurial Chinese 
enterprise establishes especially close ties to government officials and institutions to 
ensure the continuing success in the local environment.  The expansion takes the 
form of acquiring or establishing subsidiaries in different industries, therefore, inter-
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firm relationships between subsidiaries are small and the subsidiaries remain small.  
Thus, the original business functions as a holding company.  The holding company 
provides internal capital markets and the pooling of financial resources among the 
subsidiaries for further investment or expansion (H. Zhang and Bulcke 135-136).  
     Mobile exporters are the third kind of possible organizational form of Overseas 
Chinese businesses.  The mobile exporters are able to access a highly international 
production and market network.  By having worked together with MNEs as 
subcontractors or exporters to foreign markets, these Chinese businesses have 
fostered an exclusive position in the international production network by turning their 
function as an interface and facilitator between MNEs and international markets into 
the Chinese businesses’ main ownership advantage. 
     Regional and global players are the fourth type of Chinese-owned organizations.  
The regional and global players are often diversified conglomerates or integrated 
industrial groups and have committed themselves to strategic alliances with Western 
MNEs in order to establish regional and global operations.  The alliance works two-
fold.  On the one hand, Overseas Chinese businesses can facilitate the market 
entrance of Western MNEs in the Asian region.  On the other hand, the technology 
and management know-how of the Western MNEs enables the transformation of the 
Overseas Chinese family-run businesses to develop more open structures and 
integrate into the production networks of developed countries (H. Zhang and Bulcke 
135-136).   
     The 4 different forms of Chinese businesses are illustrated in regard to possible 
investments scenarios of the businesses’ from a network perspective in Figure 23. 
The M-form of an organization refers to the organization of the firm in different 
business units, for example, product A, product B, etc.  The U-form of the 
organization refers to the organization by function, for example, finance, marketing, 
etc. (McGraw-Hill/Irwin).  Local market orientation refers to the home market of the 
Chinese business while the foreign market orientation refers to international markets. 
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Figure 23:  Investment Scenarios of Chinese-owned Multinational Enterprises from a Network 
Perspective,  Haiyan Zhang, and Daniel Van Den Bulcke,  "Internationalization of Ethnic 
Chinese-Owned Enterprises: A Network Approach,"  Globalization of Chinese Business Firms,  
Eds. Henry Wai-chung Yeung and Kris Olds,  London:  Macmillan Press,  2000,  140. 
 
 
     Inward alliances are the recommended choice for paternalistic firms as these 
Chinese businesses own competitive advantages through the business’s networks 
and are able to offer the network’s resources to MNEs or Mainland Chinese wishing 
to enter the local host market (H. Zhang and Bulcke 140).  The inward alliance 
between the local Chinese family-owned business and the inward investor enables 
the foreign investor the access to the market and the local Chinese business to 
decrease the business’s reliance on local sources of support and increase political 
and financial leeway of the business (Mackie 183).  The co-operation with the foreign 
investor strengthens the comparative advantage of the Overseas Chinese business 
in terms of technology and marketing expertise, and introduces the Chinese 
business to the foreign investor’s network.  The transaction between the Overseas 
Chinese business and the MNEs or Mainland Chinese leads to an 
internationalization of the Overseas Chinese business and the business’ networks 
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and “has contributed to the dynamic interaction between, and gradual switching 
from, inward to outward internationalization of Chinese enterprises.” (H. Zhang and 
Bulcke 142) 
     The outward alliance-scenario concerns the mobile exporters.  Due to changing 
circumstances in the business environment, these Chinese businesses were forced 
to restructure the business’ activities.  Because of the inability to do so in the home 
market, the Overseas Chinese family business moved the production to Southeast 
Asian countries which enabled the business “to avoid or delay transformation by 
providing location specific advantages that prolong their firm’s specific advantages 
and enable them to continue with their traditional business practices.” (Lim 21-22)  
The advantages of the mobile exporter lie in the business’ position in the highly 
internationalized network.  The characteristic of the mobile exporter’s outward 
investment is the follow-up operation.  Having worked together internationally with 
MNEs in JVs, as suppliers or subcontractors, these mobile exporters are now 
basically being “pulled out” from their home country.  Although the mobile exporters 
take part in the outward alliance in host countries in Southeast Asia while conducting 
business in the local market, the mobile exporters build and rely less on local 
network connections as on the international markets and networks established in the 
home countries of the business’ international (Western) alliance partners (H. Zhang 
and Bulcke 143-144). 
     Multiple Alliances represent the multiplication of business networks of large 
Overseas Chinese business in a variety of markets.  These large Chinese 
businesses have diversified into the manufacturing sector abroad and at the same 
time also diversify the ownership structures of their businesses by establishing 
foreign JVs with MNEs and inward ethnic Chinese investors in the host market. In 
this process, these Chinese businesses also become multinational conglomerates 
with extensive local ties to companies and governments and the further 
enhancement of resources.  These Chinese conglomerates take advantage of the 
further liberalization of FDI and markets in Southeast Asia and invest in neighboring 
countries.  The Chinese conglomerates duplicate the conglomerate’s’ networks by 
entering JVs, cross-directorship and cross-shareholding with other ethnic Chinese 
businesses in host economies.  Thus, the conglomerate’s network expands and 
accessible resources significantly increase (H. Zhang and Bulcke 144-145). 
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     Global Networking by Overseas Chinese businesses takes the described 
internationalization through multiple alliances even further.  Global networking by 
Overseas Chinese results in global alliances between Overseas Chinese 
conglomerates and indigenous, ethnic Chinese and Western MNEs.  These global 
alliances consist of cross-border alliances between Chinese and non-Chinese 
business groups in order to establish a regional presence in a chosen country, 
expand ethnic Chinese business in the Western hemisphere and create worldwide 
value-adding networks.  The global alliances provide the Chinese companies with 
much needed management expertise, global production networks and access to 
technology.  The results of global alliances so far have been mixed.  Most Chinese 
global companies acquired knowledge of operating in different environments; 
nonetheless, the lack of firm-specific advantages and highly structured markets in 
the Western hemisphere which lack Chinese networks means that the ventures of 
the Chinese’s conglomerates on a global scale have been unsuccessful (H. Zhang 
and Bulcke 146).  H. Zhang and Bulcke conclude (147): 
Globalization is a big challenge for ethnic Chinese-owned enterprises and 
requires more linkages between Chinese, indigenous and foreign enterprises 
because of the growing scale and complexity of their business operations.  It 
is expected that the more advanced Chinese enterprises will incorporate and 
rely more and more on non-Chinese capital, on non-Chinese and non-family 
members as employees and in managerial and professional positions as well 
as on non-Chinese partners. 
     Thus, the internationalization of Overseas Chinese businesses requires the 
integration of non-Chinese financial and human capital to achieve success on the 
global stage.  The integration of local and internal resources into the hierarchy of a 
globally operating business has so far not taken place.  Therefore, “few Chinese 
business firms are really global [original italics] in their cross-border operations, 
despite the fact that some ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs have built truly global 
networks of social relationships (Yeung and Olds, "Epilogue" 275).  Nonetheless, 
states Peng, “the emergence of ‘connected Chinese enterprise groups’ […] is a new 
trend in international business development.  […] The connected Chinese enterprise 
group can enjoy the integral power of the whole group while retaining the flexibility of 
individual firms.” (245)  Hence, one can expect Chinese businesses to accelerate 
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expanding internationally within a globalized network of individual firms in the next 
years and take advantage of the embedding in this network. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions and Propositions for the International 
Expansion of Ethnic Chinese Businesses 
 
     The ethnic Chinese business is generally family lead and managed by the 
patriarch of the family.  Decision-making is centrally organized and key positions of 
the firm are occupied by family members.  Overseas Chinese family businesses are 
integrated into familial, informal and formal networks of relationships.  When 
Overseas Chinese businesses start to expand from the core business into other 
business activities, new ventures are regularly financed by family members, friends 
and business partners.  The diversification takes mostly place into unrelated 
industries and activities because of the focus on low cost business opportunities.  
The characteristics and behavior of ethnic Chinese businesses can be traced to 
distinctive cultural variables and determinants, for example, filial piety/power 
distance, face, high-contexting and guanxi.  
     Overseas Chinese businesses expand internationally to minimize the risk of the 
investment in just one market.  Furthermore, the engagement of Overseas Chinese 
business which paved the way for MNEs in the host societies with the MNEs in JVs 
and other co-operative forms enabled the Overseas Chinese business to gain 
valuable knowledge and access to Western technology, management know-how and 
marketing expertise.   
    Overseas Chinese businesses prefer M&A and JVs when entering new markets.  
The acquisition of foreign local knowledge and expertise as well as the speed of the 
transaction are key factors for the Overseas Chinese business in the consideration 
for the right market entry mode.  JVs also give the Overseas Chinese business 
access to foreign, mostly Western, technology and know-how and paved the way for 
a further expansion in the chosen market.  The market entrance through acquisitions 
or JVs is followed by the set-up of a new venture supported financially and 
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immaterially by other ethnic Chinese businesses.  Other modes of expansion are 
generally neglected by Overseas Chinese businesses.  
     Which exemplary conclusions can be drawn from the expansion and the 
internationalization of Overseas Chinese business for the internationalization of 
Mainland Chinese business?  Two selected propositions are made from the analysis 
of the expansion of Overseas Chinese business.  First, Mainland Chinese 
businesses are culturally very similar to Overseas Chinese businesses since both 
are ethnic Chinese businesses.  Organizational forms of Mainland Chinese business, 
due to the communist rule and the transitional economy, can not be expected to 
feature the same characteristics as do Overseas Chinese business.  However, 
Chinese cultural determinants and variables are able to explain characteristics and 
behavior of ethnic Chinese businesses.  Thus, features and characteristics of 
Overseas Chinese businesses which can be traced to the Chinese ethnicity are 
probably also applicable to private Mainland Chinese businesses because these 
features and characteristics are due to the cultural heritage of being an ethnic 
Chinese business.  Therefore, it can be expected that private Chinese businesses 
from Mainland China are similarly structured and led as Overseas Chinese 
businesses. Subsequently, if the Mainland Chinese businesses are family-led, then 
these businesses are also centered on the patriarch of the family and are centrally 
led, managed and controlled.  A strong reliance on the family for the management of 
the business, including the leadership of the business by the family head and, thus, 
the lack of professional management, as well as the diversification with unrelated 
subsidiaries can be expected, too.   
     Second, Mainland Chinese businesses, similar to Overseas Chinese businesses, 
establish, use and maintain networks based upon, for example, ethnicity, friend- or 
kinship.  Overseas Chinese businesses rely heavily on the use of network and 
relationships when expanding abroad.  Regardless of the chosen or classified mode 
of enterprise as described by H. Zhang and Bulcke, the firms make extensive use of 
networks to expand internationally.  It is reasonable to expect that Mainland Chinese 
business in the internationalization process choose to and be able to rely on ethnic 
Chinese business networks due to ethnicity, cultural similarities, the Chinese 
heritage and the close connection Overseas Chinese business feel toward the 
Mainland.  Mainland Chinese SMEs are able to utilize the same economic benefits  
of business networks based on guanxi (see Figure 21) as overseas/ethnic Chinese, 
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for example, access to organizational resources, capabilities, provision of capital and 
information, lower transaction because of mutual trust and reciprocity, closeness of 
the network and protection of network members.  Mainland Chinese SMEs probably 
utilize the networks already available in most countries to accelerate the 
internationalization of Mainland Chinese’s business activities.   
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5 International Expansion of Mainland Chinese Business 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the international expansion of Mainland Chinese business.  
First, a short overview about the development of the Chinese economy in recent 
years is given.  Subsequently, the second section of the chapter features the 
different types of enterprises in China.  The third section of this chapter deals with 
the challenges Mainland Chinese firms face in the context of their 
internationalization.  Chapter 5.4 presents a synthesis of the conclusions drawn in 
Chapter 4.5 and the findings of Chapter 5 so far.  Subsequent Chapter 5.5 deals with 
conceptual frameworks available to explain the internationalization of firms.  In 
conclusion, Chapter 5.6 summarizes and examines the findings of Chapter 5. 
 
 
5.1 The Chinese Economy 
 
     The Economist observers that ("From T-Shirts to T-Bonds" 65): 
China is behind almost everything […] going on in the world economy.  […]  
Uniquely, China combines a vast supply of cheap labor with an economy that 
(for its size) unusually open to the rest of the world, in terms of trade and 
foreign direct investment. 
     Figure 24 illustrates how China’s importance to the world economy is set to grow 
in the coming years.  In 2004, China was contributing just 4 percent to the world 
gross domestic product.  This number is to increase nearly fourfold by 2025 and 
sevenfold by 2050.  Consequently, China will overtake the USA as the world’s 
biggest economy sometime between 2025 and 2050.  Thus, by looking at the 
projections one can observe a significant shift of economic power from the EU, USA 
and Japan to China and India in the next decades.   
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Figure 24:  Percentage of World Gross Domestic Product,  Pete Engardio,  "A New World 
Economy,"  BusinessWeek,  22. August 2005:  38. 
 
     Additionally, China could become the world largest exporter by 2010 and Chinese 
goods and services could account for as much as 10 percent of global trade (OECD, 
China).  Thus, in essence, China is probably to become the most important player on 
the global economic stage and will continue to dominate the world economy within 
the next decades.  Add Child and Tse, “China is the most singular of the transition 
economies. It is the largest, the fastest growing and the most heavily engaged in 
international business and investment.” (5)  The transition of China from a command 
to a market economy with social characteristics is unusual since the transition is 
planned and executed by the state with a strong involvement of the Chinese 
government in the country’s social and economic affairs (Child and Tse 5-6).  The 
goals of institutional reform in China are (Child and Tse 7): 
 Introduction of a market economy with socialistic characteristics 
 Withdrawal of the government from direct business governance 
2050 Estimate
China
28%
India 
17%Other
10%
U.S.
26%
EU
15%
Japan
4%
China
India 
Other
U.S.
EU
Japan
2004
China
4%
India 
2%
Other
20%
U.S.
28%
EU
34%
Japan
12%
2025 Estimate
China
15%
India 
5%
Other
21%
U.S.
27%
EU
25%
Japan
7%
  - 134 -  
 Strong and globally competitive Chinese firms 
 Open and competitive industrial structures 
 The achievement of economies of scale and scope 
 Favored development of pillar industries  
    Child and Tse state that “decentralization and privatization signal the diminution of 
central government involvement in business governance and ownership.” (8)  Thus, 
the state relaxes its grips on businesses, reforms state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and supports the development of private enterprises.17  The Chinese government 
plans keep some SOEs under governmental control in strategic industries; the rest of 
the SOEs are to be reformed, privatized or closed. The market reforms undertaken 
by the Chinese government have taken place in incremental steps to ensure political 
and social stability in China (Child and Tse 5-8).  A short overview of the most 
significant steps of the reforms of China’s enterprises in the move from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy with social characteristics is given below in 
Table 13. 
 
                                            
 
17 In accordance to the definitions used by IBM(3), the term SOE refers to companies in which the 
state owns more than 50 percent of the shares, while the term private enterprises refers to enterprises 
in which the state has less than 50 percent of the shares and has no or limited managerial influence. 
  - 135 -  
- Expansion of the rights in management of state-owned 
enterprises
- The goal of a “socialist market economy” is stipulated
- Passing of Company Law which made all companies 
regardless of their ownership equal
- Abolishment of governmental administrative ranks in 
enterprises 
- Establishment of a modern enterprise system
The Standardizing Stage1992 - present
- Introduction of “go-out strategy”
- Collaboration with foreign enterprises
- Introduction of joint-stock ownership
- Insolvent enterprises may apply for bankruptcy
- First Enterprise Law since founding of PRC introduced
- Separation of ownership and management introduced
The Exploring Stage1984 – 1991 
- Delegation of power and sharing profits
- Limited autonomy in regard to production, pricing,
material procuring, etc. 
The Initiating Stage1978 – 1984  
Enterprise Reform MeasuresStageTime-Frame
 
 
Table 13:  Overview of Market-Oriented Reforms of China’s Enterprises,  compiled from:  
Anonymous,  Market-Oriented Reforms of China's Enterprises in Retrospect,  7. November 
2003,  China.org.cn,  Available: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003chinamarket/79520.htm,  
4. February 2005. 
 
     Thanks to the undertaken reforms, China has experienced a massive and 
impressive growth in the last years on its way to a market economy.  In 2005, 
China’s real GDP grew at 9.9 percent, up from 9.2 percent in 2004.  With its 
population of approximately 1.3 billion people it is the largest market on earth and 
continues to attract foreign investors (HKTDC).  Figure 25 illustrates the growth of 
China’s gross domestic product during the last five years and China’s projected 
growth in the near future. 
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Figure 25:  China’s Real GDP Growth for the Period of 2002-2007,  compiled from:  IMF,  World 
Economic Outlook: Globalization & Inflation,  Washington:  International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
2006. 
 
     The growth of the Chinese markets leads to the creation of wealth among the 
consumers since a real increase in the gross domestic product translates into a 
higher income for most households in China.  The higher household income in turn 
encourages consumers to spend more money and, thus, enhances the revenues 
and profits of enterprises in the local market.  Consequently, the Chinese market 
attracts a steady and rising share of FDI of companies wanting to enter and expand 
in the Chinese market.  Figure 26 displays the growth of FDI in China for the period 
of 2000-2005.  
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Figure 26:  FDI in China for the period of 1999-2005,  compiled from:  UNCTAD, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development,  "World Investment Development - Country Profile: 
China,"  New York and Geneva:  UNCTAD,  2004;  Anonymous,  China's FDI Witnesses 13% 
Growth in 2004,  14. January 2005,  People's Daily Online,  Available:  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/14/eng20050114_170596.html,  12. February 2005, 
and Anonymous,  China's Actual FDI in 2005 Reaches 72.4 Billion U.S. Dollars,  9. June 2006,  
People's Daily Online,  Available:  
http://english.people.com.cn/200606/09/eng20060609_272420.html,  10. June 2006. 
 
     The continuous flow of high FDI into China is a sign for the confidence foreign 
investors display for the domestic Chinese market.  The total FDI stock, compared to 
1990, has increased over 30-fold.  Thus, the Chinese market has become one of the 
most heavily-invested economies in the world.   Figure 27 illustrates the 
development of FDI stocks in China for the period of 1990-2005. 
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Figure 27:  Total FDI in China for the period of 1990-2005,  compiled from:  UNCTAD, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  "World Investment Development - Country 
Profile: China,"  New York and Geneva:  UNCTAD,  2004,  Anonymous,  China's FDI Witnesses 
13% Growth in 2004,  14. January 2005,  People's Daily Online,  Available:  
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/14/eng20050114_170596.html,  12. February 2005, 
and Anonymous,  China's Actual FDI in 2005 Reaches 72.4 Billion U.S. Dollars,  9. June 2006,  
People's Daily Online,  Available:  
http://english.people.com.cn/200606/09/eng20060609_272420.html,  10. June 2006. 
 
     A total of $634,50 billion in FDI flowed into China in the period of 1979-2005 and 
much of it during the last few years.  The investment boom in China was driven by 
Overseas Chinese who from 1985-1996 alone accounted for two-thirds of all 
investment in China (S. Long).  The FDI from Overseas Chinese in China helped 
build up a significant number of Mainland Chinese companies.  Now, these Mainland 
Chinese companies have accumulated substantial amounts of capital and have 
access to of one of the world’s lowest-cost manufacturing markets (Roberts et al.).  
As a result, Chinese companies are increasingly turning towards foreign markets to 
apply the competitive advantages gained in their home country.  The next section of 
this chapter analyzes which types of enterprises conduct business in the Chinese 
market and can be considered for an analysis in regard to a possible international 
expansion abroad.  
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5.2 Types of Chinese Enterprises 
 
     The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS General Survey Indicators) in China 
distinguishes between 3 different types of enterprises in the Chinese economy.  The 
first are domestic enterprises, followed by enterprises funded through investments 
from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and lastly, foreign-invested enterprises.  
Domestic enterprises are further differentiated into state-owned enterprises, 
collective-owned enterprises, cooperative enterprises, joint ownership enterprises, 
limited liability corporations, share-holding corporations Ltd., private enterprises and 
other enterprises.  Foreign-invested companies and enterprises from Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Macau consist of joint-venture enterprises, cooperative enterprises, sole 
investment enterprises and share-holding corporations Ltd (NBS General Survey 
Indicators).  For the scope of this dissertation, a further analysis of the domestic 
enterprises is conducted with the focus on SOEs and private enterprises while other 
types of enterprises are neglected.  Other types of enterprises are neglected 
because they are not relevant within the scope of an analysis of the expansion of 
Mainland Chinese businesses since these enterprises either do not qualify as being 
purely ethnic Chinese Mainland companies with the capital solely coming from 
Mainland China or have an organizational structure that makes labeling or analyzing 
them too complicated or even impossible. 
 
5.2.1 State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
     SOEs are run directly by either the central authority or by local governments at 
the provincial, municipal or county level.  Since China is basically still a planned 
economy (albeit one which is in transition to a market-based economy), SOEs are 
managed at the macro- and micro-level.  At the macro-level, SOEs are run by the 
corresponding bureaucracy within the framework of the centrally-planned economy.  
At the micro-level, SOEs are run by the government-appointed management of the 
enterprise in regard to the day-to-day affairs of the company (Jackson 16).  Figure 
28 illustrates the hierarchy in the planned economy of China with regard to the 
management of China’s enterprises. 
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Figure 28:  Industrial Management and Planning Hierarchy in China;  Sukhan Jackson,  
Chinese Enterprise Management Reforms in Economic Perspective,  De Gruyter Studies in 
Organization,  Ed. Stewart R. Clegg,  Vol. 41,  Berlin; New York:  Walter de Gruyter,  1992,  17. 
 
     Wang describes SOEs as ("Reforming State-Owned Enterprises in China"):  
A social unit in that, besides providing life long employment to its employees, 
it also provides all the necessary social services to its employees and their 
family: housing, healthcare, child care, education, grocery, to a name a few. In 
some sense, a unit takes care of its employees “from the cradle to the grave.”   
     Therefore, SOEs not only served their primary function, which is the production of 
goods and services, but fulfilled a larger role encompassing that of a care-taker of 
the SOEs’ employees and the employee’s families.  At one point of time in the past, 
SOEs performed these social obligations to more than 112 million people.  The 
social obligations and the notoriously weak performance of the SOEs led to the 
decision to reform the SOEs since they would not survive in a market-oriented 
economy (Wang). 
     In the early 1980s the Chinese government started to implement SOEs reforms.  
The reforms entailed the separation of ownership and management of the enterprise.  
  - 141 -  
The Contract Responsibility System and the Enterprise Law aimed to make a more 
efficient management of the SOE possible while the ownership of the enterprise still 
remained with the government.  The decentralization of decisions to the enterprises, 
for example, the actual amounts of goods produced, were encouraged.  
Furthermore, JVs with foreign companies were also encouraged.  The measures 
were aimed at increasing efficiency and productivity and proved successful.  Still, 
serious problems and challenges persisted in the 1990s for the SOEs (Wang) which 
include, according to Lee, Wong and Ka-ho ("The Decline of State-Owned 
Enterprises"):  
 Declining profitability 
 Mounting losses 
 Debts 
 Stoppage and bankruptcy 
 Drain of state assets 
 Over-staffing 
 Poor competitiveness 
 Excessive government interference 
     SOEs have continuously performed unsatisfactorily in the past.  Further 
increasing their troubles were the comparatively higher tax burden on SOEs as 
compared to private businesses.  In 1996, 37.5 percent of all SOEs were officially 
loss-making (Lee, Wong and Ka-ho).  Estimates by other institutions hold 
approximately 70 percent for a more accurate number.  The ensuing cash drain led 
to labor disputes in regard to pay and pensions, causing social unrest.  Furthermore, 
the SOEs had to borrow money from the banks and, thus, increased their debts 
(Lee, Wong and Ka-ho).  “In fact, some enterprises maintain production by 
swallowing up large amounts of bank loans, consuming their materials reserve 
funds, and resorting to loan defaults and non-payment of taxes” which do “not go 
towards investments, but to the payment of wages, current inputs and employees’ 
health costs.” (Lee, Wong and Ka-ho)  The non-payment of debts significantly 
weakened the banking system.  Adding to the problem of non-payment was the 
policy of the Chinese government not to let SOEs go bankrupt because the bankrupt 
enterprises would not have been able to pay the settlement of the unemployed 
which, in turn, could have resulted in political instability and social unrest.  Also, 
bankruptcy was emotionally or ideologically not acceptable.  Banks also did not want 
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SOEs go bankrupt, because the debts would become non-collectible and, thus, the 
banks themselves would face a serious crisis (Lee, Wong and Ka-ho). 
     A further drain of state assets by SOEs was due to the declaration of false 
bankruptcies, on the one hand, and the misappropriation of state assets and 
pilferage by workers, on the other hand.  False bankruptcy allowed the enterprise to 
shed its debts, but the conditions and structures of the enterprise normally did not 
change, so that the vicious cycle soon began again.  The misappropriation of state 
assets was performed by managers and officials who took advantage of the 
underdeveloped financial accounting and governance structures and redirected 
assets into their own private pockets.  The same holds true for workers who, due to 
the ideology of communism, believed that they also own the factory/company and 
take whatever they wanted or needed.  The theft of assets, therefore, was 
widespread (Lee, Wong and Ka-ho). 
     Most products of SOEs were low grade and low quality.  Old equipment and 
unmotivated staff contributed to the poor competitiveness of SOEs.  Overstaffing of 
enterprises led to low economic efficiency.  In general, it was estimated that SOEs 
had a surplus workforce-capacity of 20 percent (Lee, Wong and Ka-ho).  The 
overstaffing increased the financial burden on SOEs twofold.  One the one hand, it 
had to pay more for wages.  On the other hand, the enterprise also had to make 
more contributions for social services, health care plans, etc.  Additionally, the 
excessive government interference troubled the day-to-day management of the 
enterprise.  In general, government and enterprise can have different goals and 
targets which result in different preferences, e.g. the number of the workforce.  While 
the enterprise would like to reduce costs and, thus, prefers an adequate workforce, 
the government/local authority wants to ensure political and social stability, ensured 
through the employment of as many people as possible.  It was difficult for 
enterprises to exercise the management’s autonomy as local government refused to 
grant them authority for business matters due fear of losing the decision making and 
power (Lee, Wong and Ka-ho).  
     In recent years attempts have been made to change the structure, governance 
and management of state-owned enterprises.  The number of SOEs has been 
greatly reduced to about 150.000 at the end of 2003, down from 233.000 in 1998 
and 305.000 in 1996 (Anonymous, Initial Success Achieved in State-Owned 
Economic Restructuring; Lee, Wong and Ka-ho).  The number of SOEs which are 
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loss-making was reduced to 74.000, 88.000 less than in 1998.  Between 1998 and 
2003, SOEs increased their annual profit by 44.2 percent (Anonymous, Initial 
Success Achieved in State-Owned Economic Restructuring).  In 2004, the sales 
revenues of major SOEs were more than $671 billion generating a profit of $58 
billion (Anonymous, State-Owned Enterprises Perform Well in 2004).  Therefore, the 
reforms undertaken to address the problems of profitability and overstaffing of 
enterprises as well as letting SOEs go bankrupt seem to have proven successful.  To 
this end, The Economist observes, that “after two decades of reform and 
privatization, only about a third of China’s economy is still directly controlled by the 
government through state-owned enterprises (SOEs).” (Anonymous, "The Myth of 
China Inc.")  The massive lay-offs of workers and employees have been cushioned 
by the accelerated hiring of private enterprises which have gained momentum and 
economic power in the Chinese economy is illustrated in the next section of this 
chapter. 
 
5.2.2 Private Enterprises 
     Most private enterprises, whether family-held or collective-owned, are primarily 
registered as wholly-owned enterprises, partnership enterprises and limited-liability 
companies.  The most basic characteristic of the private enterprise is the private 
capital used for the foundation of the enterprise which accounts for 92 percent of the 
stock of all private enterprises.  A high ratio of over 83 percent of the capital stock is 
brought in by the proprietors of the business; i.e. founder and owner as well as 
family-members.  The rest is held by managers, staff, collective stocks and township 
governments.  Thus, “private companies show the typical characteristics of family-
dominated enterprises:” (Jia-gui and Qun-hui)  In 2001, 68.02 percent of all private 
enterprises were in the form of limited liability companies.  A further 6.44 percent 
were registered as partnerships; and proprietorships accounted for 25.5 percent of 
all private enterprises (Anonymous, Development of Non-State Owned Sector).  In a 
report published in 2005 by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, it 
was found that over 90 percent of private enterprises are family owned and “among 
such enterprises, the vast majority are operated according to family style 
management.” (Anonymous, 90% of China's Private Business Are Family Owned) 
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     Additionally, collective-owned enterprises which are supposedly owned and run 
by the township government, can also be either government-controlled or are family-
run.  Joint stock enterprises replaced the former collectives with stocks being held by 
the government, the collective and the individuals.  The increasingly multi-
polarization of ownership of enterprises in China has led to varying degrees of 
ownership in enterprises among all different types of enterprises (Anonymous, 
Development of Non-State Owned Sector).  The reforms introduced by the Chinese 
government emphasized the separation of management and ownership and led to, 
for example, enterprises with the government, the township-government, 
management and staff as shareholders.  For private companies, Jia-gui and Qun-hui 
assert that “many private companies have been registered in the name of collective-
owned enterprises. This phenomenon is called wearing a ‘red cap.’”18 ("Governance 
Structures of Chinese Enterprises")  These ‘red cap’ enterprises may also be 
enterprises with dormant governmental partners.  However, when these ‘red cap’ 
companies become successful, local governments decide to interfere which has lead 
to bankruptcy and failed realization of growth opportunities (Anonymous, "The Myth 
of China Inc.").  Thus, these ‘red cap’ enterprises may not be well positioned in terms 
of organizational structure to survive the intensifying competition in China as well as 
on the global stage. 
     The internal governance of family-dominated private enterprises is based on the 
distribution of power and balance among the family members.  Although, private 
enterprises are gradually moving closer to corporate standards, such as 
management board, board of directors and shareholder meetings, the characteristics 
of family control persist.  These characteristics also define the managerial incentives 
in the company.  Non-family members are given high pay in order to bind the 
employees to the enterprise while family members are bound and committed through 
their holding of the company (Jia-gui and Qun-hui).  
     Family-run businesses are also known as getihu.  The getihus were the first type 
of individual business and were introduced by the communist government in the 
1980s to encourage the development of jobs for the unemployed.  Getihus are not 
allowed to employ more than 7 people.  In the past, if the getihu had more than 7 
                                            
 
18 In China, firms that `wear the red cap' are actually capitalist businesses under the disguise of public 
ownership (Cheng). 
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employees, the getihu was classified as a private business which was banned until 
the late 1980s and, subsequently, closed.  From 1999 to 2003 the number of getihus 
decreased from 62 million to 46 million.  The decline results from heavy fees and the 
focus of authorities on the need of large firms as opposed to the need of small 
family-run businesses.  Furthermore, a substantial number of getihus have been 
classified as private businesses and non-function, but registered getihus have been 
eliminated from official statistics (Anonymous, "The Bulldozing of Silk Alley" 51). 
     By mid-2004, China had more than 3.44 million private companies according to a 
survey conducted by the Research Association on the Private Economy.  The 3.44 
million enterprises employed approximately 47.14 million employees.  By the end of 
2004, the number of private enterprises had grown to more than 3.8 million.  One 
cannot underestimate the progress private business have made in China.  In 1989 
the production value of all private enterprises was a meager $5.1 billion.  In 2003, 
the value had risen to an astonishing $241 billion.  This represents an increase of 
nearly 5000 percent.  The growth of private enterprises is expected to be well above 
10 percent annually for the next 5-10 years and, subsequently, to be responsible for 
60 percent of the increase in the national economy.  Furthermore, another 10 million 
entrepreneurs are expected to emerge (Anonymous, Private Enterprises Expanding 
Quickly).  The economist Fang Gang estimates that 70 percent of the Mainland 
Chinese GDP is produced by private enterprises (Engardio, China Is a Private-
Sector Economy).   
     Based on the organizational features of the mainly family-led private businesses 
which are relatively small, the introduction of the term Mainland Chinese SMEs for 
private Mainland Chinese business is proposed as a classification.  Although the 
development of Mainland Chinese SMEs has been impressive in the last years, the 
SMEs are nonetheless still discriminated against.  For example, Mainland Chinese 
SMEs are denied access to the state Foreign Aid Fund that is reserved only for 
SOEs (A. Zhang).  A further 87.4 percent of Chinese private entrepreneurs worry 
about the reforms in the taxation system, the implementation of property rights in 
regards to private assets in the constitution, the shift of governmental functions and 
the establishment of a social credit system.  Despite the granting of access to 
Mainland Chinese SMEs to engage in hitherto closed business fields, more support 
by government departments and financial institutions to the Mainland Chinese SMEs 
is recommended (Anonymous, Private Enterprises Expanding Quickly).   
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     The problems of Mainland Chinese SMEs are consequences of politically 
motivated reforms by the Chinese government which was afraid of the development 
and power of the private sector.  Therefore, the government gave SOEs privileged 
access to capital technology and markets.  But foreign nationals with advanced 
technologies were also treated preferentially and invited to invest in China.  The 
Western MNEs took advantage of the preferential treatment, and in the process the 
foreign investment transformed the landscape of the market and accelerated the 
competitive pressure in the Chinese market.  The result is, as The Economist 
observes, “a corporate landscape of a few big private companies such as Huawei, a 
mass of lumbering state-owned firms and increasingly powerful foreign 
multinationals.” (Anonymous, "The Struggle of the Champions" 60)   
     A second unintentional result is the focus of Chinese managers on short-term 
profit.  The inconsistency and opacity of regulations lead Chinese managers to 
pursue a strategy of short-term returns and excessive diversification.  Long-term 
investment, such as in technology, is neglected and the development of horizontal 
networks among customers, suppliers and trade bodies - needed to establish 
technology standards - are shunned (Anonymous, "The Struggle of the Champions" 
60).  Subsequently, 85 percent of high-technology goods produced in China are 
controlled by foreign firms.  Additionally, China runs an annual $10 billion trade 
deficit in technology.  Thus, essentially, “China has a low-tech economy.” 
(Anonymous, "I Spy Spies" 60) 
     In general, one cannot even be really sure whether a Chinese business is a truly 
independent (private) enterprise or a government-controlled company.  The mix-up 
of ownership as discussed above in regard to collective-owned enterprises can be 
applied to private businesses in general as well.  The assumedly private company 
Huawei, one of China’s biggest companies and a maker of routers and 
telecommunications equipment is suspected of being actually government-
controlled, i.e. by the military.  The founder of Huangwei, Ren Zhengei, was in the 
People’s Liberation Army and staff members of the company’s overseas offices are 
even allegedly spies for Chinese consulates.  Consumer electronics producer 
Lenovo which appears to be a private business expanding worldwide and 
aggressively selling its computer and consumer technology products is, in fact, state-
owned.  The company was founded by - and is majority-owned by - the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences.  Apparently Lenovo uses the company’s excellent 
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government connections to boost revenues (Anonymous, "The Struggle of the 
Champions" 58-59).  Table 14 gives an overview over a selected number of SOEs 
which are aggressively expanding and behaving the same way private enterprises 
do, but in which the government owns a significant part of the shares. 
 
43PetrochemicalsSinochem
24Consumer electronicsKonka
30Appliances, consumer 
electronics
Haier
50ComputersLenovo
25Consumer electronicsTCL
71Oil explorationCNNOC
100Auto maker Shanghai Automotive (SAIC)
100Auto makerFirst Auto Works
75Cellular operatorChina Mobile
90Oil production and distributionPetroChina
84Oil production and distributionSinopec
Share owned by 
Government (in %)
BusinessCompany
 
 
Table 14:  Mainland Chinese Businesses and Government Ownership, compiled from:  
Frederik Balfour,  “The New Corporate Model: State Ownership,"  BusinessWeek,  22. August 
2005:  52-54. 
 
     Most aspiring companies in which the state is still heavily invested are, 
nonetheless, managed like private enterprises.  Kurtenbach acknowledges the 
progress in the iterative separation of ownership and management of SOEs by 
concluding that, “the state holds controlling stakes in many companies, but 
Communist Party bureaucrats no longer fill management posts.” (Chinese Business 
Begins to Expand Overseas)  However, intransparency with regard to certain 
business practices of companies is still rampant.  Although companies might be 
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listed at the stock-exchange, the dealings between the state-owned parent and the 
subsidiary listed at the stock exchange remain murky.  The problem of 
intransparency coupled with the lack of independent boards makes the control of 
actions and dealings of Chinese companies nearly impossible.  The problem of 
control in turn enhances the risk of fraudulent activities by companies and their 
managers.  Table 15 lists some scandals of Chinese firms during the past few years. 
 
Guangdong’s investment vehicle went bust, owing over $5 
billion
1999Gitic
Orchid grower collapsed after inflating revenues. 
Chairman jailed for fraud and bribery
2002Euro-Asia Agricultural
Holdings
Property developer collapsed after chairman jailed for fraud2004Shanghai Land
Conglomerate blew up after exposure of fictious growth 
through acquisitions and misappropriations of $725 million
2004D’Long
TV-maker‘s top management arrested for theft of funds2004Skyworth
ProblemDateCompany
Scandal Sheet
Selected Chinese companies‘ problems
 
 
Table 15:  Scandal Sheet,  Anonymous,  "Fools Rush In,"  The Economist,  9. December 2004:  
68-69. 
 
     Hence, it seems that China still has some way to go in regard to corporate 
governance.  Furthermore, the contradictions between dirigisme and free markets of 
the Chinese government, as demonstrated above with the example of Huangwei and 
Lenovo, remain visible. The contradictions are the result of the power of the 
government to control and lever enormous resources, but at the same time 
undercutting the government’s efforts towards free markets by the paranoid desire to 
remain in charge of the country and the international expansion of Mainland Chinese 
enterprises (Anonymous, "The Struggle of the Champions" 58) .  Nonetheless, 
Chinese companies are expanding worldwide and are facing a number of challenges 
and problems as well as opportunities.  The next chapter analyzes these challenges 
and opportunities of internationalization.  
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5.3 The Internationalization of Mainland Chinese Business       
 
     According to Bob Broadfoot, “[is] the story now […] not the flow of foreign 
investment into China, but the flow of Chinese investment overseas, and its impact 
on other countries.” (Kurtenbach)  The quote illustrates the development of China 
from a FDI recipient to an outward investor with expanding Mainland Chinese 
businesses.  China has become increasingly assertive because Chinese companies 
are flush with cash and  Chinese companies are looking abroad for expansion.  
Adjacently, the Chinese Government needs to maintain the high GDP growths of the 
past years and encourages Mainland Chinese businesses to expand internationally 
(Anonymous, "The Dragon Tucks In" 67).  Consequently, the internationalization of 
Mainland Chinese business has accelerated in the last years. In 2005, Mainland 
enterprises established 1067 companies abroad and invested $6.92 billion overseas 
which is more than 12 percent of the total Mainland Chinese ODI to date.  The total 
overseas investment by Mainland Chinese business reached $51,7 billion at the end 
of the year 2005.  29 percent of the overseas investment in 2005 was put in 
manufacturing, 28.7 percent in mining and 26.3 in information transmission, 
computer service and software.  60 percent of the investment went to Asia.  In 
Europe, favorite investment locations were Russia, Germany, Britain and 
Kazakhstan.  56.5 percent of equity investment was used for M&A, 43.5 percent 
went into the establishment of production facilities. (Anonymous, China Makes More 
Overseas Investment in 2005, Mainly in Asia).   
     Figure 29 illustrates the acceleration of outward direct investment by China.  As 
one can see, while the stock of outward direct investment (ODI) was just $2.5 billion 
in 1990, ten years it had reached $25.8 billion and increased to $37 billion in 2003 
and 51,7 billion in 2005, respectively (UNCTAD, " Country Profile: China"; Hess).  It 
is expected that Mainland Chinese companies will invest another $60 billion abroad 
by 2010 (Hess 1).  Thus, the tremendous acceleration of Mainland Chinese’s 
investment abroad becomes evident. 
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Figure 29:  Total Mainland Chinese Outward Direct Investment,  UNCTAD, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development,  "World Investment Development - Country Profile: 
China,"  New York and Geneva:  UNCTAD,  2004,   and  Hess, William,  Going Outside, Round-
Tripping and Dollar Diplomacy: An Introduction to Chinese Outward Direct Investment,  
Beijing, China:  Global Insight,  Available: 
http://www.globalinsight.com/Highlight/HighlightDetail2717.htm,  2006. 
 
     Due to the acceleration of investment of Mainland Chinese businesses, for 
example, in Southeast Asia, researchers believe that the numbers for total outward 
investments have been significantly underestimated.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, ethnic Chinese businesses employ networks to enter markets and channel 
funds to other ethnic Chinese businesses.  The same holds true for Mainland 
Chinese businesses which utilize the ethnic Chinese networks when expanding, for 
example, in Southeast Asia.  Frost states (Hua et al. 20): 
There’s really a black hole of Chinese FDI.  The data are missing lots of small 
and medium-sized enterprises and one-man bands, as well as money that 
goes through ethnic Chinese or other countries.  It’s impossible to know how 
much investment isn’t being picked up, but I reckon it’s a lot. 
     According to Wong and Chan, Chinese ODI underwent 4 stages.  Because the 
ODI was initially directed by the government, certain industries or sectors were 
favored and encouraged to invest overseas to gain access to raw materials and 
technology as well as increase foreign exchange earnings and promote China’s 
exports.  During the first stage from 1979-1985, only state-owned trading companies 
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as well as municipal international and technological cooperation enterprises were 
allowed to invest abroad. The total number of projects was 189 while the total 
investment was $197 million with an average of $900,000 per project (Wong and 
Chan 279). 
     The second stage from 1986 to 1991 was characterized by a liberalization of 
restrictive policies and the permission for more enterprises, even private firms, to 
invest abroad.  Firms were allowed to set up subsidiaries abroad provided that 
sufficient capital, technical and operational know-how and a suitable JV partner were 
available.  891 projects were granted with a total volume of $1.2 billion having an 
average project value of $1.4 million.  An increasing number of local and provincial 
enterprises invested abroad during the third stage from 1992-1998.  Corruption and 
nepotism as well as heavy losses by many firms led to a restriction of rules, policies 
and procedures.  Therefore, the average value of a project decreased to $1 million 
while a total of $1.2 billion were invested overseas.  The fourth and continuing stage 
which started in 1999 is marked by the introduction and consolidation of the “going-
out” strategy of the government. (Wong and Chan 280-281).  
     According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM), the “Going Out” – Strategy was designed to enhance the strengths of 
Chinese enterprises in the exploiting of resources, processing and labor.  But in 
recent years, the focus shifted to technology, production capacity and brands.  
Chinese enterprises increasingly cooperate or purchase foreign enterprises to gain 
access to technology and brands.  By cooperating with small and medium foreign 
enterprises, Chinese businesses gain access to sophisticated technology and 
improve the competitiveness of the Chinese enterprise (MOFCOM It is a New Trend 
for Scientific and Technological Enterprises to Go Out).    
     China’s businesses are emerging as powerful rivals, not only in China but on the 
global market.  But so far only few companies have become known globally.  There 
are three reasons why Chinese businesses are not yet globally as big and powerful 
as multinationals from other countries.  First, China is a vast country with a weak 
transportation, distribution and retail infrastructure.  The coastal regions are also 
significantly richer in terms of income per head than the western regions of China 
(Zeng and Williamson 93).  The differences in household incomes between regions 
as well as the inadequate infrastructure of China means that there is not one single 
market, but several markets with strong disparities in income, living style and 
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available products.  The rivalry between provinces and the local/regional grooming of 
enterprises into champions leads to the establishment of many regional brands, but 
few national brands.  Because of the cumbersome process of taking over rival 
companies, Chinese companies in generally seldom grow large enough to compete 
on the national stage let alone the global stage (Zeng and Williamson 93).  In 
conclusion, the weak infrastructure, the income disparities between regions and the 
rivalry between provincial governments hinder the development and implementation 
of national champions. 
     Second, only large organizations can compete on the global stage.  However, in 
China these large organizations are mostly state-owned.  The SOEs are, as has 
been discussed previously in this chapter, mostly unprofitable, riddled with debt and 
are not truly globally competitive.  Third, in the past the government did not support 
Mainland Chinese SMEs and continues to prop up SOEs with cheap credit and 
favorite investment regulations.  The measures introduced by the government in 
recent years ensure that Mainland Chinese SMEs are now being assisted by the 
government and regional institutions as well, but the lack of support in the past 
means that the Mainland Chinese SMEs have yet to catch up.  The development of 
Chinese businesses has been hard to track since the evolution has so far not taken 
place in a predictable form such as in Japan or South Korea.  Instead, 4 different 
groups of Chinese enterprises are emerging as challenger on the global stage (Zeng 
and Williamson 94-95).  
     The first group consists of national champions.  Examples for national champions 
are Haier, Huawei Technologies and Lenovo [Legend]19.  These national champions 
have successfully coped with the multinational’s entrance onto the Chinese market.  
When these Mainland Chinese businesses expand abroad, the companies look for 
small, segmented markets, define niches and use their competitive advantages of 
low labor and material cost in China to successfully serve segments and markets 
vacated by multinationals due to low profitability.  National champions find it difficult 
to leverage the companies’ advantages in highly segmented markets as the 
companies often lack understanding of local tastes and customer behavior.  
Furthermore, investment in R&D continues to be low (Zeng and Williamson 95).  
                                            
 
19 Legend changed its English name to „Lenovo“ on 1st April of 2004 (Lenovo) 
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     The second group of emerging Chinese businesses is the group of dedicated 
exporters.  The dedicated exporters move into mass market where Mainland 
Chinese businesses can apply the competitive advantage of low production cost in 
China.  The dedicated exporters try to reap global economies of scale by targeting 
the global market for manufactured products.  After gaining in the production of 
goods at a global scale and increasing technological skills and capabilities, the 
dedicated exporters move up the value chain and into higher segmented markets.  
Examples for dedicated exporters are BYD Battery, China International Marine 
Containers and Galanz.  Although strong in mass markets, dedicated exporters face 
difficulties when the business requires customized products or service (Zeng and 
Williamson 96-97).  
     Competitive networks are the third group of emerging global businesses from 
Mainland China.  A competitive network consists of several hundred small 
entrepreneurial companies in one location, each producing or servicing a certain part 
of the production chain of a product.  All entrepreneurial enterprises which specialize 
in just one part of the value chain form a cohesive and interdependent entity.  A good 
example for a competitive network can be found in Wenzhou where cigarette lighters 
are produced.  Today, more than 700 private companies operate as a single 
unofficial entity and produce cigarette lighters in the Wenzhou network.  The network 
now enjoys a world market share of approximately 70 percent.  Further examples for 
competitive networks can be found in Chenghai and Shenzen for toys, as well as in 
Shenzhou for neckties.  Competitive networks from China now dominate the world 
markets in watches, socks, shoes, toys, pens among others.  So far, the competitive 
networks have been unable to make the investments necessary to turn a competitive 
network into a strong brand (Zeng and Williamson 97-98).   
    The last group of emerging businesses from Mainland China encompasses 
technology upstarts.  These upstarts have sprung from the large infrastructure of 
basic science research and military-related technology research.  The technology 
upstarts have used state-of-the-art technologies created in government laboratories 
and applied them to the production of goods for the world market.  The upstarts are 
normally able to acquire the technology relatively inexpensively since the Chinese 
government underwrites most of the costs.  One impressive example of the 
technology upstarts is consumer electronics producer Lenovo which was founded by 
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scientists working at the Institute of Computing Technology (Zeng and Williamson 
98-99).  
     Under orders of the Chinese government, more and more Chinese businesses 
have dared to expand abroad.  Companies such as Lenovo, Baosteel, TCL, Huawei 
and Haier are aggressively pushing into foreign markets.  The drive abroad not only 
results from the desire of the Chinese government to build national champions, but is 
also due to structural overcapacity and cut-throat competition on the Mainland China 
market.  The fierce competitors are often domestic firms which are not allowed to go 
bankrupt by officialdom and, thus, force Chinese businesses to expand abroad in 
order to survive (UNCTAD, “Country Profile: China").  Table 16 gives an overview of 
the motives of Chinese companies expanding abroad. 
 
- Prestige of having international operations
- Acquire brands and marketing skills
- Aspiration to become global players
Image/Branding/ 
Marketing
- Growing and fierce competition in home market 
- Sustain growth rate having become dominant  in one or more domestic 
markets through          • Exports
• Building global footprint
- Support exports and service local markets
- Expand market presence
- Diversification strategy in the generation of revenues
- Acquire advantages related to “transnationality”, i.e. confidence and of knowledge 
of operating in foreign environment
- M&A used to enhance the competitiveness of a mainland Chinese business
- Avoiding tariff barriers and trade quotas
Growth
- Acquire technology to deploy in China
- Secure access to raw materials
- Advance product development
- Acquisition of locational assets that enhance the competitiveness of a Chinese 
business
- Acquire brands and distribution/sales networks
Resources
MotivesArea
 
 
Table 16:  Motives for Chinese Business to Expand Internationally,  compiled from:  McKinsey,  
"China's Businesses Go Global,"  Launch Event Presentation Asia House Opening,  Frankfurt:  
McKinsey,  2004,  3;  and  UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  
China - an Emerging FDI Outward Investor,  4. December 2003,  UNCTAD,  5-8. 
 
  - 155 -  
     The most aggressive push abroad seen so far by a Chinese business has 
probably been the acquisition of the PC division of IBM by Lenovo for $1.75 billion in 
December 2004.  The acquisition makes Lenovo the third largest PC manufacturer 
worldwide, behind Dell and Hewlett-Packard.  However, it is questionable whether 
Lenovo can obtain significant synergies or bring anything significant to the target in 
terms of management skill or strategy.  Lately, Lenovo dithered strategically, 
changing its name from Legend to Lenovo, selling non-core businesses and focusing 
on rural customers.  And the production of the PC division of IBM already took place 
in China so that cost savings are limited to synergies in purchasing (Anonymous, 
"Champ or Chump?" 54-55).  So, why did Lenovo buy IBM and what does the step 
mean for the expansion of Chinese businesses in general? 
     Ostensibly, Lenovo wanted to gain access and control over distribution, customer 
and service networks as well as research facilities of IBM.  The deal also provides 
Lenovo with the access to the global network of IBM, a global player (Anonymous, 
Chinas Lenovo Wird Drittgrösster PC-Hersteller Der Welt).  Furthermore, Lenovo 
obtains the sole rights to the valuable IBM brands for the next 5 years.  It seems that 
“[China’s] leaders – both political and corporate – clearly want to develop their own 
brand names and technology, for both the prestige and the fatter profits they bring.” 
(AP)  “They are very ambitious but also quite pragmatic in the sense that they want 
to buy brands,” says Duncan Clarke, the managing director of a consulting firm (AP).  
Clarke elaborates his point of view by stating that “the government is encouraging 
this ‘go forth’ program to encourage Chinese enterprises not only to export, but to 
acquire companies or set up bases for manufacturing overseas and buy brands, 
whatever it takes.” (AP)   
     The acquisition of IBM’s PC division by Lenovo has been heralded as “the dawn 
of a new era in China’s merger and acquisitions market.” (Guerrera and McGregor)  
According to Guerrera and McGregor, Lenovo “has become the first state-controlled 
Chinese company to acquire an iconic global brand, together with the high profile 
and psychological leap of faith such a deal entails.” (Lenovo Deal May Herald Dawn 
of Chinese M&A)  Thus, the acquisition provided Lenovo with a reputable brand, 
respect by other multinationals and a morale boost.  Lenovo took the step in order to 
enter the global stage, soften the effects of tough competition at home and raise the 
company’s reputation and image.  The incremental M&A activities among Mainland 
Chinese businesses are a sign of the growing maturity of the Chinese companies 
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and the commitment of the companies to global activity (Guerrera and McGregor). 
Table 17 gives an overview about a selected number of M&A deals and other FDI by 
Chinese businesses abroad while Figure 30 illustrates the growing value of M&A 
transactions by Chinese companies over the last few years.  
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Table 17:  Overview of M&A-Deals and other FDI by Mainland Chinese Businesses in the Past 
Years,  McKinsey.  "China's Businesses Go Global,"  Launch Event Presentation Asia House 
Opening,  Frankfurt:  McKinsey,  2004,  9-10.  
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Figure 30:  Overview About the Yearly M&A-Purchases by Chinese Companies for the Period 
1999-2005,  UNCTAD,  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  "World 
Investment Development - Country Profile: China,"  New York and Geneva:  UNCTAD,  2004;  
and UNCTAD,  Foreign Direct Investment Statistical Database,  2006,  UNCTAD,  Available:  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3159&lang=1,  19. January 2005;  and 
Anonymous,  China Makes More Overseas Investment in 2005, Mainly in Asia,  10. February 
2006,  People's Daily Online,  Available:  
http://english.people.com.cn/200602/10/eng20060210_241644.html,  31. March 2006. 
 
     The growing value of M&A-purchases by Chinese companies and the increasing 
number of big M&A-deals and FDI by Chinese companies illustrates that Mainland 
Chinese companies are using part of the capital inflow from China-bound FDI (see 
Figures 26 & 27) to invest in foreign ventures themselves.  The acceleration in the 
number and value of deals also signals a new trend:  Mainland Chinese businesses 
are willingly to spend heavily on foreign resources and speed up the 
internationalization process of Mainland Chinese businesses.  Probable targets are 
Western industrial firms that are little-known and private since, as Meyer believes, 
“internationalization will be a small-firm phenomenon.” (Knowledge@Wharton)  
Buying up these Western companies „can provide competitive advantages to 
Chinese firms struggling to survive in hypercompetitive domestic markets.” 
(Knowledge@Wharton) 
     It seems that Mainland Chinese businesses indeed do not have another choice.  
According to Marshall Meyers, “Chinese companies are now facing serious foreign 
competition at home. So they have to do something. They’ve got to grow to global 
scale.” (Barboza)  Adds DiPaola of Bain&Company, “the Chinese understand that 
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global scale gives them lower-cost components, and that R&D and branding are now 
done globally.  […] Chinese companies in industries where the economics are global 
will have no choice but to make these [M&A] deals.”  (Roberts, et al.)  Subsequently, 
“China Inc.” (Kurtenbach) is aspiring to global scale and raising its international 
profile by spending billions of dollars on assets and resources.  But as Table 17 
shows, so far most deals focus on the acquisition of access to natural resources.  
Nonetheless, three quarters of all Mainland manufacturing firms have plans to 
expand abroad (Kurtenbach).  Chinese exporters especially have bold ambitions, 
wanting to sell products with their own brand names and capture foreign markets.  
“The Chinese are fast learners. When they realize what it takes to build a brand, they 
will really get into it,” says marketing expert Shirley Young (Dolan and Hardy 72).  
“The perception is that the Chinese are never going to get anywhere because they 
don’t have their own brands. That was true ten years ago, but it’s changed 
dramatically,” adds Nicholas Lardy, a scholar at the Brookings institution (Dolan and 
Hardy 72).  Therefore, endangered Western companies with strong brands but a 
weak capital base could be the perfect target for Mainland Chinese companies to 
acquire.  A banker from Shanghai observes, that “it’s a perfect match.  The Western 
companies have the technology, and the Chinese have the money and the low-cost 
manufacturing base.” (O’Connell) 
     The observation by the banker is accurate since Chinese businesses’ main 
advantage is cost.  Factory input costs, such as labor and utilities, are low in China.  
The Chinese government supports local companies in the drive abroad with cheap 
capital for the expansion and special programs.  Furthermore, R&D costs are low 
and response time to market changes is fast.   A comparison of China, other 
emerging countries and the U.S. reveals that skilled labor costs average $242  a 
month in China, compared to $707 in Brazil and $5,451 in the U.S.  Unskilled labor 
costs are around $0.59 in China compared to $21.33 in the U.S.  Manufacturing land 
costs $33 in China compared to $43.04 per square meter in the U.S. and $94.53 in 
Korea.  Energy costs are 3.76 US-Cents/Kwh. in China compared to 4.98 US-
Cents/Kwh. in the U.S. and 9.28 US-Cents/Kwh. in India.  Additionally, a comparison 
of Huawei and Cisco, both producer of network routers, reveals that Huawei’s 
engineers earn about 1/8 the salary of Cisco’s employees and Huawei’s engineers 
work an average of 55-60 hours a week compared to Cisco’s 40 hours a week 
(McKinsey 4-6).  Although wages and production costs are rising, steep differences 
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in operating and labor costs between China and Western countries remain.  Thus, 
Mainland Chinese businesses enjoy a unique competitive advantage with the low 
costs of manufacturing in China.  
     The importance of the development of powerful branding has finally been 
recognized by Mainland Chinese businesses which want to be multinational.  “With 
well-known brand names and strong marketing strategies, not only can companies 
dominate [in China], but also succeed in going global,” observes Stremme (Local 
Famous Brands in China).  In the past, Chinese businesses have limited themselves 
to the role of OEM.  OEMs supply multinationals and retailer’s private labels with 
products ranging from toys to televisions.  Since business with own products and 
brands is significantly more lucrative than producing for other companies, Mainland 
Chinese businesses are now striving to position their company and their products 
abroad by developing and positioning their brands (Deckstein, Kerbusk and Wagner 
73).  Companies that try to establish a branded presence in foreign markets are 
Haier, Lenovo, Kejian and SVA.  However, “sustaining brands in developed markets 
is complex, expensive, and uncertain. The biggest obstacle is the Chinese 
manufacturer’s lack of vital marketing skills.”  (Gao, Woetzel and Wu)    
     Thus, the lack of marketing and branding skills hinders the expansion of Chinese 
businesses in developing and developed markets.  According to Stremme, “most 
Chinese companies lack marketing experience and fail to understand the importance 
of brand positioning.” (Local Famous Brands in China)  But, “pristine production, 
however, won’t be enough to win over rank-and-file consumers,” warn Dolan and 
Hardy (“The Challenge from China”).  Thus, “the Chinese need a Sony: a company 
that will stand for high quality, that will produce incredible amounts of innovation,” 
concludes Martyn Straw (Dolan and Hardy).  The development of a company such 
as Sony in consumer electronics requires substantial investments in R&D to identify 
market niches as well as develop and produce new products.  Furthermore, 
considerable investments have to be made into the advertising and marketing of the 
products.  In the past Chinese companies did not significantly invest in innovation 
and brand marketing as the Chinese businesses underestimated the importance of 
innovation and marketing.  The same holds true for distribution and sales networks.  
That is why most Chinese products are generally regarded as cheap, low-tech and of 
poor quality.  But now more and more Chinese businesses realize that a change of 
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attitude towards expenses for innovation, branding, distribution and sales networks is 
needed (Dolan and Hardy; Roberts, Balfour and Einhorn et al. 77-80). 
     Chinese carmakers are a case in point because they understand the assembly of 
vehicles, but lack profound knowledge in vehicle research, components technology, 
purchasing or brand-building (Anonymous, "Rover's Return").  Consequently, for 
example, Mainland Chinese Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) is 
trying to take on global car makers by spending heavily on the acquisition of 
technology and brands of other endangered car makers.  SAIC planned to form a JV 
with British MG Rover that would give SAIC control of the brand and the design.  So 
far, SAIC has JVs with German Volkswagen and American General Motors.  
However, even counting its commercial vehicle maker Wuling, SAIC still does not 
possess its own brand.  The planned JV in which SAIC and Nanjing Auto would have 
hold approximately 70 percent and MG Rover 30 percent would have given SAIC the 
rights to the Rover brand name, the engine technology and the rights to make Rover 
models in China (O’Connell).20  SAIC spokesman Zhu Xiang Jun explains SAIC’s 
strategy by saying that “we have to have our own brands.  And we want to acquire 
and develop a bridgehead for international expansion.  To start our own brand from 
scratch would be too slow and expensive.” (O’Connell) Dunne observes that “SAIC’s 
strategy seems to be one of buying struggling companies for their expertise.” 
(Wilson) 
     Consequently, SAIC has been busily buying up assets outside China.  In 2002 it 
acquired a 10 percent stake in Daewoo Auto and in 2004 a 48.9 percent controlling 
stake in Korean car maker Ssangyong Motors (O’Connell).  It also seems that SAIC 
is trying to buy a stake in Italian car maker Fiat.  In December 2004 both firms signed 
a treaty for a long-term cooperation between both firms (Anonymous, Chinas 
Größter Autokonzern Will Sich Bei Fiat Einkaufen).  In conclusion, SAIC is trying to 
position itself as an international car maker and stepping on the global stage by 
buying the necessary technology, know-how, design and brands.  
                                            
 
20 The joint venture ultimately was not established, but Chinese Nanjing Automobile outbid SAIC and 
acquired the remains of MG Rover in July 2005 after Rover went bankrupt (Anonymous, Rover Sold 
to Nanjing Automobile).  “Both Chinese companies car companies [SAIC and Nanjing Automobile] 
made no bones about the fact that buying MG Rover was a way for them to start fulfilling their 
ambitions in the global car market.” (Maidment) 
 
.  
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     Hence, Gao, Woetzel and Wu identify two different approaches for Mainland 
Chinese businesses to expand a company’s branded goods into developed markets.  
The first approach involves the M&A of foreign companies with valuable assets by 
Mainland Chinese businesses.  Valuable assets can be brands, customer bases, 
technology, channels and products that have become too pricey for the foreign 
company.  To save cost and to integrate the acquired assets with the Mainland 
Chinese organization, the acquired company’s production is moved to China.  At the 
same time, the brand name, distribution channels and valuable employees are being 
retained.  After some time, a co-branding strategy that would consist of both the 
Chinese and the foreign brand being displayed on the products can be introduced.  
After establishing the Chinese brand in the minds of consumers, the original (foreign) 
brand would be slowly phased out until the products are solely sold under the 
Chinese brand  (Gao, Woetzel and Wu).   
      SAIC, as discussed above, and the Chinese electronic consumer products maker 
TCL are a case in point.  TCL acquired the German brand Schneider in 2002 for €8 
Million.  In 2003 TCL founded a JV with Thomson in which the TV division of 
Thomson was incorporated.  TCL has a controlling stake in the JV with Thomson 
and the rights to the brands Thomson in Europe as well as RCA in the USA.  The 
strategy of TCL aims to use the 4 brands, i.e. TCL, Schneider, RCA, Thomson, for 
the different markets in Germany and Europe, the USA and China.  In a twist, TCL 
even introduced the German brand Schneider to the mobile phone market in China 
for maximum utilization of the brand.  TCL also acquired the mobile phone business 
of the French company Alcatel and plans utilize the brand in Europe and Latin 
America (WirtschaftsWoche).  After selling in the markets under the acquired brand, 
a co-branding strategy could be introduced by TCL.  In the end, the acquired brands 
could be phased out and the brand TCL would finally be established in the foreign 
markets.  TCL, thus, could be a good example of the first strategy identified by Gao, 
Woetzel and Wu.   
     Gao, Woetzel and Wu propose a second approach for Chinese businesses to 
introduce their company’s product into the foreign market.  The step-by-step 
approach entails the penetration of foreign markets through independent distributors 
which serve independent channels.  The gradual process of exporting and 
penetrating the market allows the Mainland Chinese business to gain an 
understanding of the market, the local customer profile and establish brand 
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recognition for products and goods.  After having established a brand presence in 
the foreign market, the Mainland Chinese business can begin to move into similar 
markets, develop its own distribution and sales network and try to expand the 
brand’s reach by spending significant amounts on marketing (Gao, Woetzel and 
Wu). 
     The Shanghai-based electronics company SVA sells high-end plasma TVs, TFT-
LCD displays (flat-panel monitors) and DLP projection TVs.  SVA exemplifies the 
second approach identified by Gao, Woetzel and Wu to establish a branded 
presence in a foreign market.  First, SVA chose to work together with the distributors 
Ingram Micro and D&H Distributing which offer promotion and service assistant to 
manufacturers when entering the US market.  The collaboration allowed SVA to 
learn about the US market and build its own marketing capabilities in regard to 
foreign markets.  In the next step, SVA attended industry and trade conferences in 
order to promote the company’s products rather than spend money on advertising 
efforts.  Subsequently, SVA decided to target the high-end plasma TV and TFT-LCD 
market instead of low-tech color TV market where the company would have had to 
compete with numerous OEM from China and other low-cost countries.  Instead, 
SVA focused on offering high quality products to customers who were technology 
savvy, but not too brand-conscious.  One of the most important steps was putting a 
local team in charge in the USA to understand local markets and consumer behavior 
and to develop appropriate company strategies (Gao, Woetzel and Wu).  As 
proposed by Gao, Woetzel and Wu, a business expands step-by-step and increases 
the commitment of its resources in accordance with its increasing knowledge about 
and matching capabilities in doing business in foreign markets. 
     Not everyone agrees that Mainland Chinese businesses, whether they utilize the 
M&A strategy or the step-by-step approach, are ready to conduct business globally 
and become true global multinationals with strong brands.  Tom Doctoreff, CEO for 
Greater China at the US ad agency J.Walter Thompson asserts, that “Chinese 
companies are light years away from [exporting their brands successfully].” (Roberts, 
Balfour and Einhorn 78)  Brand awareness of Chinese brands among Americans and 
Europeans is low.  Most Mainland Chinese businesses do not even know what 
positioning a brand means.  Furthermore, China has a mediocre record in innovation 
as Chinese companies tend to save on innovation costs.  Management is another 
problem.  Most Mainland Chinese businesses are established by entrepreneurs who 
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lead the company the same way as in the founding days of the business, regardless 
of the complex management challenges that come about when a business generates 
billions of dollars revenues and expands internationally (Roberts, Balfour and 
Einhorn 80).   
     When comparing the management of Mainland Chinese businesses to the 
management of Overseas Chinese businesses it becomes obvious that both, as has 
been predicted in the conclusion of Chapter 4, rely on autocratic leadership of the 
family business, tend to focus on keeping operating costs low and save on 
technology and brands.  Additionally, Mainland Chinese management lacks the 
experience of capitalism, especially the problems posed by taking over a company.  
Most Mainland Chinese businesses invest in run-down companies which pose 
serious and sometimes insurmountable challenges when these acquired companies 
need to be restructured.  Mainland Chinese businesses lack the experience to turn 
around such businesses.  For example, the take-over of Schneider by TCL and the 
subsequent restructuring has not gone well.  Revenue targets have been missed and 
the management admits that it needs more time to implement and achieve the goals 
of the acquisition (Deckstein, Kerbusk and Wagner 77). 
     In regard to outward investment, most of the investment by Mainland Chinese 
businesses is the purchase of access to resources by SOEs.  Also, the 
competitiveness of the home market in China translates into low profits for Mainland 
Chinese businesses which are, therefore, cash-stripped.  Furthermore, the turn to 
foreign markets with the intention of utilizing the competitive cost base at home does 
not pay off as the lack of brand power makes it difficult to gain a foothold in the 
foreign markets.  Thus, Chinese M&A activities for natural resources do not “presage 
the emergence of super-competitive Chinese firms producing brand-name finished 
goods,” writes Kroeber (Chinese Invasion Has yet to Happen).  Deals such as the 
acquisition of IBM’s PC division by Lenovo and the spending spree of TCL do not 
signify a new trend in M&A (of brands) for Chinese businesses, because as Joe 
Zhang, co-head of China research at UBS asks, “how many other companies are 
there that can do the same?” (Guerrera and McGregor) 
     Michaelis concludes (Knowledge@Wharton): 
Realizing the benefits of a transaction depends strongly on the experience, 
discipline and cultural sensitivity of the acquirer when actually negotiating the 
deal and merging the operations. Given the comparatively low level of 
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experience Chinese companies have with large-scale cross-border M&A 
transactions[…] a lot still needs to be learned until Chinese outbound mergers 
can be executed successfully. 
     Still, Chinese companies have a big cost advantage by manufacturing their 
products in Mainland China compared to other MNEs.  But the deficiencies, such as 
lack of marketing skills, discussed above, could mean that China might not be able 
to produce global brands but would be better advised to focus on the cost advantage 
of China’s manufacturing base.  The FDI inflow into China ensured the build-up of a 
first-class infrastructure while at the same time labor costs are low which leads 
Kroeber to observe that China is unique in the “combination of first world 
infrastructure and third world [labor] costs.“(Anonymous, "The Struggle of the 
Champions" 58)  In conclusion, the unique combination and “[China’s] focus on 
capacity building rather than technological innovation mean that corporate 
successes are more likely to be component manufacturers or processors of 
intermediate goods than global consumer brands such as South Korea’s Samsung.” 
(Anonymous, "The Struggle of the Champions" 58) 
     Furthermore, a close look of the competitiveness of big Mainland Chinese 
companies reveals serious business faults and competitive disadvantages.  For 
example, white goods producer21 Haier lacks cost control, production discipline, 
market dominance and sales support.  Lenovo who bought IBM lacks efficiency, 
failed to make its brand “Legend” global and suffers from laggard profits.  SAIC is 
trying to catch up to global car companies by buying technology and design.  TCL is 
relying on the foreign brands RCA, Thomson and Schneider to expand 
internationally instead of TCL’s own brand.  It is, thus, fitting that Vincent Yan, 
managing director of TCL International admits that “no Chinese company is ready to 
build a global brand. You need technology and products. Just spending money on 
ads without good products doesn’t make sense.” (Anonymous, "The Struggle of the 
Champions" 58) 
     Other impeding factors to the growth of Mainland Chinese businesses and the 
businesses’ brands seem to be the lack of focus on long-term commitment and 
cooperation among Mainland Chinese businesses.  Horizontal networks of 
                                            
 
21 Definition of White Goods:  Large electrical home appliances (refrigerators or washing machines 
etc.) that are typically finished in white enamel (Webster’s Online Dictionary) 
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cooperation between a business, suppliers, trade bodies and customers are 
basically non-existent.  Mainland Chinese businesses tend to pursue short-term 
interests and favor excessive diversification instead of investing in long-term 
technological development (Anonymous, "The Struggle of the Champions" 59).  The 
Economist observes, that (“The Dragon Tucks In" 68): 
China’s political system makes its managers particularly unsuitable for running 
complex, global companies that demand consistent strategies.  In an 
environment of regulatory inconsistency, corruption and political patronage, 
Chinese companies have tended to pursue short-term returns and excessive 
diversifications rather than long-term technological development.  And rather 
than build networks of suppliers and customers, they have preferred to curry 
favor with bureaucrats and party officials. 
    Good examples for the neglecting of technological development in favor of 
excessive diversification are Haier, TCL and Baosteel which all have subsidiaries in 
insurance or banking.  For example, Baosteel has a 5 percent stake in Shanghai AJ 
Corp, a property and finance firm (Anonymous, Baosteel Buys Stake in Finance 
Company).  George Gilboy, a former manager at a multinational in Beijing asks, 
“how can a long-term company emerge in such a short-term environment?” 
(Anonymous, "The Struggle of the Champions" 60)  
     A lack of skills in segmentation, supply chain management and after sales 
services add to the woes of Mainland Chinese businesses.  Further problems are 
posed by the lack of patience to build businesses organically.  Researchers blame 
the political and corporate landscape of China for the lack of long-term commitment 
to organizational and technological development.  Significant reforms in political and 
market structures are needed to aid and boost long-term technology, product and 
strategy development of companies.  Additionally, management and human 
resources have to be improved to survive in the global arena.  Management skills to 
clinch cross-border alliances and mergers are missing which means that “even the 
best Chinese companies have still not developed the killer instinct to close deals.” 
(Mc Kinsey; Guerrera and McGregor)   
     Within, but not limited to, the context of M&A, one should take into account 
potential difficulties arising from the distinct differences in Chinese and Western 
culture.  The problems and challenges are not limited to national cultural differences 
but also corporate cultures.  Hemerling, Michael and Michaelis observe (17): 
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Chinese companies also face major cultural barriers when it comes to 
integrating a non-Chinese acquisition.  To be sure, any postmerger integration 
must navigate often subtle differences in the cultures of the merged entities.   
But the differences between how Western companies and Chinese companies 
operate are extensive.  Often, they are run by a small group of owner-
managers who create a strong patriarchal culture characterized by personal 
loyalty. They make decisions quickly with a lot of analysis.  They also lack 
process discipline and their management processes tend to be disorganized.  
Integrating this kind of corporate culture with the more professionalized 
managerial cultures of most Western companies requires an even higher than 
normal degree of sensitivity, determination and flexibility.  
     In general, “Chinese companies face the hurdles of getting to grips with very 
different management styles, culture, priorities and mindsets of other companies.” 
(Egan et al. 7)  Finding solutions for intercultural problems is one of the key 
challenges Mainland Chinese businesses face if they want to successfully expand 
abroad.  Consequently, Mainland Chinese businesses have to find ways to 
overcome or align differences in communication, language and culture (Ewert 19). 
     Table 18 provides a summary about the weaknesses, problems and challenges 
Mainland Chinese businesses face on the way to being global players as has been 
discussed in this chapter. 
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- Competitive home markets in China cut into profits and removes 
much needed cash for the international expansion of the company
- Structural and political hurdles constrain the internationalization of 
firms, for example, the former restriction of support funds for 
companies was limited to SOEs
- Few private companies are large enough to go abroad, but SOEs are not 
yet globally competitive
- Consolidation in industries is hampered by regulations
- So far overseas investment by mainland Chinese business has been 
negligible when compared to yearly FDI flow into China
Government and Market
- Lack of investment in technology, thus, most products are low-tech
- Missing commitment to long-term R&D
- Specialization of mainland Chinese companies in low-tech manufacturing
- Missing cooperation among China’s companies in R&D leads to serious     
competitive disadvantages as their own standards cannot be introduced   
but license fees to foreign MNEs for their technology have to be paid 
Technology
- Lack of basic marketing skills
- Branding is a new concept to Chinese businesses
- Many regional brands, but few national brands due to the size of the 
country and protectionism of regional and provincial authorities
- Chinese brands are unknown to American and European customers
- Lack of cultural references = Lack of understanding of local needs and 
customer profiles and behavior
- Lack of Sales and Distribution networks for products
- Lack of critical skills in:    • Segmentation
• Supply chain management
• After-sales services
- Products are often regarded as cheap, low-tech and of poor quality
Brands & Marketing
- Lack of negotiation skills in M&A
- Most private companies are still led the same ways as in the founding 
days of the business despite the fact that companies have considerably 
grown since then
- Lack of internationally experienced management, especially in people 
management
- Foreign operations are generally characterized by low efficiency
- Lack of patience to build business organically
Management
Challenges, Problems and WeaknessesArea
 
 
Table 18:  Weaknesses, Problems and Challenges for Mainland Chinese Businesses in the 
Drive to Become Global Players. 
 
     Wong and Chan conclude (296): 
Chinese companies remain woefully unprepared to deal with the competitive 
business environment.  When they venture abroad, they often have 
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misconceptions about the host countries. Their business plans generally fail to 
address the business climate, marketing, operational efficiency, and foreign 
regulations of the host countries.  They also frequently misgauge the 
additional costs, prospective competition and management complexities of the 
foreign marketplace. […] Faced with a myriad of problems, it is little wonder 
that most Chinese companies have yet to make an impact on world markets. 
     Thus, the above quote accurately illustrates that Mainland Chinese companies 
are not yet ready to dominate global markets.  Mainland Chinese companies still 
have to learn how to adapt to foreign markets and how to deal with foreign business 
environments.  Furthermore, Mainland Chinese companies lack vital management 
skills and advanced technology capabilities.  Mainland Chinese businesses will need 
several years to acquire these skills and capabilities.  Therefore, it is not really 
surprising that no Mainland Chinese company has so far become a globally 
competitive and truly global business. 
 
 
5.4 Synthesis from the Expansion of Ethnic/Overseas Chinese 
Business 
 
     The previous section of this chapter analyzed the international expansion of 
Mainland Chinese business.  Most of the information available and analyzed above 
refers to large companies which are mainly wholly or partly government-owned.  
However, the analysis of the expansion of Mainland Chinese business is at least 
partly flawed if the dissertation solely concentrates on the discussion in Chapter 5.3 
as a further analysis of the international expansion of Mainland Chinese business 
because the above discussion focused nearly exclusively on the expansion of partly 
or wholly-owned SOEs or enterprises with (suspected) government ties.  However, 
private Chinese SMEs are also preparing for going abroad.  “At the moment, the 
majority of Chinese enterprises overseas are large SOEs.  There are indications that 
non-state-owned firms are now nurturing global ambitions and following the SOEs in 
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making forays into the world markets although most of them are small and medium-
sized companies.” (Wong and Chan 297) 
     The expansion of small and medium Mainland Chinese businesses can be 
expected to be of similar form as the expansion of Overseas Chinese firms, due to 
cultural closeness as well as the status of being ethnic Chinese SMEs.  As far as 
Mainland Chinese businesses are privately owned and, thus, family held, the 
conclusions drawn in Chapter 4.5 should be considered in the analysis of the 
expansion of Mainland Chinese business.  The main conclusions drawn in Chapter 
4.5 were: 
 Ethnic Chinese businesses are led by the head of the family, family members 
hold key positions in the enterprise, professional management is missing and 
the businesses are part of formal and informal networks 
 Ethnic Chinese businesses utilize informal and formal networks for the 
expansion of the firm as well as for competitive advantages 
 Ethnic Chinese businesses are mainly employing JV and acquisitions in their 
internationalization process to pave the way for a later establishment of a 
WOS and integration into local networks. 
      Hence, it is time to review whether the analysis of the expansion of ethnic 
Chinese business in the previous chapter indeed does hold some insights applicable 
to Mainland Chinese SMEs.  To describe, analyze and predict the characteristics 
and expansion of small, private Mainland Chinese companies the application of the 
results from the analysis of ethnic Chinese business is proposed.  Here, based on of 
the expansion behavior and characteristics of ethnic Overseas Chinese business, a 
comparison to Mainland Chinese is appropriate as long as the deducing is based on 
shared features of ethnic Chinese business such as common cultural roots.  Since 
ethnic Chinese and Mainland Chinese share the same cultural determinants and 
variables , for example guanxi, collectivism and Confucian teachings, it is reasonable 
to expect Mainland Chinese to think and act similar as Overseas or ethnic Chinese.  
The similarity is also recognizable in the analogous structure and behavior of 
Mainland and ethnic Chinese businesses. 
      M.-J. Chen states that these private, family-owned Mainland Chinese businesses 
“are similar to the typical Overseas Chinese business: They make decisions quickly, 
are sensitive to cost, have low debt-to-equity ratios, and are linked to similar 
organizations across the country through interpersonal networks.” (164)  The strong 
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focus on the family in the business is a distinctive feature of ethnic Chinese business 
and can be expected to be found in Mainland Chinese business as well.  The same 
holds true for the personalism and autocratic management style of most Mainland 
Chinese businesses.  Opportunistic diversification into unrelated business sectors is 
likely, too.  Least but not last, the diversification allows a Chinese firm to integrate 
other ethnic Chinese businesses into the firm’s network and create a relationship of 
mutual indebtness and reciprocity.  
     However, the one child policy in the PRC has drastically reduced the number of 
average family members and, therefore, possible members of the family business.  
Hence, family businesses have to reach out to friends of the family and extended 
relatives for the management and survival of the family enterprise.  That is why, 
although it seems that Chinese family tradition is still strong, M.-J. Chen asserts that 
“PRC businesses will diverge from Overseas Chinese business family model and will 
map out their own development and transformation paths.” (42) 
      Ethnic Chinese business networks have close ties to the mainland and, thus, the 
integration of Mainland Chinese business into the networks can be anticipated.  
Mainland Chinese SMEs are able to utilize the same advantages of business 
networks as overseas/ethnic Chinese, e.g. access to organizational resources, 
capabilities, provision of capital and information, lower transaction because of mutual 
trust and reciprocity, closeness of the network and protection of network members.  
The integration into ethnic Chinese networks based upon, for example, ethnicity, 
guanxi or friend- or kinship facilitates and enhances the expansion drive of Mainland 
Chinese business.  Thus, the setting up of wholly-owned subsidiaries with the help of 
guanxi and networks can be anticipated.  
     Private Mainland Chinese business lack marketing skills and technology just like 
Overseas Chinese business when they first started their businesses.  Therefore, the 
M&A of technology, know-how and management can be expected by private 
Mainland Chinese businesses as well.  JV and alliances are probably the preferential 
way to access technology from MNEs and gaining a first foothold in foreign markets 
as well as learning to work abroad.  The assumptions are affirmed by Wong and 
Chan who found that “Chinese firms engage in JVs with foreign counterparts due to 
limited financial resources, lack of knowledge about local conditions, to minimize 
various risks, or utilize the wide distribution networks of local partners.” (294)  In 
regard to M&A, Chinese private firms (Wong and Chan 294): 
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 Merge or acquire foreign firms to access advanced technologies and promote 
the Chinese products 
 Utilize M&A as a channel to raise funds 
 Use M&A in developed countries with mature systems of law and regulations 
      In conclusion, it seems that Mainland Chinese SMEs are likely to emulate the 
expansion of ethnic and Overseas Chinese business.  Thus, Mainland Chinese 
SMEs are family-led businesses in which key posts are staffed by family members.  
The firm is likely to diversify into unrelated business sectors.  The firm is embedded 
in and utilizes interpersonal formal and informal ethnic (Mainland and Overseas) 
Chinese business networks in the process of international expansion, i.e. the 
networks are utilized for the establishment of wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
Additionally, Mainland Chinese SMEs use JVs and M&A as preferential method to 
access markets, technology, know-how and management skills in their globalization 
drive.  Consequently, Mainland Chinese businesses are similar to Overseas Chinese 
businesses, follow similar strategies and take similar steps when expanding abroad.   
 
 
5.5 Approaches to a Theoretical Framework for the International 
Expansion of Mainland Chinese Business 
 
     This part of the chapter discusses possible theoretical frameworks that apply to, 
and could explain, the expansion and internationalization of Mainland Chinese 
business.  So far, the literature lacks a significant number of contributions of 
frameworks for the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses at the firm-
level.  Within this section, a number of different explanatory approaches to the 
expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses are tried and analyzed.   
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5.5.1 The Investment Development Path (IDP) 
     Chapter 1.1.3 analyzed the eclectic paradigm of Dunning.  The investment 
development path (IDP) discussed here is closely related to the eclectic paradigm.  
While the eclectic paradigm refers to the theoretical framework for and analysis of 
the internationalization of businesses at the firm-level (micro-economic analysis), the 
IDP is concerned with the analysis of the internationalization of firms at a macro-
economic level and analyzes the development of countries as the countries’ firms 
internationalize.  A short summary of the IDP- theory is given and a possible 
application to the expansion of Mainland Chinese business is analyzed. 
     According to Dunning and Narula (1):  
The IDP suggests that countries tend to go through five main stages of 
development and that these stages can be usefully classified according to the 
propensity of those countries to be outward and/or inward direct investors. In 
turn, this propensity will rest on the extent and pattern of the competitive or 
ownership specific (O) advantages of the indigenous firms of the countries 
concerned, relative to those of firms of other countries; the competitiveness of 
the location-bound resources and capabilities of that country, relative to those 
of other countries (the L specific advantages of that country); and the extent to 
which indigenous and foreign firms choose to utilize their O specific 
advantages jointly with the location-bound endowments of home or foreign 
countries through internalizing the cross-border market for these advantages, 
rather than by some other organizational route (i.e. perceived I advantages). 
     The IDP is divided into 5 stages. In stage 1, the L specific advantages of a 
country are not sufficient enough to attract direct investment.  The exceptions are 
natural resources.  Economic systems, government policies and communication and 
transportation infrastructure are inadequate.  The market is characterized by low per-
capita income and non-qualified labor force.  Therefore, “foreign firms will prefer to 
export to and import from this market, or conclude cooperative non-equity 
arrangements with indigenous firms.” (Dunning and Narula 2-3)  The lack of O 
specific advantages of domestic firms, few assets and low-technology mean that the 
focus is on labor-intensive manufacturing.  The government will try to improve the 
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situation with policies aimed at the import and export of products as well as providing 
infrastructure and training to the labor force (Dunning and Narula 3). 
     In the stage 2, inward direct investment rises while outward direct investment 
(ODI) is still low or negligible.  Local markets have grown insofar that some local 
production by foreign firms is viable.  The inward investment is likely to still take 
place in natural resources and labor-intensive manufacturing.  The manufacturing in 
stage 2 substitutes for importing (as in stage 1) and is related to the possession of 
intangible assets, for example, trademarks or technology.  The inward investment 
hinges on the question whether the host country can supply transportation and 
communication infrastructure as well as a pool of unskilled and skilled labor.  Thus, 
“a country must possess some desirable L characteristics to attract inward direct 
investment.” (Dunning and Narula 3)  The stage 2 country begins with ODI but 
restricts the investment to market-seeking or trade related investment in neighboring 
countries as well as to asset-seeking investments in developed countries.  The 
extent of the ODI depends on the support of the government, for example, cheap 
loans and export programs, as well as the development or acquisition of technology 
by domestic firms.  Still, the rate of ODI is significantly lower than the inflow of inward 
investment (Dunning and Narula 4).  
     Stage 3 of the IDP is characterized by the gradual decrease of inward investment 
and an increasing ODI which results in a positive net outward investment (NOI).  
Comparative advantages in labor-intensive areas, for example, manufacturing, are 
decreasing while the standardization of products takes place and a higher level of 
expectation in regard to product and services quality can be observed.  ODI is 
directed at companies at a lower IDP stage while O specific advantages of foreign 
firms are undermined as domestic firms draw level with the multinationals and 
compete head on in the local market. O specific advantages of foreign firms are now 
more focused on intangible knowledge of, for example, production processes which 
manifests itself in more technology-intensive manufacturing and higher value added 
in the local production.  One of the motives for local production by foreign firms is the 
trend to efficiency-seeking production as opposed to import-substituting production 
as in stage 2.  O specific advantages by domestic firms are not government-related 
anymore but rather to the learning effects from the first two stages and their own 
proprietary assets.  The government will focus on reducing structural barriers and 
attract FDI into sectors in which domestic firms’ O specific advantages are the 
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weakest, but comparative advantages of location-bound assets are the strongest.  
For example, luring companies with vital marketing skills to the local market which 
has plenty of consumers.  Outward investment takes the opposite direction, investing 
in sectors in which the O specific advantages of domestic firms are the strongest and 
the locational advantages of the host country the weakest.  For example, offering 
labor-intensive products or services in high labor-cost markets (Dunning and Narula 
5-6).  
     The outward investment stock has reached or exceeded the inward investment 
stock in stage 4 of the IDP.  Additionally, the ODI is still rising faster than the inward 
FDI.  Domestic companies compete effectively in foreign markets and rely upon 
capital-intensive production as the cost of capital is lower than the cost of labor.  
Subsequently, created assets will have the highest share in L specific advantages 
(Dunning and Narula 6).  Inward investment is mostly from other stage 4 countries 
and O specific advantages are more transaction- than asset-related.  ODI is 
increasing as domestic firms are trying to keep the firm’s competitive advantage by 
moving operations abroad to countries at a lower stage.  The focus now lies on 
internalizing advantages by FDI, for example, into subsidiaries, as opposed to 
export.  There is a clear trend towards the conducting of business between units 
within MNEs as opposed to the transacting of business between MNEs from different 
countries.  The role of government will be directed towards the structural adjustment 
of location-bound assets and technological capabilities.  Subsequently, the 
government is phasing out declining industries and promoting promising industries.  
Thus, “the role of government is now moving towards reducing transaction costs of 
economic activity and facilitating markets to operate efficiently.” (Dunning and Narula 
7) 
     In stage 5 the NOI fluctuates around zero.  Stage 5 is further characterized by two 
key features.  First, cross-border transactions are not transacted through the market 
but within MNEs.  Second, countries and their location-bound assets converge and 
so does the international direct investment positions.  The result is the trade of goods 
and services within hierarchies or cooperative ventures between MNEs of different 
countries which produce similar products.  Thus, “MNEs will be less dependent on 
their country’s natural resources but more on their ability to acquire assets and on 
the ability of firms to organize their advantages efficiently and to exploit the gains of 
cross-border common governance.” (Dunning and Narula 8)  By internalizing 
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transactions, MNEs increasingly act like mini-markets.  Countries that had low 
international activities in the past internationalize at faster rates than those countries 
with more geographically dispersed activities which results in the reduction of the 
NOI.  The reduction of the NOI and the continuing fluctuating around the zero level 
can be explained by the fact that the catch-up processes of countries as well as the 
growth-seeking of MNEs lead to an equilibrium of fluctuation around zero of the NOI 
as companies are seeking to imitate competitors and “develop similar O specific 
advantages in the same industry, but not necessarily in the same country.” (Dunning 
and Narula 8) 
     Inward investment will come from countries of lower IDP seeking markets and 
knowledge while investments from stage 4 and 5 countries are directed at seeking 
efficiency, i.e. “plant and product specialization is encouraged in sectors where 
economies of scale and scope are important.” (Dunning and Narula 9)  The quest for 
efficiency gains results in an increase in cross-border alliances, mergers and 
acquisitions and the governance and equity positions of MNEs becomes increasingly 
transnational.  The commercial success of MNEs depends on the ability of firms to 
coordinate the firm’s resources and capabilities at a regional and global level.  In 
regard to the role of government, Dunning and Narula assert that “in stage 5, 
governments will increasingly assume the role of strategic oligopolists, taking into 
account the behavior of other governments in the formation and execution of their 
own macro-organizational strategies.” (Dunning and Narula 11) 
     To summarize, Dunning and Narula assert that countries undergo 5 stages in the 
IDP and that in the end all countries converge toward an equilibrium in which stage 5 
countries produce nearly the same products, offer the same services and undertake 
investments solely for the purpose of efficiency gains.  ODI is non-existent at the 
beginning and rises to overtake the inward FDI in stage 4 which results in a NOI.  
The NOI fluctuates for countries in stage 5 around zero, depending on whether 
domestic efficiency gains are perceived to be feasible by foreign MNEs or countries 
from lower IDP stages undertake strategic asset seeking; resulting in the NOI 
becoming negative.  Or efficiency gains can be achieved abroad in which case the 
NOI increases.  Additionally, the more a country moves towards stage 5, the more 
transactions are conducted internally within and by the MNEs leading to the premise 
that the firm switches from O specific advantages which are location-bound over 
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knowledge-based advantages to transactional advantages which result from 
internalization specific advantages.   
     During the past 30 years, three variables have been identified as being critical to 
the development and economic restructuring of countries (Dunning and Narula 13):  
 The type of FDI undertaken 
 The structure of the indigenous resources and capabilities of the specific 
country 
 And the macro-economic and organizational policies pursued by the 
government 
     Now, the concept of the 5 stage model is further elaborated by Dunning and 
Narula who recognize that circumstances, situations and variables in economies and 
in business have changed in the past years.  While in the past MNEs were engaged 
in FDI in order to better exploit or organize the existing competitive advantages, 
nowadays MNEs are increasingly motivated by the drive to acquire new competitive 
advantages or to protect existing ones.  M&A is undertaken due to (Dunning and 
Narula 15): 
 The rising costs of innovation and of entry into unfamiliar markets 
 The competitive pressure to be more cost competitive 
 The growing need for complementary technology and economies of scale and 
scope 
 The protection or advance of global markets 
 The need to encapsulate the time of the innovating or market entry process 
     Therefore, “such strategic asset acquiring FDI implies that firms may engage in 
outward FDI from a position of weakness, and that countries may attract inbound FDI 
because their resources and capabilities offer competitive advantages to foreign 
MNEs.” (Dunning and Narula 15)  The effect of the strategic asset seeking 
investment is the increase in ODI, especially for rapidly growing industrializing 
nations.  The ODI is aimed at the establishment of a market presence.  Firms from 
developing countries often lack the full range of resources and capabilities to expand 
on their own and, thus, choose to engage in FDI, minority JVs and other forms of 
cooperative alliances.  To conclude, the presence of strategic asset seeking 
investments leads to a rise in inward FDI in industrialized nations and a rise in ODI 
from industrializing developing countries as MNEs from the developing countries 
seek to advance their entrance into global markets (Dunning and Narula 15).   
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     How can or does the IDP model and recent modifications by Dunning and Narula 
apply to China?  Analyzing the differences between the different stages of the IDP 
paradigm, one would conclude that China is probably in the transition from stage 2 to 
3.  As has been discussed in this chapter, the inward investment hit a new high of 
$72.4 billion in 2005 while the outward direct investment was 6.92 billion.  L specific 
advantages could be the vast pool of unskilled and skilled labor as well as the low 
manufacturing costs in general.  Additionally, the government is pushing the Chinese 
enterprises to venture abroad.  Chinese enterprises are also increasingly pursuing 
asset seeking investments as the illustration in Table 17 has shown.  China is 
starting to push abroad from a position of weakness, as the Chinese lack vital 
resources, for example, brands, technology and know-how.  The strategic asset 
seeking investment through M&A by Chinese companies is supposed to ensure the 
entrance into global markets.   
     It is reasonable to expect China to conclude the move from stage 2 to stage 3 in 
the next few years.  Some of the characteristics that define stage 3 and differentiate 
stage 3 from stage 2 can already be observed in China even though the country has 
not yet reached stage 3.  For example, China has, and will probably not reach a NOI 
in near future, but the drive to technology-driven manufacturing can already be 
observed as demonstrated by the firms TCL and Lenovo.  Furthermore, an 
investment by China in other developing nations (stage 1 and 2 countries), for 
example, Indonesia, can also be observed as well as the stage 3 attributed fierce 
competition in the local market between foreign and domestic firms possessing 
specific O advantages.  For example, Lenovo, and TCL compete directly in 
consumer electronics with global players such as Siemens and Sony on the Chinese 
domestic market.   
     In conclusion, the IDP model by Dunning and Narula might offer a possible 
explanation and framework for the expansion of Chinese businesses as the model 
points to the relationship between O, L and I specific advantages and the importance 
and interaction of these advantages as well as of inward FDI for the development of 
ODI and the accompanying internationalization of Chinese businesses.  
Furthermore, the IDP model offers an explanation of the drive of Chinese companies 
to actively engage in M&A as Table 17 has shown.   
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5.5.2 Networks and China’s Outward FDI 
     According to Yang, if the IDP is to be applicable to China, then China would 
already be in the early phase of stage 3.  Yang argues that “contrary to the IDP 
pattern, the emergence and development of outward direct investment flows coincide 
with each other.” (5)  Yang further refers to the substantial total FDI outflows of $29.5 
billion by the end of 2001 ($51.7 billion at the end of 2005) and concludes that “these 
features suggest that China’s outward FDI has skipped the first and part of the 
second stage of the investment-development path, and has now entered the early 
period of the third stage.  Therefore the process of the development of China’s 
outward FDI is difficult to be explained by the IDP paradigm.” (5)  Hence, the IDP 
would be inadequate to fully explain the development of China’s ODI and expansion 
drive of Chinese business. 
     Yang further elaborates his criticism at the IDP model of Dunning and Narula. 
Yang explains that the IDP model rests on the possession of sufficient ownership 
advantages as has been also illustrated in the previous section of this chapter.  Yang 
asserts that (36-41): 
 Chinese companies are small 
 Chinese companies are weak in R&D 
 Chinese firms badly need technological transformation 
 The product quality of Chinese products is unsatisfactory 
 Chinese companies as a whole are inferior in management 
 Lack management efficiency, productivity and corporate performance 
     The described weaknesses of the Mainland Chinese companies are mostly 
congruent with the weaknesses of ethnic Chinese companies previously identified in 
Chapter 4.2.1 and Table 9.  It is, thus, all the more astonishing that contrary to the 
IDP and despite the lack of ownership advantages, the ODI from China has been 
substantial.  Also, the main investment by China has been in the U.S.A., Canada and 
Australia which is the antithesis to the common FDI theory which states that the 
investments of a country is directed at geographically and culturally close countries 
during the first step of international expansion.  To conclude, China seems to have 
skipped the first two stages described by Dunning and Narula. (Yang 42-45)  Yang 
concludes that (47): 
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China’s outward FDI exhibits two conspicuous characteristics, rapid 
expansion in a relatively short time, and high geographic concentration in the 
United States, Canada and Australia.  A further examination of China’s 
outward FDI reveals that Chinese firms do not possess clear competitive 
advantage, especially when considering the fact that China’s overseas direct 
investment takes developed countries as its major destinations.  Therefore, 
China’s outward FDI is not readily explained by the insights gained from 
existing theories of FDI from developing countries.  The difficulties in providing 
a convincing explanation of the pattern of China’s outward FDI by using a 
mainstream theory call for a different approach. 
     Yang offers the application of the network theory, developed by Johanson and 
Mattsson, to China’s FDI to offer a framework for the Chinese outward investment.  
The network approach to the internationalization of firms has been discussed at 
length in previous chapters and can be summarized as follows.   
     Economic activity can involve two methods of organization (price and hierarchy) 
and three possible institutions (the market, network and firm).  Parent firms and 
subsidiaries, whether they are wholly-owned or JVs, for example, can constitute a 
network.  A network is a model of nodes which are connected with each other.  Each 
node represents a business entity, for example, a firm.  Each firm is engaged in a 
network of relationships among customers, suppliers, distributors, etc., and through 
indirect relations with the supplier’s customers, suppliers, distributors, etc..  A firm 
can access the resources of other members of the network through exchange 
processes in the formal and informal networks the firm is embedded in.  The 
members of the network have differential knowledge about activities, resources and 
other actors in the network. Resources can be physical assets, for example, 
production facilities, as well as immaterial assets, such, for example, country-specific 
knowledge and information.  Networks can reduce governance costs and save 
transaction costs by decreasing boundaries between firms.  Communicating 
information, assuring quality and reducing in information costs lead directly to a 
saving in transaction costs and are attributable to firms actively participating in 
networks.  Additionally, economies of scale and scope, for example, joint research 
and production, are possible.  Business networks are characterized by a division of 
work, the complementarity of resources of firms in the network and a relative stability 
of the network itself.  In the process of internationalization, the firm can utilize the 
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network’s resources to access and enter foreign markets and accelerate the 
internationalization of the firm.   
     The internationalization of the firm can be modeled as a three-fold sequential 
process of establishing and strengthening international relationships (Yang 55):   
(1) Relationships with firms in new countries are formed (international extension) 
(2) Commitment to existing foreign networks are increased (penetration) 
(3) Integration of positions in networks in different countries (international 
integration) 
     The engaging in networking can lead to a reduction of costs in two ways.  First, 
networking saves transaction costs and, second, networking reduces governance 
cost.  The cost savings stem from the overlapping of economic and governance 
boundaries in networks.  The bonds sustained in a network reduce the cost of 
communicating information and assuring quality.  Furthermore, networks can lead to 
economies of scale and/or scope in, e.g. joint research, marketing or production 
(Yang 70-71).  Now, how is FDI utilized in networks and what are the motives for 
engaging in FDI from a network perspective? 
     According to Johanson and Mattsson, within the concept of networks (Yang 191):  
FDI can be defined as a process in which resources are committed to create, 
build or acquire assets in foreign countries so as to establish and develop 
positions for the investing firm in relation to its counterparts in foreign 
networks.  An FDI project is a node (in the case of an initial investment) or an 
improvement at an existing node (in the case of subsequent incremental 
investment) in the network of the investing firm’s global business and this 
node not only ties different business activities of the firm but also ties the 
firm’s business network to the market network of the host country. 
     The FDI is, thus, aimed at creating (subsidiary), building (extending or taking-over 
of JV) or acquisition of assets (M&A) in a foreign country and ties the node into the 
firm’s local and global network.  According to Yang, three motives for FDI in regard 
to business networks are predominant (77): 
(1) Taking advantage of networks in resource exchange and sharing 
(2) Enforcing transactions via markets 
(3) Improve the firm’s position in the network 
     The above sequential process illustrates that FDI is utilized to stretch, expand or 
integrate networks.  By investing FDI in a foreign country, the firm is basically 
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investing in the development of the firm’s network.  Expanding networks with FDI 
aims to expand already existing nodes/projects, undertake new FDI projects, for 
example, in different locations, alter ownership structure or establish a new venture 
on the base of an existing node.  Network integrating FDI is targeted at forming and 
improving a firm’s global business network (Yang 81-86).  However, the network 
model relies on the existence of markets and autonomous firms as a prerequisite for 
the application of networks.  Therefore, Chinese companies could only engage in 
networking since the introduction of market reforms, the opening of local and foreign 
markets and the retreat of the state from the management of companies because 
before the opening a market economy did not exist and firms were state-owned and -
managed (Yang 193-196).   
     The establishment of foreign subsidiaries through FDI establishes networks 
between the subsidiary and the parent company.  Yang states that “through these 
networks, information, technology and natural resources can flow more smoothly 
within the relevant firms. […] Direct benefits from such investments are transaction 
costs saving and efficiency improving.  Indirect benefits include the improvement of 
the market power of the investing firm.” (158-159)  
     As Yang observes above, Chinese companies are weak in R&D and badly need 
technological transformation.  One of the motives of Chinese companies to expand 
internationally is, therefore, the acquisition of technology seeking investment.  In 
terms of network theory, “it is natural for Chinese investors to have such motives.” 
(Yang 153)  New overseas ventures are similar to a node.  The node provides the 
company with an internal flow of information and enables the company to collect and 
process local information in a short period of time.  Yang states that “FDI is the 
unavoidable choice, as it is a type of knowledge not codifiable in nature and 
information needs close contact to be obtained.” (Yang 154)  The inferiority of 
Chinese companies as a whole in management and management efficiency is 
supposedly overcome by using the overseas ventures for training and experimenting 
with Western management styles and principles.  The same holds true for production 
techniques.  Furthermore, the establishment of the node and the ensuing activity in 
the foreign environment also leads to the improvement of the network position of the 
company and, thus, the transactions performed by the firm (Yang 155-157).  
     Chinese companies also venture out to gain access to natural resources and 
exploit them accordingly. (Yang 149)  In regard to the network theory, if a subsidiary 
  - 182 -  
exploits natural resources in a country and faces production disruptions, the network 
established by the parent firm with subsidiaries in various locations is able to 
minimize the total effect on the firm.  Furthermore, natural resource exploitation often 
results in the vertical integration within the investing firm and, therefore, leads to cost 
reduction through co-ordination of activities amongst the different subsidiaries in the 
network of the parent firm (Yang 158).  Thus, information, technology and natural 
resources are accessed and exchanged efficiently within the networks of the firm.   
     So far, China’s outward investment in terms of resource access and exchange 
has been directed at countries with abundant natural resources and at countries with 
technological leadership.  The investment in countries with abundant resources and 
the resulting establishment of network nodes is aimed at bringing the relevant natural 
resources under control.  The establishment of JV with foreign companies as well as 
of subsidiaries in developed countries with technological leadership serves the 
collection of information, technology acquisition and transfer as well as the 
recruitment and improvement of human resources.  The overseas investment in 
technologically leading countries ensures the establishment of nodes which facilitate 
the internal flow of critical information and resources.  In regard to the improvement 
of transaction enforcing and improving FDI, the investment is targeted at reducing 
the distance between the transaction partners and thereby improving transaction 
conditions.  The FDI by Chinese companies is market-seeking oriented and 
facilitates other types of transactions, for example, imports, information collection, 
technology acquisition and transfer, and leads to internationalizing manufacturing.  
The establishment of manufacturing ventures enables the immersion of the company 
in the local setting and leads to the improvement and strengthening of the node’s 
bonds in the local networks as well as the reduction of transaction costs (Yang 169-
176). 
     The existing network of ethnic Overseas Chinese business can be utilized by 
Mainland Chinese business for the internationalization of Mainland Chinese 
companies by using them used as a platform for Mainland Chinese companies to 
access local markets and business communities.  The networks of ethnic Chinese, 
thus, helps the Mainland Chinese lower transaction costs and efficiently accelerate 
the internationalization of the Mainland Chinese companies (Yang 178-180).  This 
holds especially true for the investment in countries which inhibit ethnic Chinese 
minorities and extensive and powerful business networks, for example, in Southeast 
  - 183 -  
Asia.  In Southeast Asian countries, “the common cultural heritage among the 
Mainland Chinese and Overseas Chinese enable China’s investors to settle down to 
business quickly. [..] These factors contribute greatly to the growth of China’s 
outward FDI in these countries.” (Yang 181)   
     Mainland Chinese ODI has been mainly directed at the U.S.A., Canada and 
Australia which have the largest ethnic Chinese communities outside Asia (Yang 
201).  The concentration of Mainland Chinese investment in these three countries 
can be explained in three ways.  First, the developed countries possess advanced 
technology and management skills which Chinese companies desperately lack and, 
thus, seek with the investment.  Second, the large Chinese ethnic community makes 
these countries very useful as a platform for Mainland Chinese firms who access the 
ethnic Overseas Chinese networks to accelerate the expansion of Mainland Chinese 
firms.  Third, Australia and Canada possess large amounts of natural resources 
which are of great interest to resource-hungry China.  The drive of Mainland Chinese 
businesses for natural resources has previously been illustrated in Table 17.   
     In conclusion, it is argued that the IDP model has proven unsuitable for the 
expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses.  The development of Mainland China’s 
ODI has been dependent to a great extent on the introduction of reforms aimed at 
introducing the concepts of markets and autonomous firms to China.  Autonomous 
firms and markets are a pre-requisite for the network model.  After reforms had been 
introduced in China, inward FDI as well as ODI started to rise and the conditions for 
networks were set (Yang 193-196).  The development shows that the network model 
is more adequate to explain the development of ODI from China. 
     The reforms enabled Mainland Chinese companies to invest on a global scale 
and accelerate the internationalization of the Mainland Chinese companies.  Thus, 
Mainland Chinese companies are now able to access business networks established 
wholly or partly by Overseas Chinese all over the world and use these networks for 
the international expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses.  According to the 
network model, the ODI in nodes is undertaken in order to establish subsidiaries, 
support existing operations or take-over JVs and acquire businesses.  The goal of 
these activities is to overcome gaps/deficiencies in technology, management and 
marketing skills as well as gain access to markets and (natural) resources. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
     This Chapter has shown that the internationalization of Mainland Chinese 
companies has rapidly increased in the past years.  But, so far no Mainland Chinese 
enterprise has become a real global power in its industry nor does one wield 
significant power on the global market.  The same holds true for Chinese brands.  
Both Mainland Chinese SMEs and SOEs lack vital skills for the success in the global 
economy, e.g. brands, technology, know-how, management skills. However, 
Mainland Chinese companies are busily engaging in JVs and M&A abroad in order 
to close the gaps in know-how and capabilities.  Chinese companies are still 
impeded by the lack of past corporate governance; Chinese SOEs and Mainland 
Chinese SMEs with complicated ownership structures and the legacy of the 
command economy, i.e. obstructive regulations and procedures that hamper all 
Mainland Chinese companies.  As has been discussed in Chapter 5.2, the ownership 
of most large companies still lies at least partly with the state which means that 
expansion plans have to approved by local or national government, complicating 
business transactions.  Most, if not all, of the large companies expanding abroad and 
trying to make an impression on the global stage are state-owned.  Most SOEs are 
still struggling to improve the competitiveness of their operations in the local Chinese 
market.  These SOEs have so far mainly focused on acquiring natural resources.  
SOEs from consumer electronic industries which are significantly large enough to 
conduct business globally have not yet succeeded in conquering foreign markets.   
     The analysis of the nature of ethnic Chinese businesses, their expansion 
behavior and internationalization within business networks in Chapter 4 offered 
enlightening insights for the internationalization of private, family-led Mainland 
Chinese SMEs.  Because of shared cultural determinants such as filial piety and 
collectivism, it can be concluded that Mainland Chinese businesses are similarly 
structured and behave akin to ethnic Chinese businesses.  Similar to Overseas 
Chinese family businesses, Mainland Chinese family-led SMEs use JVs and M&A to 
gain access to technology, know-how, brands and other resources.  Additionally, 
Mainland Chinese SMEs employ networks to establish nodes, i.e. wholly-owned 
subsidiaries which give them full control over the venture.  The Mainland Chinese 
family businesses is be led by a dominant company head with an autocratic 
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management style and key posts in the enterprise and in subsidiaries are be staffed 
by family members.  Diversification of the enterprise into unrelated industries is 
pursued.  Also, Mainland Chinese SMEs are able to utilize the same advantages of 
business networks founded upon, for example, ethnicity, guanxi, friend-or kinship as 
overseas/ethnic Chinese, for example, access to organizational resources, 
capabilities, provision of capital and information, lower transaction because of mutual 
trust and reciprocity, closeness of the network and protection of network members.  
The large informal and formal networks of ethnic Chinese (overseas and mainland) 
accelerate the international expansion of Mainland Chinese SMEs.   
     Again, as in the expansion of Overseas Chinese businesses, the network theory 
has proven to be a suitable tool for providing a theoretical framework for the 
expansion of ethnic Chinese SMEs.  The IDP as postulated by Dunning and Narula 
could not offer sufficient explanation for the development of China’s ODI in recent 
years.  However, the network model of China’s ODI was able to explain China’s ODI 
more adequately.  In the context of the network model, FDI is undertaken to support 
existing or establish new nodes in the network of the firm and enhance the 
competitive advantages Chinese firms gain from networks.  The implementation of 
nodes takes place through either the establishing of a subsidiary, the support of an 
existing node through the take-over of a JV or the acquisition of a company.  
Mainland Chinese business, just like their overseas counterparts, engage in informal 
and formal networks to facilitate the exchange of immaterial and material goods and 
increase the competitiveness of the network’s member as well as the network itself.  
In recent years Chinese SMEs engaged in FDI to accelerate the internationalization 
of their firms and pursue new opportunities abroad.   
     The formidable challenges let one doubt whether Mainland Chinese enterprises 
can soon play an imminent role on global markets.  Nonetheless, Wong and Chan 
forecast that “as Chinese indigenous enterprises emerge more competitive and 
stronger as a result of further domestic restructuring, they are likely to spearhead 
Chinese investment overseas and achieve considerable success in the global 
marketplace.” (297)  Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect an accelerating 
internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses in the next years, but it is yet 
unclear if they will succeed in (developed) Western countries, for example, in 
Germany.  
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6 Market Entrance in Germany 
 
 
     This chapter analyzes the economic situation in Germany and the conditions of 
doing business in Germany.  Consequently, the chapter shows why foreign 
businesses could possibly be interested in the German market.  Furthermore, the 
role and importance of the German Mittelstand for the German economy is 
demonstrated.  Subsequently, frameworks for the internationalization of the firm and 
the chosen modus operandi for entering the Germany market are analyzed.  Finally, 
the market entrance of Mainland Chinese businesses in the German market is 
described and hypotheses for the author’s study are deduced. 
 
 
6.1  The German Economy and Market 
 
     According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Germany is the biggest 
economy in Europe and was also the world’s leading exporter in 2005.  Germany 
exported products and services worth about $786.2 billion while imports amounted to 
about $625.6 billion which resulted in a total account surplus of about $160.6 billion.  
Germany’s most important trading partners are France, the United States and Great 
Britain. With over 82 million citizens, it is also the largest country in Europe 
measured by population (Statistisches Bundesamt). However, in recent years its 
economic performance has been disappointing when compared to the Euro Area as 
a whole and to the United States.  Despite being the world leading export nation, 
Germany has failed to translate the growth generated by its export into strong 
domestic demand by its consumers. The constant underperformance of the German 
economy can be observed in Figure 31 which compares actual and projected GDP - 
growth rates for the World, the Euro Area and Germany from 2000 to 2007.  
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Figure 31: Comparison of GDP – Growth Rate of the World, the Euro Area and Germany,  
compiled from:  OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,  OECD 
Economic Outlook No. 79,  Paris:  OECD,  2006. 
 
    The weak performance of the German economy as a whole compared to the 
World and the Euro Area is even the more surprising if one compares the growth 
rates in net exports of products and services of Germany and the Euro Area.  Figure 
32 shows that Germany, except in 2003, exports more than it imports leading to a 
net-inflow of capital which in turn should bolster the German economy.  Still, the 
German economy lags behind the Euro Area and the World.  
 
  - 188 -  
 
* Estimate
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
2003 2004 2005 2006* 2007*
G
ro
w
th
 R
a
te
 (
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 %
 p
.a
.)
Germany
Euro Area
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
Figure 32:  Net Export Growth Rates of Germany and the Euro Area,  compiled from:  OECD, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,  OECD Economic Outlook No. 79,  
Paris:  OECD,  2006. 
 
     The strong performance in Germany’s net-exports can be traced back to a 
constant and sound growth in exports in the past years.  An accelerating growth in 
exports is expected for the foreseeable future. Figure 33 shows the expected growth 
for exports in products and services from Germany for the period of 2003-2007.       
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Figure 33:  Growth Rate of German Exports for the period of 2003-2007,  compiled from:  
OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,  OECD Economic Outlook 
No. 79,  Paris:  OECD,  2006. 
 
     In 2005 the average income per person in Germany was € 27,253 while the 
disposable income per household stood at € 17,842 (Statistisches Bundesamt).  The 
amount of € 17,842 available to discrete spending shows that consumers in 
Germany have considerable purchasing power.  Despite the purchasing power of the 
German consumers and the strength of growth in exports, consumption by German 
customers has been negative in the past.  It is expected that consumption will 
continue to rise less than German GDP and German exports.  The same holds true 
for the overall pattern in domestic demand. The trend rates of private consumption 
and total domestic demand are compared in Figure 34 for the period of 2002-2006. 
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Figure 34:  Growth Rate of Real GDP, German Private Consumption Expenditure and Real 
Total Domestic Demand for the Period of 2002-2007,  compiled from:  IMF,  World Economic 
Outlook: Globalization & Inflation,  Washington:  International Monetary Fund (IMF),  2006. 
 
     The growth rate of the German private consumption constantly lags behind the 
real GDP growth rate as well as the real total German domestic demand and 
significantly underperforms when compared to the growth of German exports.  Thus, 
the German economy is characterized by a weak private consumption and domestic 
demand while at the same time there is a strong growth in exports of products and 
services.  Therefore, the strong growth in exports has in the past offset the sluggish, 
and sometimes even negative, private consumption growth and enabled Germany’s 
GDP to even rise at all.  In conclusion, the German economy has depended largely 
on the exports of products and services to sustain economic growth and reach 
positive growth rates.   
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6.2 The German Mittelstand  
 
     The following section of this chapter is concerned with the German Mittelstand.  A 
qualitative and quantitative definition of SMEs, i.e. the German Mittelstand, is given.  
The definition of German the German Mittelstand is compared to the definition of 
SMEs in the EU.  Furthermore, the economic relevance of enterprises of the 
Mittelstand and permanent challenges facing the German Mittelstand are analyzed.  
First of all, a definition of the German Mittelstand is needed. 
 
6.2.1 Definition of the Mittelstand  
     Each economy is compromised of large, medium and small enterprises.  The 
differentiation between “Large Size Enterprises” (LSEs) and “Small- and medium-
sized enterprises” (SMEs) is usually based on two variables:  the number of 
employees and the annual turnover of the enterprise.  In most countries the small 
and medium enterprises are called SMEs, the Germans use the term Mittelstand to 
refer to those small and medium sized businesses.  Although from the statistical 
point of view, the definitions of SMEs from other countries and German enterprises 
from the Mittelstand are the same, there are characteristics unique to these German 
enterprises which can not be deduced from official statistics. The German term 
Mittelstand includes economic, social and psychological as well as qualitative and 
quantitative features.  Without taking into account these unique features which are 
further elaborated in this section, one will not be able to apprehend the behavior, 
motives, conditions, peculiarities and impacts of this group of economically and 
legally independent entrepreneurs and businesses (IfM, SMEs 2004 1). 
     According to the Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn (IfM), the enterprises of 
the Mittelstand are characterized by “private ownership, freedom in decision making 
and contracting, individual responsibility of entrepreneurs for the success or failure of 
their own enterprise.” (IfM, SMEs 2004 1)  The institute emphasizes two main 
aspects of the definition of German Mittelstand-enterprises, the qualitative and the 
quantitative aspects.  The qualitative aspects of German Mittelstand which is the 
most visible in the coherence between the owner and the enterprise and which in 
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turn influences the market behavior, performance and social and political role of the 
Mittelstand (IfM).  In the report “SMEs in Germany – Facts and Figures 2004”, the 
IfM lists qualitative factors such as (1-2):  
 Identity between ownership and personal responsibility for the enterprise’s 
activities 
 Identity of ownership and personal liability for the entrepreneur’s and the 
enterprise’s financial situation 
 Personal responsibility for the enterprise’s success or failure and 
 Personal relationship between employer and employees 
     These characteristics are responsible for the fact that the Mittelstand is defined 
not only by economic variables but also through the social factor, i.e. the close 
connection between owner and enterprise (IfM, SMEs 2004 1-2).  The qualitative 
part of the definition, thus, illustrates the unique connection between a SME-owner 
and the enterprise and its employees. 
     Quantitative aspects of the definition of the Mittelstand are measured by 
indicators, such as profit, fixed assets, balance sheet total, value added, number of 
employees or annual turnover as decisive instruments to separate enterprises from 
the Mittelstand from LSEs.  Due to statistical restrictions alleged by the IfM, the 
sector in which the enterprise conducts business, the annual turnover and the 
number of employees as criterions are available to estimate and describe 
enterprises by size-classes or generate and compare empirical findings.  However, 
one should note that each sector of economic activity has its own micro- and macro-
economic conditions, for example, relationship to suppliers or labor intensity, which 
forecloses a precise comparison of companies from different economic sectors (IfM, 
SMEs 2004 2-3). 
     To generate and analyze data, the IfM has developed a pragmatic definition of 
SMEs for research purposes.  Table 6 displays the different classifications of 
enterprises by turnover and the number of employees.  
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50 million and more500 and moreLarge
1 to 50 million10 to 499Medium-sized
Up to 1 millionUp to 9Small
Turnover (€/Year)Number of EmployeesSize of Enterprise
 
 
Table 19: Classification Scheme for SMEs used by IfM Bonn,  IfM,  Institut für 
Mittelstandsforschung,  SMEs in Germany - Facts and Figures 2004,  Bonn:  IfM,  2004,  3.  
 
     Table 19 illustrates the fact that companies below the threshold of €50 Million and 
with up to 499 employees are considered small to medium-sized companies.  The 
classification of the IfM is more inclusive when compared to the new classification by 
the EU which is given in Table 20.  On the one hand, the IfM considers enterprises 
with as many as 9 employees and up to €1 Million annual turnover to be small 
enterprises.  The EU classifies enterprises with up to 9 employees and up to €2 
Million in annual turnover and on the balance sheet as micro.  Small enterprises 
have 10-49 employees and €2-10 Million in annual turnover and on the balance 
sheet.  The EU considers companies with an annual turnover of €9-50 Million and up 
to 249 employees to be medium-sized while the IfM classifies enterprises with an 
annual turnover of €1-50 Million and up to 499 employees as being medium-sized.  
In conclusion, the German Mittelstand, i.e. micro, SMEs, can be defined as 1. being 
enterprises with up to 500 employees and up to €50 Million annual turnover and 2. 
are in quantitative terms not that much different from SMEs as defined by the EU.  
Ultimately, the qualitative characteristics of the German SMEs constitute the 
definition and uniqueness of German SMEs as being the Mittelstand. 
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More than 50 
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10 to 50 million
2 to 10 million
Up to 2 million
Turnover 
(€/Year)
More than 43 million
10 to 43 million
2 to 10 million
Up to 2 million
Balance Sheet total 
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Up to 9Micro
250 and moreLarge
50 to 249Medium-sized
Up to 49Small
Number of 
Employees
Size of 
Enterprise
 
 
Table 20:  Classification Scheme for SMEs according to the EU,  IfM,  Institut für 
Mittelstandsforschung,  SMEs in Germany - Facts and Figures 2004,  Bonn:  IfM,  2004,  4. 
 
 
6.2.2 Economic Relevance and Structure of the Mittelstand      
     To truly assess the uniqueness and importance of the Mittelstand for Germany 
one has to look at the economic activities of these small and medium-sized 
companies.   Companies from the Mittelstand are defined by the ownership and 
management by an entrepreneur.  Not all large family-led enterprises belong to the 
Mittelstand, but generally, companies which are led by an entrepreneur or by a 
family are attributed to the Mittelstand.  And these family-led companies are a major 
economic force in Germany.  38 of the top 100 German companies are led by 
entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial families.  No other country in the EU comes close 
to the ratio displayed in Germany.  Of the 50 biggest private companies in Europe, 
26 reside in Germany (Tiemann).  Though not the major contributor to the German 
GDP with just 41.2 percent of all turnover subject to Value Added Tax (VAT), the 
German Mittelstand nonetheless employs 70.2 percent of all employees in private 
businesses and represents 99.7 percent of all businesses in Germany.  The 
enterprises provide vocational training for 81.9 percent of all apprentices. Currently, 
there are over 3.384 million small and medium-sized companies registered (IfM, 
SMEs 2004 5).  Thus, the German Mittelstand is probably the most powerful sector 
of the German economic and is commonly referred to as the Rückgrat22 of the 
German economy and business landscape (Friedrich). 
                                            
 
22 Translation: „Backbone“ (LEO) 
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     Small and medium-sized can choose from different kinds of forms of business 
organization when conducting business. The sole proprietorship 
(Einzelhandelskaufmann/Einzelunternehmen) is the most common form. The sole 
proprietorship commits a person to be liable for all obligations and authorizations in 
regard to the sole proprietor’s business activities, including the private means. The 
chosen type of enterprise, sole proprietorship, requires no formal or legal 
requirements.  If the annual turnover exceeds a certain limit, the sole proprietorship 
is required to be registered with the trade register (IHK). Nearly 70 percent of all 
SMEs are sole proprietorship as it is the most convenient legal form of an enterprise 
without too many formal and legal requirements (IfM, SMEs 2004 12).  
     The limited liability company (GmbH) is the second most popular type of 
enterprise.  The liability of the enterprise and its partners is limited to the capital of 
the enterprise.  Several partners can invest in the limited liability company, but each 
has to contribute at least 100 Euro.  Furthermore, the minimum nominal capital 
required is €25.000.  The limited liability company has to register in the trade register 
and is preferred by many entrepreneurs due to the easy set-up, the flexibility and the 
limited liability of the shareholders (IHK). 
     Partnerships, such as the unlimited company (OHG) or limited partnerships (KG) 
are other means to conduct business. The OHG (Offene Handelsgesellschaft) 
requires at least two partners, both who are fully personally and unlimited liable for 
the financial accounts and legal matters of the enterprise.  The OHG is most 
appropriate when the partners are fully involved in the daily business of the 
enterprise since all partners of the OHG can act as managing director and legally 
represent the enterprise.  The KG (Kommanditgesellschaft) requires at least two 
partners of whom at least one is fully liable and another is liable to the extent of 
his/her deposits in the KG.  The partner in a KG cannot act as a managing director or 
a proxy of the KG.  However, authorization can be transferred to the partner to also 
act as managing director.  The partner has limited access to the yearly financial 
statement and the daily business operations (IHK).  
     Other types of enterprises include the Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts (GbR), 
the GmbH & Co. Kg, the Aktiengesellschaft, Partnerschaftsgesellschaft and the Stille 
Gesellschaft (IHK).  These types of enterprise are not widely used by the Mittelstand 
and are, therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation neglected.  Figure 35 shows 
the dispersion of types of enterprises among the German Mittelstand. 
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Total number of all SMEs: 2.918.642
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Company; KG-limited Partnership)
Other Legal Forms of SMEs
 
 
Figure 35:  SMEs by Legal Forms - Forms of Enterprises, Germany,  2002,  IfM, Institut für 
Mittelstandsforschung,  SMEs in Germany - Facts and Figures 2004,  Bonn:  IfM,  2004,  12. 
 
     Nearly 70 percent of all SMEs are sole proprietorships which offer the benefit of 
easy set up and minimal legal and formal requirements.  The second most chosen 
mode of operation with 15.40 percent is the limited liability company (GmbH) which 
offers the entrepreneur flexibility in doing business while at the same time limiting the 
legal and financial exposure and liability.  Partnerships, unlimited and limited, 
account for 12.60 percent off all legal enterprise forms and are the third most popular 
chosen mode of operation.  Other legal forms account for only 2 percent of all 
enterprises and, thus, do not have a significant impact on the composition of the 
German Mittelstand.  Figure 36 shows the ranking of the different forms of 
enterprises in regard to the enterprise’s generation of annual turnover which is an 
indication for the financial volume related to each kind of chosen mode of operation. 
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Figure 36:  SMEs by Legal Forms - Turnover of Enterprise Forms, Germany, 2002,  IfM, Institut 
für Mittelstandsforschung,  SMEs in Germany - Facts and Figures 2004,  Bonn:  IfM,  2004,  12. 
 
     Figure 36 illustrates that limited liability companies generate the highest part of 
the annual turnover of all SMEs.  Partnerships and sole proprietorships generate 
roughly about the same share of the annual turnover of SMEs.  Again, other legal 
forms of other enterprises generate only a small percentage, i.e. 5.6 percent, of the 
whole turnover of all SMEs.  The shares of each enterprise form in regard to the total 
number of enterprises in conjunction with the shares of each enterprise form in 
regard to the share of the total turnover of all SMEs leads to several conclusions.  
Although nearly 70 percent of all enterprises are sole proprietorships, they generate 
only 27.3 percent of all turnovers.  Thus, it can be assumed that the sole 
proprietorships are small businesses with relatively low annual turnover.  Most of the 
annual turnover is generated by limited liability companies; the appropriate share in 
annual turnover is nearly 2.5 times larger than the share in the total number of 
enterprises.  The same holds also true for partnerships whose share in turnover is 
twice the size of their share in the total number of enterprises.  Thus, both 
partnerships and limited liability companies are forms of enterprises which are used 
to deal in business with high annual turnover.  The relative prominence of the limited 
liability companies also indicates that entrepreneurs appreciate the flexibility given by 
its legal and formal requirement as well as the protection of personal wealth through 
limited liability vs. the sole proprietorship with the full personal liability.  
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6.2.3 Challenges facing the Mittelstand 
        The German Mittelstand faces a number of challenges which threaten to lead 
more than even the 39,320 registered insolvencies among SMEs in 2003 into 
insolvency (IfM, SMEs 2004 18). According to the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW)23  the lagging domestic demand and private consumption, as described 
previously in Chapter 6.1, is especially worrisome for the SMEs since, in contrast to 
the LSEs, they rely mostly on domestic demand.  The actual share of SMEs in 
export-based activities is 98.1 percent, but SMEs only account for 20.9 percent of all 
export-based turnover.   Furthermore, the turnover generated by exports is only 8.8 
percent of the entire annual turnover of SMEs (Reize, IfM, SMEs 2004 29).  Thus, a 
weak domestic demand and sluggish private consumption hurt SMEs 
disproportionately.  
      The weak domestic growth requires SMEs to ensure that their business is run 
financially sound and that liquidity is available in an adequate amount.  Therefore, 
further pressure on the financial situation of SMEs is added by the requisites of 
Basel II24 which require banks and, ultimately, SMEs to bolster their capital base and 
comply with rules laid down by the Basel directives in order to be eligible for loans.  
Of 1.9 million SMEs (about two third of the total number of SMEs) who negotiated 
with banks, 59 percent failed to secure a loan agreement.  Interviews revealed that in 
57 percent of the cases, the negotiations were terminated by the banks.  The banks 
refrained from granting loans in 60 percent of the cases due to lack of securities and 
in 45 percent of the cases due to a change in business policies.25  Enterprises broke 
off negotiations due to the lack of available and requested securities in 41 percent of 
the cases and regarded the interest rates asked in 34 percent of the cases as being 
too high.  24 percent of the enterprises also blamed poor advisory services for the 
failure of the negotiation.  In the end, of those enterprises which did not secure a 
                                            
 
23 The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) is the KfW Bankengruppe (the KfW banking group) and 
consists of the KfW promotional bank, the KfW SME bank, the KfW IPEX-Bank and KfW development 
bank.  The KfW Bankengruppe is owned by the federal government (80 percent) and the Länder (20 
percent) and is active in the promotion of SMEs, in home finance or housing modernization, in the 
protection of the environment and the climate, in export and project finance or in the promotion of the 
developing and transition countries (KfW).  For further information please visit http://www.kfw.de.   
 
24 Further information on Basel II and the effect on the financial situation of German SMEs can be 
found at http://www.mittelstand.info/. 
25 Please note that multiple answers could be chosen in the questionnaire. 
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loan agreement, only 14 percent actually went ahead with the planned investments 
(Reize).  
     Another dangerous development is the rising number of insolvencies among the 
SMEs.  In 2003 39,320 insolvencies were reported. The number is expected to rise 
even further in the next years, due to the weak growth in the domestic market (IfM, 
SMEs 2004 20).   Further pressure comes from the restriction of capital lending by 
banks due to Basel II as discussed above.  More and more enterprises are probably 
not able to continue business operations due to an insufficient capital base.  
Although the enterprises generate revenues, outstanding payments might put 
pressure on the liquidity of the enterprise, resulting in a cash-drain and ultimately in 
the need for capital lending.  Thus, the restriction of capital lending by Basel II might 
lead to a further increase in the number of insolvencies.  As more enterprises slip 
into insolvency, domestic demand will further decrease. The dependence of SMEs 
on the domestic market as illustrated in this chapter means that a further increase in 
insolvencies of SMEs hurts the domestic demand and, thus, in turn poses a serious 
threat to the existence of the surviving SMEs.   
     A permanent challenge for the SMEs is the question of the leadership of the 
enterprise.  As has been seen in Figure 35 above, most enterprises are sole 
proprietorships which have to find a suitable successor once the entrepreneur and 
founder of the enterprise dies or goes into retirement.  Every year about 71,000 
enterprises are affected by the (voluntarily) retirement of its leader.  The number of 
employees to be affected in 2005 is estimated at about 680,000.  Consequently, 
about 21.2 percent of the affected enterprises will have to be sold to external buyers. 
Still, each year about 5,900 enterprises have to be closed due to a lack of 
successors or adequate outside buyers (IfM, Jahrbuch).  Thus, the question of a 
suitable solution for enterprises facing an alternation of generation, for example, 
choosing a suitable successor or buyer is a pressing issue for SMEs. 
     Small and medium-sized companies also have to confront the fact that in a 
globalized world they have to compete globally on quality and price with their 
products.  But the relative high labor costs in Germany make it hard for SMEs to 
compete on price.  The average working hour cost for a German employee was 
$25.08 in 2002, while the comparable figure for an American employee is $21.11 
and for a Chinese employee even only $0.64 (Coy, Economist.com Economic Data).  
The low labor costs in China puts German production at home at a distinct 
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disadvantage and, coupled with a promising market of 1.3 billion customers, led to 
an investment in China of nearly all major German businesses.  German companies 
that invested in China include, BMW, Volkswagen, Bayer, BASF, Metro and TUI 
(Ludwig 6).  However, this option is mainly available to LSEs.  As has been 
discussed above, SMEs generally cannot meet the requirements in terms of capital 
and human resources needed for international production.  The higher labor costs in 
Germany compared to the USA are another source of worry, since the SMEs that 
export products and services, deal in US-Dollars.  Due to the continuous rise of the 
Euro against the Dollar to around $1.30 (wallstreet:online) over the past years, 
German labor becomes even more expensive.26   Figure 37 illustrates the 
development of the exchange rate of Euro/US for the period 2001-2006. 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Development of Euro/USD Exchange Rate from 2001-2006,  Wallstreet:online,  
EUR/USD Spot,  27. June 2006,  wallstreet:online AG,  Available:  http://www.wallstreet-
online.de/informer/common/charttool.php?tr=5y&inst_id=100742&market_id=19&spid=ws,  27. 
June  2006. 
                                            
 
26 The exchange rate is from 27. June 2006 (Wallstreet:online). A continually high exchange rate of 
the Euro against the Dollar is expected due to the trade deficit of the USA and the still mounting 
budget deficit. For further information see: "The Disappearing Dollar." and “The Future of the Dollar - 
The Passing of the Buck”,  The Economist  2. December 2004.  
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     The growing competition from low-cost countries like China and the lack of 
competitiveness in regard to labor costs compared to developed countries, such as 
the USA, are another challenge German SMEs have to cope with.  Friedrich 
summarizes the challenges German SMEs face as follows (9): 
 Growing stress of competition 
 Structural transformation 
 Globalization 
 locational / national competitiveness 
 Euro 
 Succession transition problems 
 Business policy congestion 
 Change in the way enterprises are financed 
 Basel II 
 Increment in Insolvencies  
     The previous section of the chapter has defined the German Mittelstand using 
qualitative and quantitative factors.  German SMEs are the backbone of the German 
economy and distinguish themselves from counterparts in other countries mainly due 
to the qualitative definition of the Mittelstand, i.e. the close connection between the 
owner and its company.  The German Mittelstand is the main economic force in 
Germany.  Despite the fact that Germany is a leading export nation, most SMEs 
depend on the home market.  The SMEs face a number of persistent challenges, 
namely the succession problem for those enterprise-founders retiring, a weak capital 
base of the enterprises, the new and strict financial requirements laid down by Basel 
II and high labor costs when compared to other developing and developed countries. 
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6.3 Investment in Germany 
 
     The United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) regularly 
reviews the institutional settings and conditions in a country to assess the 
attractiveness of a country as an investment location. The last available UNCTAD-
report certifies Germany to possess an open and welcoming FDI environment and to 
actively seek and permit FDI in Germany.  Germany offers an investor-friendly 
environment by encouraging foreign investment by guaranteeing (intellectual) 
property rights by law, with tax incentives, investment grants and loan programs 
("World Investment Development - Country Profile: Germany" 62).  In 2005, € 26,264 
billions were invested in Germany (Bundesbank,Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in 
Deutschland).  Figure 38 shows the development of FDI in Germany for the period of 
1999 – 2005 while Figure 39 illustrates the accumulation of total FDI in Germany for 
the period of 1990-2005. 
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Figure 38:  Development of FDI in Germany (in Billions of Euro) for the Period of 1999 – 2005,  
compiled from:  Deutsche Bundesbank,   Zahlungsbilanzstatistik: Ausländische 
Direktinvestitionen in Deutschland,  12. June 2006,  Available:  
http://www.bundesbank.de/stat/download/aussenwirtschaft/S201ATB34849.PDF,  12. June 
2006. 
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Figure 39:  Total FDI in Germany for the period of 1990 - 2005,  compiled from:  United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development,  World Investment Report 2004,  New York and 
Geneva:  UNCTAD,  2004,  376;  and  Deutsche Bundesbank,  Zahlungsbilanzstatistik: 
Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Deutschland,  12. June 2006,  Available:  
http://www.bundesbank.de/stat/download/aussenwirtschaft/S201ATB34849.PDF,  12. June 
2006.
27
 
 
     The different types of operation manners available for the market entrance in 
Germany were discussed at length in Chapter 1.4.  According to the International 
Enterprise Singapore (IE) organization, investing and setting up a business in 
Germany can take the following forms (IE): 
 Sole proprietorship 
 Limited liability company (GmbH) 
 Joint stock company28 
 Partnership 
 Branch 
 JV 
                                            
 
27 An exchange rate of 1 Euro = 1.25441 US Dollar was used in the compilation of the statistics. 
28 A joint stock company is known as Aktiengesellschaft (AG) in Germany is commonly used by larger 
corporations and listed companies.  The AG allows the transfer of shares. The liability of the AG is 
limited to €50,000 and is raised by the issuance of shares.  A minimum of 5 incorporators is needed.  
Furthermore, a supervisory board has to be nominated which appoints the management board.  The 
management board has to be independent from the supervisory board and the shareholders (IE). 
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     Of course, M&A of a German company is also an option.  M&As are generally 
responsible for a major part of the FDI-investment in a country since M&As allow a 
company to gain complete control of a business which most firms desire when the 
firm enters a foreign market.  The biggest M&A in Germany took place in 2000 when 
Mannesmann was taken over by Vodafone.  The deal was valued at $183 billion 
(CBC) at the time and is the reason for the distortion of the M&A sales statistics of 
Germany in 2000.  German companies are attractive take-over targets for 
companies favoring market entry in Germany by M&A because of the good 
reputation of German companies, the domestic German market, the low price for 
German companies and the competitiveness of German companies (Anonymous, 
"Langsam Aber Stetig Aus Dem Tal").  Figure 40 illustrates the development of M&A 
sales of German companies to foreign transnational companies29 as well as sales of 
affiliates of foreign businesses to companies from Germany.  
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Figure 40:  Development of the Value of M&A Sales in Germany for the Period of 1990 – 2004,  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  World Investment Report 2004,  New 
York and Geneva:  UNCTAD,  2004,  411; and Foreign Direct Investment Statistical Database,  
2006,  UNCTAD,  Available:  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3159&lang=1,  25. June 2005. 
                                            
 
29 A transnational corporation (TNC) is generally regarded as an enterprise comprising entities in 
more than one country which operate under a system of decision-making that permits coherent 
policies and a common strategy. The entities are so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or 
more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over the others and, in particular, to 
share knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others (UNCTAD, Transnational 
Corporations Statistics). 
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     M&A sales in Germany grew from $6.22 billion in 1990 to $35.69 bill. in 2004 
(UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Statistical Database).  SMEs are good target 
candidates for the M&A market entry mode since they have succession problems, a 
weak capital base and growing stress of global competition (Friedrich; IfM).  Most 
German SMEs are purchased because the acquirer (Behringer 19) 
 Aims to increase market share or access new markets 
 Acquire know-how or immaterial assets, such as licenses or brands 
 Acquire a qualified labor force 
 Improve their own market position by buying up a competitor  
     Although one regularly hears only about the acquisition of or merger amongst 
large companies, actually most activities in the M&A-sector take place in the German 
Mittelstand.  Of the problems plaguing German SMEs mentioned above, the 
succession problem is probably the most pressing one to German SMEs and the 
major reason for the sale of German SMEs to domestic and foreign investors 
(Behringer 7).   
      Consequently, German companies are attractive take-over candidates.  The 
arguments used to justify the SMEs’ appeal to acquirers can also be applied to 
companies seeking a partner for a JV.  Furthermore, the large domestic market and 
an annual disposable income of € 17,842 per household (Statistisches Bundesamt) 
make Germany a appealing market for other entry modes, such as for example, 
exporting or licensing, as well. 
     Although Germany’s economic performance has been disappointing when 
compared to the economic growth to worldwide or Euro Area growth (as has been 
seen in Chapter 6.1), it still has managed to attract foreign investors who consistently 
seem to achieve a higher growth in the German market than the German economy.  
For example, U.S. companies continue to invest in Sales, Marketing and R&D in 
Germany and make Germany the core location for marketing and competence 
centers precisely because these U.S. companies continue to generate excellent 
revenues in the German market (Anonymous, US-Unternehmen Verlagern 
Produktion Nach Osteuropa). 
     According to the business initiative “Invest in Germany” and Gösche, Germany 
offers several distinct advantages which make it a favorable investment location 
(Invest-in-Germany; Gösche 14): 
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 Highest GDP and population of all EU-members  
 Central location in Europe and a bridge between central and eastern Europe 
 Excellent labor training and resulting high labor productivity 
 Highly developed infrastructure 
 Quality seal "Made in Germany" 
 Superior technology standard of German companies and innovation 
 Innovation and dynamism through successful cooperation between research 
and industry 
 Political Stability and flexibility. 
     The ascertainments made by Invest-in-Germany and Gösche are confirmed by a 
study conducted by the consultancy Ernst & Young.  The study interviewed more 
than 1000 enterprises worldwide and concluded that 18.5 percent of all enterprises 
rate Germany as one of the three top investment locations worldwide, behind China 
and the USA.  At the same time, Germany is the most attractive investment location 
in the European Union.  The interviewees argued that Germany has one of the best 
transport and telecommunication infrastructures in Europe.  Praise is also given to 
the training and qualification of German employees as well as the attractiveness of 
the German market.  Last but not least, Germany is rated the best spot worldwide in 
terms of quality in research and development and logistic centers.  Furthermore, in 
terms of political stability and stability of law as well as social climate, Germany is 
ranked second-best in Europe.  Criticism was voiced in regard to bureaucracy in 
Germany and the flexibility of labor legislation.  57 percent of the respondents rated 
the German investment policy as good.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 55 
percent of those interviewed expect Germany’s attractiveness as an investment 
location to continuously rise in the coming years.  Further investments in Germany 
would most likely take place through the acquisition of shares and the formation of 
subsidiaries (Ernst&Young 1-31).   
     Adjacently, Germany has impressively improved its productivity and 
competitiveness in recent years.  According to The Economist ("Germany's 
Economy: A View from Another Planet"),  
 Germany has enjoyed productivity growth nearly as fast as America since 
1995 while wages have risen more slowly, resulting in falling labor costs 
 German exports growth in exports growth was more than three times the 
growth of America’s exports 
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 Germany is the only G7 country to increase the share of exports in world 
markets in the face of rising Chinese competition 
 German corporate profits increased stronger than at America’s companies 
 Germany has a 3 percent surplus account in savings while America has a 
current-account deficit of 6 percent. 
     The praise for German communication and transport infrastructure, labor 
qualification and the revival of German competitiveness compared to fellow EU 
members and the U.S. shows that Germany can offer substantial competitive 
advantages as an investment location to foreign companies.  The intended 
expansion by some 40 percents of the interviewees of the survey by Ernst&Young, 
the third place in the ranking of favorite investment locations worldwide in the same 
survey and the favorable rating of the German investment policy by UNCTAD 
indicate that further investment in Germany is probable.  Consequently, the 
distinctive advantages enjoyed by Germany as an investment location suggest that 
FDI will continue to flow into Germany.   
 
 
6.4 The Market Entrance of Mainland Chinese Business in 
Germany 
 
6.4.1 Current Situation 
     Chinese businesses view Germany as a strategic key market because 
(Anonymous, "Chinesen Kaufen Mittelstand" 1): 
 Germany is the biggest European market 
 German Technology is state-of-the-art 
 Germany is the gate to West and East Europe 
     Figure 41 shows the FDI of Mainland Chinese Business (excluding retained 
profits and credit transfers of foreign investors).  As one can see, yearly Mainland 
Chinese FDI in Germany has been low.  
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Figure 41:  Yearly Mainland Chinese FDI in Germany,  compiled from:  Deutsche Bundesbank,  
Direktinvestitionen Laut Zahlungsbilanzstatistik: Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in 
Deutschland,  12. June 2006,  Available:  
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/statistik/stat_direktinvestitionen.pdf,  12. June 2006. 
 
       Figure 42 illustrates the total Mainland Chinese investment in Germany for the 
period of 1994 – 2005.  The stock of Mainland Chinese investment in Germany has 
been rising drastically since 1994.  Still, by comparing the Mainland Chinese 
investment with investment from, for example, the Netherlands, which invested € 
7,895 million in 2005 alone, one can see that Mainland Chinese investment in 
Germany has been marginal so far (Bundesbank Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in 
Deutschland).    
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Figure 42:  Total Mainland Chinese Investment in Germany,  compiled from:  Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  Zeitreihe:Ausländische Kapitalanlagen Im 
Inland/China/Direktinvestitionen/Insgesamt/Saldo,  12. June 2006,  Available:  
www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.php,  12. June 2006. 
 
     A survey by the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation conducted in 2005 among 102 international active Chinese businesses 
showed that Germany was the second-most important investment location for 
Chinese investors (Anonymous, Schleichender „Kauf Deutschlands“).  About 600 
Mainland Chinese companies are nowadays active in the German market (Oldekop 
42).  While in the past Mainland Chinese businesses chose to establish a subsidiary 
in Germany, nowadays the M&A of a German business is the preferred course of 
action (Anonymous, Schleichender „Kauf Deutschlands“).   
     German SMEs are especially interesting take-over targets for Mainland Chinese 
SMEs since the organizational structure with a strong family and business head is 
similar to the Chinese organizational form of SMEs.  Consequently, it comes as no 
surprise that Mainland Chinese Business acquired an estimated 278 German 
companies in 2004 alone.  Nearly all acquired businesses are SMEs with an annual 
turnover between € 1 - 10 million.  Mainland Chinese businesses prefer not to buy 
the whole company, but to concentrate on acquiring the brand, the technology and 
the distribution networks.  The acquisitions are seen as a fast way to the 
establishment of a brand and appending distribution networks as well as attractive 
patents and modern technology (Anonymous Schleichender „Kauf Deutschlands“).   
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     Table 21 gives a supplementary overview about the acquisitions of German 
SMEs by Mainland Chinese businesses in the last years. 
 
UnknownProduction 
Equipment 
transported 
separately to China 
2004Dortmunder
Stahlfabrik
Jiangsu Shanggang
Group
UnknownAcquisition of 
Technology 
2005 Kaiserstuhl
Koksfabrik
Shangdong Yan
Kuang Group 
€ 9,5 million Acquisition of 
Production 
Equipment, 
Technology and 
Distribution 
Networks
March 2005 Deutsche Kelch
Corporation 
Harbin Measuring & 
Cutting tool Group 
Co., Ltd. 
Approx. €. 2 millionComplete Net-
Assets
Nov. 2004 Deutsche 
Schiess AG 
Shenyang Machine 
Tool (Group) Co., Ltd. 
No more than € 35 
million 94,98% Shares
July 2005 Deutsche DA 
Company 
SGSB Group Co., Ltd. 
Approx. € 10 
million 70% Shares
October 2004 Zimmermann 
Corp. 
Dalian Machine Tool 
Group Corp. 
Not publicly known, 
but allegedly 
around € 3 million
Acquisition of 
Brand and parts of 
the production 
equipment
January. 2004 LUTZ Company Ningbo Zhongqiang
Company 
Acquisition PriceMode of 
Acquisition
Date of 
Acquisition
Name of 
Acquired 
German 
Company
Name of Chinese 
Company
 
 
Table 21:  Overview about Mainland Chinese Acquisitions of German Companies,  
Anonymous.  Schleichender „Kauf Deutschlands“,  2005,  Investinchina.de,  Available:  
http://www.investinchina.de/onearticle.aspx?id=396# 
http://www.investinchina.de/onearticle.aspx?id=398# 
http://www.investinchina.de/onearticle.aspx?id=400#,  8. December 2005. 
 
     Mainland Chinese investors often contemplate purchasing financially stricken 
German SMEs, but frequently lack the necessary German market knowledge, for 
example, official regulations, and underestimate the difficulties of restructuring a 
German company which leads to disappointments after the purchase goes through 
(Anonymous, Die Chinesen Kommen).  Most Mainland Chinese investors tend to 
acquire a German SME that missed out on the internationalization of the companies’ 
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business as well as companies that are well positioned on the market but failed to 
find a successor for the current company leader.  These Mainland Chinese 
companies aim to take over long-term assets as well as tangible and tangible assets, 
patents, production technologies and trademark rights (Weber).  States Matz, “The 
establishing of a new company by Chinese investors is the exception; the trend is 
that they buy companies.” (Anonymous, Chinesische Investoren Drängen Auch Nach 
Deutschland)  
     Although Mainland Chinese investment into has been negligible so far, this 
chapter has shown that Mainland Chinese businesses are expanding onto the 
German market and that the market entrance through M&A seems to be one of the 
preferred market entry modes.  Is the choice of a certain market entry mode solely 
motivated by business considerations or is it possible that culture as a significant 
variable influences the choice of market entry mode? How might ethnic Chinese 
networks, which have been used for the international expansion of Overseas 
Chinese businesses, possibly play a role in the choice of market entry mode by 
Mainland Chinese businesses?  Based on observations and conclusions drawn in 
this dissertation so far, hypotheses for the international expansion and the market 
entrance of Mainland Chinese businesses onto the German market are developed 
and, subsequently, tested. 
 
 
6.5 International Expansion & Culture – Hypotheses for the 
Market Entrance of Mainland Chinese Business in Germany 
 
6.5.1 Hypothesis 1 
     The analysis of internationalization processes of Mainland Chinese Businesses in 
Chapter 5 revealed that Mainland Chinese Businesses essentially draw on 3 
different market entry choices when expanding abroad: Market entrance by a WOS, 
through a JV with a local business and the acquisition of or merging with a local 
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business.  Therefore, these three choices are analyzed in regard to the selection of 
the right market entrance mode in Germany. 
     Table 18 showed the weaknesses, problems and challenges Mainland Chinese 
businesses face.  The deficiencies in brand-reputation, technology, distribution 
infrastructure and management skills are being resolved by Mainland Chinese 
businesses through strategies involving M&A and alliances.  Another way is the 
establishment of subsidiaries in order to gain local knowledge and experience 
(UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004 25-26).     
     In Chapter 2 it was found that China has a high ranking on the power distance 
index developed by Hofstede.  A high power distance culture emphasizes the status 
of the superior and supports the obedience of subordinates towards authority which 
is not to be challenged.  A survey of different studies published on the effect of 
power distance on the choice of market entry mode reveals that “the cultural 
dimension of power distance can be considered a determinant in the choice of 
market entry-mode choice.” (Mayrhofer 85)  In effect, “a high power distance 
increases the likelihood of choice of majority or full control rather than shared control 
of international operations.” (Mayrhofer 85).   
     Thus, an internationally expanding business from a high power distance culture 
probably chooses market entrance modes with a high degree of control, i.e. M&A, 
WOS and majority JV.  Since China has a high power distance culture the choice of 
market entrance by M&A and WOS is anticipated.  The choice of a majority JV is 
neglected because, first, JVs in Germany between a German and Chinese company 
do not bear any obvious benefits since, second, JVs which enhanced the strengths  
and benefits of Germans (technology, brands, management skills) and Chinese (low 
cost labor and production assets) usually take place in China.  Therefore, Hypothesis 
1 (H1) proposes that Mainland Chinese business employ M&A and WOS for the 
market entrance in Germany because of the empirically proven correlation between 
a high power distance culture (China) and the choice of a high degree of control 
market entry mode. 
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6.5.2 Hypothesis 2 
     Chapter 6 argued that the focus of this dissertation is on Mainland SMEs as 
opposed to SOEs.  At the end of 2003 only 10 percent of all Mainland Chinese 
enterprises going abroad were private enterprises.  The number is expected to rise 
to 50 percent by 2010 (Vidaillet).  It is of significant interest how these growing 
numbers of private SMEs expand abroad.  As has been shown in Chapter 6, 
Mainland Chinese SMEs utilize guanxi networks to expand abroad.  While the 
significance of guanxi and guanxi networks has decreased for SOEs, guanxi is still of 
significance for Mainland Chinese businesses (Hutchings and Murray 189-190).  
Hence, so is the use of networks for Mainland Chinese SMEs.  
     Guanxi networks are a unique part of Chinese culture. As shown in Chapter 2 and 
3 as well as in Figure 19, Chinese individuals and the Chinese self cannot exist 
without their embedment in networks.  “Guanxi is part of the fabric of Chinese 
society.  Personal relationships are central to every aspect of Chinese society, 
including business.” (Vanhonacker, “Guanxi Networks,” 49)  Therefore, Mainland 
Chinese businesses employ networks in the market entrance in Germany because of 
the cultural programming of Chinese individuals. 
     Networks protect their members against outsiders, provide their members with 
organizational capabilities, lower transaction costs through mutual reciprocity and 
trust and offer exclusive access to capital and business opportunities.  In other 
words, networks generate sustainable competitive advantages for their members 
(Yeung, Transnational Corporations and Business Networks 214-218). 
     Luo observes that (135): 
it is important for firms that lack marketing experience, distinctive 
competencies, or distribution channels, to cultivate guanxi in order to 
compensate for their deficiencies.  Eventually, they can build a guanxi network 
of their own, which helps them gain access to and expand their local market.  
In other words, a firm can enhance its performance by benefiting from the 
guanxi network it has established.  In essence this network constitutes a firm’s 
core competency and distinctive competitive advantage that can lead to high 
performance for the firm. 
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     According to Luo, Mainland Chinese SMEs engage in guanxi networks in order to 
create a competitive advantage and increase the firm’s performance.  As has been 
shown in Chapter 6, Mainland Chinese SMEs lack, for example, marketing 
experience or distribution channels.  Thus, by establishing guanxi networks and 
utilizing them for the international expansion, Mainland Chinese SMEs can create a 
competitive advantage. 
     The engagement of Mainland Chinese SMEs in guanxi networks is a competitive 
advantage since the utilization of networks leads, for example, to the reduction of 
transaction costs.  Because resources are complimentary and information is shared 
freely, the Mainland Chinese business is able to access local knowledge when 
entering the German market.  Additionally, the ethnic Chinese network provides with 
all necessary information, introduces it to the local market network, lets it participate 
in established customer and distribution networks and might even finance part of the 
local operation of the Mainland Chinese SMEs.  Also, ethnic Chinese could protect 
Mainland Chinese SMEs against competitors, for example, by solely purchasing 
products from the Mainland Chinese business in order to financially secure the first 
months of the venture in Germany.  To conclude, Hypothesis 2 (H2) proposes that 
Mainland Chinese SMEs employ ethnic Chinese networks when entering the 
German market because these networks are part of the cultural fabric of Chinese 
society and at the same time provide a competitive advantage to Mainland Chinese 
SMEs entering the German market. 
 
6.5.3 Hypothesis 3 
     As has been discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, there is a considerable 
cultural distance between Chinese and Germans.  For example, whereas Chinese 
emphasize the role of hierarchy and obedience, Germans have a bias for 
individualism and independence.  Distinctive Chinese cultural variables such as 
guanxi, collectivism and face have been analyzed and found to greatly influence 
Chinese communication behavior.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
distinctive characteristics of Chinese and Germans can prove troublesome when 
Mainland Chinese businesses begin to expand to Germany. 
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     Only in recent years have Mainland Chinese businesses have begun to expand 
abroad.  As described in Table 18, Mainland Chinese businesses lack management 
skills since most Chinese businesses and managers have little or limited knowledge 
of foreign markets.  M&A is a chosen tool of Mainland Chinese businesses to 
overcome these deficiencies.  However, Mainland Chinese businesses should be 
careful with their choice of target and the resulting consequences because “cultural 
barriers, social misunderstandings and policy puzzles can also lead to business 
failures.  Chinese companies may have grown under a very different business 
environment with the ones that they are about to merge or acquire.” (Renfeng)   
Larsson and Risberg caution that “an acquired foreign subsidiary may be more 
difficult to manage if there are great cultural distances between the two countries, 
since it is difficult to affect or change an existing corporate culture, and the national 
culture and macro-variables differ (43).  Therefore, Mainland Chinese businesses 
are expected to have trouble not only with the corporate, but also with the national 
culture when acquiring a German business. Are the Mainland Chinese businesses 
yet prepared to deal with problems arising from different cultures? 
     The seclusiveness of the Chinese system in the past has led to a lack of 
international experienced managers as underlined by the shortage of international 
experienced managers.  Therefore, it cannot be expected that Mainland Chinese 
businesses know how to deal with local cultures and situations.  Subsequently, it is 
reasonable to expect Mainland Chinese businesses to face serious challenges and 
problems in terms of cultural and social adaptation when entering a foreign market.  
For example, Mainland Chinese businesses employ Chinese who do not speak one 
word German to manage their German investment (Anonymous, Die Chinesen 
Kommen).  One example is Li Tiehuan, managing director of Kelch & Links, who has 
a has a Chinese professor as translator at his side at all times since Li Tiehuan 
speaks neither English nor German (Oldekop 41).  Adds Arras, president of Chinese-
French JV TCL-Thomson Electronics, “the communication challenge is one of the 
unique items we face.” (Roberts et al.)  Boos warns that Mainland Chinese 
businesses also have to give their businesses operating a European face, otherwise 
the business would face a loss of acceptance (Anonymous, Chinesische Investoren 
Drängen Auch Nach Deutschland). 
     In conclusion, so far Mainland Chinese businesses have ignored the pitfalls of 
cultural and social differences when internationalizing abroad.  Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
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proposes that due to the lack of experience in international business activity, 
Mainland Chinese business still lack the understanding and ability to deal with 
cultural differences in the market entrance and subsequent business activity in 
Germany, and, therefore, run into difficulties when doing business in Germany.   
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7 Discussion of Survey Results 
 
 
Chapter 7.1 describes the methodology of the survey.  A comprehensive and 
compounding analysis of the most significant results revealed by the survey is 
offered in Chapter 7.2 in regard to possible inductive explanations for the choice of 
the market entrance mode of Mainland Chinese businesses in Germany.  Chapter 
7.3 describes the key findings of similar survey and studies.  Chapter 7.4 
subsequently creates a synthesis of the results of Chapter 7.2 and 7.3 and draws 
final conclusions for the general internationalization and choice of market entry 
modes of Mainland Chinese in Germany.    
 
 
7.1 Methodology  
 
     In order to establish possible links between the choice of market entry of 
Mainland Chinese businesses and Chinese cultural variables, a detailed 
questionnaire30 was developed.  The questionnaire is held in English and can be 
classified into several categories.  First of all, participants are asked about the their 
company, including the size and structure of the business as well as its business 
activities.  The second part of the questionnaire deals with the motivations of going 
abroad and why a company would choose the German market and the according 
market entrance mode.  The third part is concerned with the success of the 
company’s activities in the German market and the success of the chosen market 
entrance mode.  The fourth part of the questionnaire deals with cultural factors in the 
market entrance and marketing activities of the business.  Finally, the questionnaire 
tries to shed a light on the connection between market entrance and Mainland 
Chinese business relationships with ethnic Chinese individuals or organizations.  By 
                                            
 
30 The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. 
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analyzing the answers given by the participants and establishing statistical 
correlations between results of the survey, one should be able to ascertain whether 
cultural variables of Chinese culture influence the choice of market entry modes of 
Mainland Chinese businesses.  The survey was conducted in the period from 
November 2005 to February 2006 among Mainland Chinese Businesses which 
entered the German market.  The questionnaire, in cooperation with the German 
Delegation of Industry and Commerce Shanghai, was sent by e-mail and fax to 
prospective participants and regional German business development agencies who 
were asked to forward the questionnaire to local Chinese businesses.  The 
questionnaire was then sent back by post, fax or e-mail.  Due to the limitations 
imposed upon the survey by German data protection law it is not known how many 
prospective participants the questionnaire received. The total number of recipients 
can only be estimated and, subsequently, is believed to be above 500.   
     However, only 8 companies sent the questionnaire back by fax, postal service or 
e-mail.  Of those 8 companies, 6 are Mainland Chinese SMEs, the target audience of 
the survey, while the other two are a state-owned enterprise and an overseas 
Chinese business.  It should be noted that the participating companies of the case 
studies requested to be kept anonymous due to the perceived sensitivity of the 
companies’ provided answers and data.   
     Participants in the survey had the choice between the market entry modes wholly-
owned subsidiary, JV, M&A and trading company.  In the course of the research, it 
was found that companies chose to describe their market entry as being through a 
trading company.  Subsequently, the term trading company was added in the 
questionnaire in order to provide the Mainland Chinese companies with the most 
accurate available choices of market entry modes and enrich the quality of this 
survey. 
     Since an empirical, and, thus, purely quantitative analysis, due to the low and, 
thus, empirically non-utilizable response rate, cannot be pursued, a qualitative 
analysis approach is being applied.  
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7.2 Analysis Case Studies 
 
7.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
     One can argue that in the context of Mainland Chinese businesses entering the 
German market, a trading company is actually a WOS31, too.  Out of a total of 6 
companies, 4 chose the entry mode trading company alias WOS for the market 
entrance with one company actually choosing the form of a JV for the trading 
company.  Even if one subtracts this JV/trading company, there are still 3 companies 
choosing the market entry mode trading company alias WOS, and one company that 
entered the German market through M&A.  Taking into account that another one of 
the companies also gained previous experience with M&A in Germany, one can, 
thus, make a case for the preference of Mainland Chinese businesses for those 
entrances modes (trading company alias WOS, M&A) associated with a high level of 
control.  Subsequently, deducing from the available case studies, it is proposed that 
Mainland Chinese businesses do indeed select the market entry modes M&A and 
WOS for the German market due to a culture-based preference for a high degree of 
control market entry mode as proposed by H1. 
 
7.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
     Hypothesis 2 (H2) proposes that Mainland Chinese SMEs employ ethnic Chinese 
networks when entering the German market because these networks provide a 
competitive advantage to Mainland Chinese SMEs entering the German market.  
Analyzing the answers given by the participating Mainland Chinese SMEs, it can be 
observed that the majority of participants thinks that networks are useful for the 
internationalization of their business; half of the participants state that ethnic Chinese 
networks are useful for the market entrance in Germany, but only two companies 
actually employed ethnic Chinese networks when entering the German market.  Half 
                                            
 
31 Please see 7.2.5 for further explanation 
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the questioned companies admitted to having asked Chinese companies for advice 
or information in Germany.  One company said that it actually used non-Chinese 
(local) networks for the market entrance.  Consequently, one can ascertain that there 
is indeed a willingness to acknowledge the importance of ethnic Chinese networks 
for the international expansion of a Chinese business.  
     In conclusion, H2 can neither be confirmed nor dismissed.  Certainly, there is 
enough evidence to suggest that ethnic Chinese networks exist and are used for the 
international expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses.  Concerning the question 
of the importance of these networks for the market entrance in Germany, though, 
one cannot precisely judge their relevance due to ambiguous responses and the rest 
is mere speculation, at best. 
 
7.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
     H 3 proposes that Mainland Chinese businesses so far lack the understanding 
and ability to deal with cultural differences when entering a foreign market.  By 
closely examining the answers of the participants of this survey, one has to disagree.  
Nearly all companies offer intercultural training courses for their employees and 
adapt their products and marketing strategy to the German market.  The Chinese 
management of half the German operations of the Mainland Chinese participants 
speaks German.  Additionally, the majority of companies have a German website 
and all participants regard culture as a very relevant variable when doing business 
with foreigners.  Thus, it seems that Mainland Chinese businesses recognize the 
pitfalls of social and cultural differences and address these issues when entering the 
German market.  In conclusion, a case can be made that Mainland Chinese 
businesses indeed understand and have the ability to deal with cultural differences 
within the context of a market entrance in Germany and, therefore, H 3, concerning 
the available case studies, cannot be confirmed. 
 
7.2.4 Response Rate and Guanxi 
     The low response rate of the survey can be explained by taking a look at the 
characteristics of Chinese individuals and enterprises as described and discussed in 
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the current literature.  As has been discussed in Chapter 4.3, Chinese utilize different 
communicative and behavioral approaches towards people they know and people 
who are unknown to them, i.e. insiders vs. outsiders (G. Gao and Ting-Toomey 50).  
The author of this survey did not have guanxi with prospective participants, thus, 
limiting the success probability of the study from the start.  Additionally hindering 
research efforts is the preference of Chinese individuals for authority (China being a 
high power distance culture) and the fact that the author of the study lacked authority 
(because of simply being a young researcher with no formal title).  Thus, it is not 
really surprising that most Chinese companies declined to participate in this survey.   
     Participating companies were acquired through personal contacts of the German 
Delegation of Industry and Commerce Shanghai and the various local business 
development agencies.  These institutions had already established relationships with 
the participating Chinese companies, i.e. these institutions were able to draw on 
guanxi (as discussed in Chapter 3.4.2 and 5.2.3 et sqq.).  Therefore, these 
institutions were not seen as outsiders and, consequently, were offered cooperation 
by the Chinese.  In conclusion, guanxi networks established by ethnic Chinese 
individuals or organizations are of imminent importance and employed, utilized, 
cultivated and served for the benefit of their members.  Approaches on a personal or 
professional basis by outsiders, however, are ignored and disregarded unless/until 
one is being introduced into the guanxi network.  Thus, the survey was essentially 
predestined to fail; but in failing confirmed typical Chinese behavior. 
 
7.2.5 Trading company alias WOS 
     It can be argued that participants chose to select the market entry mode trading 
company when in fact, from a scientific point of view, the appropriate description 
would have been wholly-owned subsidiary.  The enterprises established by the 
companies of the case studies where registered as GmbHs which require an initial 
investment of at least € 25,000.  Furthermore, following the description of the WOS - 
market entry mode given by Newbury and Zeira (89), B. E. D. Economist.com 
(Wholly-Owned Subsidiary) and Hollensen (295,305), it can be argued that these 
trading companies are, indeed, affiliates or subsidiaries of the Mainland Chinese 
companies and act as a sales subsidiary for these Mainland Chinese companies.  
  - 222 -  
The trading companies chosen by the Mainland Chinese businesses are similarly 
structured and managed as a WOS and also offer the same organizational benefits 
of control as a WOS.  Therefore, the choice of a trading company, i.e. WOS, 
underlines the cultural preference of Mainland Chinese businesses for market entry 
modes with a high degree of control.  Thus, it is reasonable to label these trading 
companies, from a scientific point of view, to be actually WOS.  Additionally, the legal 
and organizational model of a trading company presents a risk-averse as well as low 
capital means for Mainland Chinese businesses to establish a presence in the 
German market which can, at a later point of time, be expanded. 
 
7.2.6 Distribution Networks 
     Nearly all participants agreed that the establishment of distribution networks was 
one or the main reason for expanding internationally, beating even the diversification 
of the business or becoming a global player.  This result suggests that Mainland 
Chinese businesses see the distribution of products and the establishment of 
networks through which the products or services can be delivered the main problem 
in their international expansion.  One could also argue that the establishment of 
distribution networks is the first step toward establishing formal and informal 
networks in the relevant industry, region or country which can later be turned into a 
competitive advantage.  Thus, seen from that point of view, the overwhelming desire 
to establish distribution networks can also be at least partly explained by the culture-
based desire to establish, cultivate and extend networks, i.e. to create guanxi. 
 
7.2.7 Management Style 
     Mainland Chinese businesses prefer decision making to be something that is 
done by the company head.  Half the participants state that operational and strategic 
decisions are made by the company head.  Further questions in regard to the role of 
managers and employees in the company show strong agreement on the concept 
that each person should know their place in the company and their obligations 
towards others as well as that each manager is responsible for his/her team and 
employees.  Half the participants also say that a manager is a person every 
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employee looks to for guidance.  Participants are split on whether the company head 
knows best how to lead the company and that one should not disagree with him.  
Surprisingly, a majority of the participants thinks that it is not, or only to a minor 
degree, inappropriate for employees to question the authority and integrity of their 
managers.  The results of the survey, thus, only partly support the notion that 
Mainland Chinese businesses are managed and led in accordance to the high power 
distance culture which China supposedly is (as has been discussed in Chapter 2).  
The results could also imply that Mainland Chinese businesses are partly adapting to 
global or local management practices in regard to employee empowerment. Without 
further empirical evidence, these conclusions are, again, mere speculation at best.   
 
 
7.3 Additional Surveys 
     To be able to understand and put the results of the conducted survey in a broader 
context as well as to analyze and verify whether conclusions drawn from the survey 
are empirically and scientifically relevant, a further comparison with existing literature 
and surveys is proposed.  First, the survey conducted by the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Services (FIAS), a body of the World Bank Group, is described.  
Subsequently, the results of a survey jointly conducted by the Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada (APFC) and the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT) are reported.  Last but not least, findings of a study 
conducted by the IBM Institute for Business Value and the School of Management at 
Fudan University are presented.  The results of the author’s study and key findings 
of the three external studies mentioned above are compared and analyzed in the 
synthesis in Chapter 7.4 and final conclusions are drawn. 
 
7.3.1 FIAS Survey 
     The survey conducted by FIAS included 150 Mainland Chinese businesses firms.  
Of the total sample of Mainland Chinese businesses, 33 percent are SOEs and 48.7 
percent are private businesses.  Missing percents are spread among other types of 
enterprises. 85 percent of the participants identified “market seeking” as their top 
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motivation for expanding abroad.  Additionally, 51 percent of Mainland Chinese 
businesses use FDI to acquire strategic assets. 50 percent of Mainland Chinese 
businesses undertake FDI abroad in the context of a global competitive strategy.  
The most important factors influencing the FDI by private Mainland Chinese 
businesses are, beside market seeking (81 percent), the acquisition of strategic 
assets (53 percent) and the implementation of a global competitive strategy (51 
percent).  About 59 percent of the Mainland Chinese businesses are planning to 
make new investments abroad with another 13 percent intending to.  A majority of 51 
percent identified cultural conflicts as one of the main challenges of operating 
internationally.  Further problems and challenges listed are the slow reaction of 
Mainland Chinese companies to changes in local markets, capital shortage, labor 
costs, the building of brand images and distribution channels.  The biggest 
impediment to overseas investment identified in this study is the limitations on 
foreign exchange use (Battat).  Since Chinese officials have lifted major restrictions 
of foreign exchange use in March, 2006, this impediment does not really apply 
anymore (Lifei). 
 
7.3.2 APFC/CCPIT Survey 
     In cooperation with CCPIT, APFC conducted a web-based survey in which 
ultimately 296 valid responses were registered. The survey was, of course, 
conducted with the focus on Canada as investment location.  Therefore, results of 
the survey pertaining solely to the investment location Canada are disregarded.  
Nearly 90 percent of Mainland Chinese ODI projects are wholly-owned or majority-
owned by Chinese investors (larger than 50.1 percent stake).  However, 60.7 
percent of all undertaken ODI was in the form of JV, rather than IGI (16.1 percent) or 
M&A (23.2 percent).  Of the participating Mainland Chinese companies, about 14.5 
percent are SOEs and 56.5 percent are private SMEs.  Most of Mainland Chinese 
ODI so far has taken the organizational form of representative offices and sales 
offices. Including the use of agents, these forms account for 75 percent of all forms 
of businesses of Chinese ODI:  On a scale from 1-5 (not important - very important), 
Mainland Chinese businesses ranked the following driving factors for their existing 
ODI (Anonymous, China Goes Global 16): 
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 Business potential/expansion - 4.47 
 Access to advanced technology and R&D - 3.74 
 Access to international standard management practices - 3.70 
 Overall importance of target country as a market - 3.52 
 Acquisition of established brands - 3.28 
     The results clearly show that Mainland Chinese expand internationally to 
overcome deficiencies by accessing technology, R&D, management skills and 
brands as well as to extend business potentials and seek new markets.  
 
7.3.3 IBM/Fudan University 
     The survey conducted by IBM/Fudan University, similar to the one conducted by 
APFC/CCPIT, also used a ranking from 1-5 to determine the importance of 
characteristics with 1 meaning “not important” to 5 which means “very important.”  
The three most important motivations for Mainland Chinese companies to expand 
abroad are (Beebe et al. 5): 
 Seeking new markets for growth - 4.5 
 Acquire advanced technology and management skills - 3.8 
 Intense competition in the domestic market - 3.4 
     Additionally, “Chinese companies consider brand ownership critical to their 
success overseas, but they may not fully appreciate the sustained investment 
required for brand building and management.” (Beebe et al.7)  The study asserts that 
there is no “right” market entry strategy for Mainland Chinese companies expanding 
internationally.  The study suggests that OEM should gradually build up their 
internationalization by keeping and enhancing their relationships with Western 
companies.  Mainland Chinese businesses that already have limited global 
experience should expand to developing countries first and then move on to more 
advanced markets in the U.S. and Europe.  In regard to M&A, Beebe et al. state that 
“we believe manufacturers pursuing M&A strategies will likely focus on Europe and 
the U.S., where acquisitions can provide access to brands, management talent, R&D 
capabilities, distribution and sales channels that would likely take decades to 
develop organically.” (11) 
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7.4 Synthesis of Surveys and Studies 
     Putting together the different findings from each survey with the key results from 
the author’s survey complements the author’s findings and creates a coherent 
picture of the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses.  First, as 
confirmed by the studies of APFC/CCIPT, IBM, FIAS and the author, Mainland 
Chinese businesses expand internationally to seek new markets for growth and 
extend the potentials of their businesses.  One could expect this result since, first, 
the competition on the domestic market has become intense, and expanding 
internationally gives the Mainland Chinese businesses new revenue and profit 
potentials.  Eventually, international experience gained makes Mainland Chinese 
businesses more competitive which they ultimately need to become in order to 
survive in the global economy. 
     Second, Mainland Chinese businesses expand abroad to access and acquire 
strategic assets, i.e. brands, technology, R&D, management skills and distribution 
channels, to fill resource gaps.  Hence, the M&A of a local company offers a fast and 
convenient way to achieve this goal.  Consequently, the quest for skills and assets to 
overcome competitive disadvantages can be seen within the context of implementing 
a global competitive strategy as identified in the FIAS-survey. 
     Third, according to the survey by APFC/CCIPT, overseas Mainland Chinese 
ventures are over 90 percent predominantly owned by Mainland Chinese, i.e. even 
when Chinese expand abroad and cooperate in JVs or other modes of collaboration, 
they strive to own the majority of the enterprise.  As has been discussed, trade 
companies, sales and representative offices are, in fact, WOS in the context of 
controlling a venture.  Consequently, the result of the APFC/CCIPT survey 
underlines the findings of H1 that Mainland Chinese businesses expand through 
market entry modes which give them control of the enterprise/venture.  Mainland 
Chinese businesses choose these modes due to a cultural preference for market 
entry modes with a high degree of control.   
     Fourth, Mainland Chinese businesses probably employ trade companies, sales 
and representative offices (which require only a small investment to be set up) as a 
first step toward the Mainland Chinese companies’ integration into the local 
community and (ethnic Chinese) networks as has been illustrated by the results for 
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Hypothesis 2.  The external studies described and analyzed above were successfully 
conducted because the respective institutions were able to draw on their own guanxi 
as opposed to the author’s study which lacked significant guanxi to conduct a 
scientifically creditable study.  Thus, it is important to appreciate the importance of 
guanxi when dealing with Chinese as well as guanxi as a lubricant for Mainland 
Chinese businesses expanding abroad. 
     Fifth, Mainland Chinese businesses are aware of the challenges posed by 
differing cultures when expanding internationally.  The author’s study found that 
Mainland Chinese businesses in Germany are aware of the problems and 
challenges posed by differing cultures and address these difficulties by, e.g. tailoring 
their marketing for the German market.  The Mainland Chinese companies’ 
awareness of problems, challenges and difficulties of sometimes conflicting cultural 
differences is confirmed by the result of the FIAS study which points out that 
Mainland Chinese companies identify culture as one of the most pressing challenges 
in their internationalization drive. 
 
 
7.5 Comparison and Integration with Literature 
 
     The results of this dissertation are compared to existing literature, i.e. to research 
conducted and published by Child and Rodrigues in order to verify the validity of the 
dissertation’s results.  Child and Rodrigues analyzed the internationalization patterns 
of Mainland Chinese businesses by drawing on existing literature and using case 
studies, an approach similar to the one chosen by the author.  Similar to the author, 
Child and Rodrigues found that existing literature is inadequate to fully appreciate 
and explain the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses.  According to 
Child and Rodrigues, “the question arises whether the internationalization of Chinese 
firms can be explained in terms of mainstream theory derived largely from western 
multinational corporations,” or rather “raises the possibility that an examination of 
Chinese internationalization may indicate the need for some extension of existing 
theorizing.”(382) 
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     Child and Rodrigues especially criticize that “the predominant assumption in 
mainstream theory has been that internationalization is motivated by a firm’s wish to 
exploit its existing ownership advantages.  The conventional view therefore focuses 
on the overseas possibilities for asset exploitation.” (384)  Child and Rodrigues offer 
the theoretical framework of the latecomer perspective which focuses on the 
internationalization of companies in order to address competitive disadvantages.  
According to literature, latecomers, whether nations or companies, have to ‘catch up’ 
with developed/superior peers in terms of technology and know-how.  These 
latecomers start from a position of relative weakness, and outward FDI is targeted at 
“closing the gap that separates them from leading companies through acquiring 
appropriate assets and resources.” (Child and Rodrigues 384) 
     Child and Rodrigues state that “while such firms [latecomers] had some initial 
competitive advantages, such as low labor costs, these became less crucial as the 
firms moved into more sophisticated markets with higher value products.” (384)  
Companies need certain skills and assets to be able to compete in sophisticated 
markets, e.g. to differentiate their own product from those of competitors.  Arguably, 
technological leadership, strong brands and superior management skills construe 
competitive advantages that help companies to differentiate themselves and their 
products in sophisticated markets.  As has been discussed in Chapter 5.3 and 7.3, 
Mainland Chinese businesses are looking to acquire exactly these skills in their 
internationalization drive.  As Child and Rodrigues observe (389): 
The strengthening of differentiation and/or brand advantage features an 
important driver for the outward FDI being made by leading Chinese firms. 
Often they are going abroad to acquire advanced technology, R&D 
capabilities, which provide the means to develop a differentiation advantage.  
Some are acquiring or developing global brands as the basis for securing a 
brand advantage. 
     In conclusion, the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses conforms 
more to the concept of the latecomer perspective “than to analyses derived from the 
exploitation of firm-specific advantages by already strong companies.” (403)  As 
discussed in Chapter 5.3 and 7.2, and confirmed by Child and Rodrigues, a number 
of factors lead to the quest for international markets by Mainland Chinese 
businesses, chiefly among them the tough competition on the domestic market, the 
exporting of cost advantages and the complementation of cost advantages with 
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differentiation through internationalization as a means to create and tap into 
business potentials (399). 
     This dissertation found that Mainland Chinese businesses prefer to enter a new 
market through modes that give them as much control as possible on the venture, 
i.e. through M&A and WOS.  Child and Rodrigues confirm this finding by stating that 
“the apparent preference of Chinese firms when investing abroad to pursue this 
through acquisitions and organic growth rather than through JVs with non-Chinese 
MNCs suggests that they may prefer to retain their distinctive administrative 
heritage.” (407)  One can, thus, expect Mainland Chinese business expansion to 
persist in relying heavily on WOS and M&A as a means for their internationalization 
drive towards global presence and business operations.  
     One of the key aspects of the author’s study was the role of networks or guanxi in 
the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses.  One cannot extract a clear 
confirmation of the use and importance of guanxi for the market entrance of 
Mainland Chinese businesses, but based on circumstantial evidence, it was 
concluded that Mainland Chinese businesses use guanxi for the internationalization 
of their businesses.  The work by Child and Rodrigues is able to complement and 
partly confirm the findings of the author.  
     First, a much larger focus of Mainland Chinese guanxi is directed at firm-
government/state relations.  The institutional support includes regulatory and 
financial backing as well as access to governmental research. While government 
support is common in most countries, its prominence in China is probably unique 
(Child and Rodrigues 399, 406).  Second, “the extent to which they [Mainland 
Chinese businesses] tap overseas Chinese communities in developed countries 
such as the USA needs to be clarified.  While not denying the potential strategic 
value of ethnic networks, some of the foreign investment projects being undertaken 
[…] relied on advice and expert backing from non-Chinese sources.” (406)  Similar to 
the author, Child and Rodrigues are also not able to give a definite answer to 
importance of (overseas) Chinese networks, but point to the importance of non-
Chinese networks for the Mainland Chinese businesses internationalization as 
illustrated in the analysis of the case studies discussed in Chapter 7.2.  Thus, the 
question whether Mainland Chinese businesses use (ethnic Chinese) networks for 
their internationalization calls for further research. 
  - 230 -  
     Since the work by Child and Rodrigues does not focus on the significance of 
culture for the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses, only a passing 
reference to the problems posed by differing cultures can be found in that work.  The 
question of the liability of foreignness (=cultural differences) is raised but is focused 
more on the significance of overseas Chinese networks for the international 
expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses. However, Child and Rodrigues raise 
two cultural issues.  First, operating globally poses a major challenge in regard to the 
differences in managerial culture and style between Chinese and locals; especially 
for the management of overseas affiliates.  Second, the liability of foreignness may 
jeopardize the effectiveness of purchased tangible assets, e.g. brands, technology 
(Child and Rodrigues 385, 393).  Finally, Child and Rodrigues raise the question 
whether Mainland Chinese businesses “adapt successfully to different modes of 
managing and transacting that are suited to the environments in which they 
expand?” (406).  This question cannot be completely answered by this dissertation; 
nonetheless, the author’s study has shown that there are signs that Mainland 
Chinese businesses are beginning to understand and attempt to tackle the 
challenges and problems posed by operating in a foreign environment. 
     Although the number of samples in the author’s study was restricted, conclusions 
drawn from the case studies were confirmed and complemented by current literature.  
The international expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses is driven by the twofold 
quest for assets and resources and control over the ventures; WOS and M&A are 
seen as appropriate means to achieve these goals.  Alongside, further research in 
regard to, first, the utilization and importance of Chinese networks and, second, to 
the latecomer perspective and consequences for business management theory is 
needed.  Internationalization patterns of Mainland Chinese businesses are just 
beginning to emerge, but are yet not significantly pronounced since the rise of 
Mainland Chinese businesses on the global stage is just starting.  Mainland Chinese 
businesses are not yet as competitive as to be able to dominate global markets in 
any industry.  However, since the international expansion of Mainland Chinese 
businesses is still in its infancy, future development and internationalization of 
Mainland Chinese businesses should be watched closely. 
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8 Outlook 
 
 
          Although the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses has been 
widely ignored by researchers so far, there are encouraging signs that more and 
more researchers are paying attention to the changes taking place.  Indeed, the 
growing presence and significance of Mainland Chinese businesses on the global 
stage calls for an integrated and comprehensive analysis of their actions and 
possible contributions to internationalization theory. 
     Of special interest in this regard is the organizational model of Mainland Chinese 
business. While ethnic Chinese businesses employ networks in their 
internationalization drive, this cannot be confirmed (beyond doubt) for Mainland 
Chinese businesses.  The unique economic, social and cultural development of 
Mainland China in the past 50 years seems to have led to a partially different 
organization model in Mainland Chinese companies compared to the one by 
Overseas Chinese.  Research directed at determining to which effect networks do 
influence Mainland Chinese business internationalization and management practices 
should give insights to possible organizational structures and transaction methods 
that might prove invaluable to companies doing business in the interwoven global 
economy of the 21st century.  The same also holds true for further examination and 
contribution to research of the latecomer perspective in international business 
theory.  As more and more developing countries strive to emerge on the global 
business stage and catch-up with (Western) developed countries/companies, new 
insights for internationalization theory and MNEs (from developing countries) can be 
expected. 
     The importance of culture as a variable in international business has been widely 
accepted only recently.  While studies of cultural differences and challenges have 
become really prominent for the first time through Hofstede’s publications, accepting 
the validity of Hofstede’s results, predictions and consequences of culture in 
international business has taken more time.  These days, culture as a variable in the 
international expansion of businesses, negotiations and dealings is recognized; and 
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appropriate steps are taken by companies themselves to prepare for possible 
cultural conflicts.  While this is mostly true for Western MNEs, little evidence has so 
far been found for the willingness of Eastern companies, especially Chinese ones, to 
tackle cultural issues.  The author’s study in this dissertation has shown that 
Mainland Chinese companies are aware of cultural challenges when entering the 
German market.  Therefore, on the one hand, one can expect that future expansion 
of Mainland Chinese businesses might take into account cultural challenges. On the 
other hand, the inexperience of Mainland Chinese managers and the relatively 
strong focus on costs by Chinese businesses is probably going to lead to the 
negligence of culture in many instances of international business.  Thus, Mainland 
Chinese businesses can be expected to make the same mistakes of cultural 
adaptation in international business as Western companies did in the past. 
     More and more Mainland Chinese companies step on the global stage and enter 
foreign markets.  Still, so far none of these companies has come to dominate its 
industry.  Mainland Chinese companies lack significant skills, capabilities and 
operating knowledge which impedes their success in international business.  While 
Mainland Chinese businesses might neither be globally competitive or dominant in 
the near future, it is more than probable that these companies will achieve their goals 
in due time. 
     The accelerating internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses has 
significance and impact going further than business theory since the repercussions 
of internationally active Chinese businesses in the global economy can already be 
felt beyond mere international trade today.  Chinese SOEs are on a buying spree 
around the world, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa to purchase natural 
resources desperately needed to secure energy output and, thus, future growth of 
the Chinese economy.  While today most countries see the USA as the sole and 
predominant superpower on the global stage, the rise of China may change this 
perception in the coming years.  The rise of the Chinese economy and, thus, of a 
vast country with over 1.3 billion potential customers, with a tradition of innovation 
and hard work, could lead to a significant power shift in politics and economics 
worldwide.  A country with a potential consumer base of over 1 billion people, with a 
people, is probably going to play a dominant role in global business.  But the impact 
of a rising China will not only be felt in countries abroad, but also in Germany. 
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     This dissertation has described the various challenges Germany and German 
companies, especially the Mittelstand face.  Already, Mainland Chinese businesses 
have purchased several German SMEs in the quest for brands, technology and 
skills.  Yet, the acquisition of German SMEs by Mainland Chinese businesses is far 
from over.  While in the past Mainland Chinese businesses competed mostly by 
producing and supplying cheap products to Western companies and are now 
entering markets by selling similar products at comparatively low prices, these 
Mainland Chinese businesses have realized the need to move their business and 
products upwards on the value chain.  Since most Mainland Chinese companies, 
first, lack the necessary know-how and skills to be able to do so organically and, 
second, face a serious shortage of educated Chinese managers who could, for 
example, develop and implement brands, processes, management technique, most 
Mainland Chinese companies will have to grow through M&A to, third, expand 
quickly.  
     All over the world German companies from a wide range of industries are 
respected for their expertise, skills and high-quality products.  The same German 
companies have problems finding successors for their enterprise, have a low equity 
capital base and are at risk from weak domestic demand and high labor costs.  
Mainland Chinese businesses may in some cases be the only chance these German 
SMEs have to survive. 
     The ramifications of German SMEs being bought by Mainland Chinese 
businesses are manifold.  If Mainland Chinese businesses buy German companies 
and shift production to China, what happens to the manufacturing jobs in Germany?  
If Germany loses its technological edge and leadership because it “sold out” to 
China, how will Germany compensate this loss?  How will Germany deal with China 
becoming the biggest exporter (by some estimates in 2010), and later, largest 
economy on earth?  Since Germany has only few natural resources and the German 
economy mostly thrives on the export of products and adjacent services for 
sophisticated products, how will Germany secure economic growth and, thus, jobs 
and social stability in the future?  That is why Wolfgang Nowak, a former advisor to 
erstwhile chancellor Gerhard Schröder, remarked that “the biggest challenge for us 
[Germans] is not Hartz IV, Hartz V oder Hartz XVIII, but that millions of people in 
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China are successful and that millions will join them.  What happens in China is part 
of German domestic politics.”32 (Seibel and Blome 4)  
     The analysis of the international expansion of Mainland Chinese businesses has 
shown that, first, Mainland Chinese businesses have not yet emerged as dominant 
player on the global stage, but that they are probably on their way.  Second, it can be 
deduced that developed countries which possess high-technology industries, rely on 
intellectual property-intensive industries and are export-dependent, should pay heed 
to future Mainland Chinese expansion and take a close look at possible 
consequences for their own economies and enterprises.  Nonetheless, this advice 
actually applies to nearly all economies and enterprises since nowadays everything 
and everybody seems to be intertwined in the global economy in some way.  While 
the rise of Mainland China on the global stage is widely perceived as a threat, the 
Chinese symbol for crisis is also the same as for chance.  This is probably why 
paying attention to the internationalization of Mainland Chinese businesses becomes 
indispensable to any business wanting to successfully prevail in the 21st century. 
                                            
 
32 „Die große Herausforderung für uns ist nicht Hartz IV, Hartz V oder Hartz XVIII, sondern das 
Millionen Menschen in China erfolgreich sind und Millionen neue noch kommen werden. Was in 
China geschieht ist Teil der deutschen Innenpolitik.“ (Own Translation) 
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Appendix 
Questionnaire 
 
1) What is the name of your Company?  
 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
 
2) Where is your German business operation located?  
 
____________________________________________ 
 
 
3) Where is your Chinese parent business (headquarters) located?  
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
4) Which of these choices best describes your Chinese company? 
 
 state-owned   a private business   a collective  
     enterprise 
 
 has mixed ownership  is a joint stock enterprise – majority-held by  
     Overseas Chinese 
 
 
If your business is a private one, please continue with question 5.If your business 
is not a private one, please continue with question 8.  
 
 
5) If your business is a private one, is it family-owned? 
 
 yes   no  
 
 
6) If your business is family-owned, is the family head also the head of the 
business? 
 
 yes   no  
 
 
7) If your business is family-owned, are family members managing the business 
in key positions? 
 
 yes   no  
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8) Who makes operational decisions in the business? 
 
 company head   the top management   
 
 each group head  each individual employee   N/A 
 
 
9) Who makes strategic decisions in the enterprise? 
 
 company head   the top management  
 
 each group head  each individual employee   N/A 
 
 
10) How long have you been active on the German market (in years)? ________ 
 
 
11) How many workers does your German operation employ? 
 
 <below 5  5-10  10-20  20-50  50-100  
 
 100-250  250-500  over 500    N/A 
 
 
12) How many employees does your parent operation in China have? 
 
 <below 5  5-10  10-20  20-50  50-100  
 
 100-250  250-500  over 500    N/A 
 
 
13) What is the approximate yearly sales revenue of your German 
     operation (in Euro): 
 
 < 100,000 .  100-500,000.  500,000-5 Mio.   5-10 Mio. 
 
 
  > 10 Mio.  N/A  
 
 
14) What is the relative proportion the revenue generated in Germany contributed 
to the revenue your Mainland Chinese business achieved (in percent)?  
 
approx. ________ percent   N/A  
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15) Your German operation is resident in the product sector/branch: 
 
 
 
 mechanical engineering/ plant construction  electronics/ electrical  
     engineering  
 
 energy       construction 
 
 automobile/ -supplier     chemicals/ pharmaceutics
  
 
 Culture & Arts      tourism/wellness 
 
 natural resources      industrial goods 
 
 food        real estate  
 
 consumer electronics     consumer goods 
 
 information technology     wholesale/retail 
 
 advertising/media      transportation  
 
 medicine/healthcare     biotechnology 
 
 telecommunication services    shipping products & 
services  
 
 finance/banking/investment    Other _________________ 
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16) What are generally your motives for going abroad and internationalize your 
business? Please rate the following factors according to their relevance: 
 
 not 
at all 
to a 
minor 
extent 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• Increase revenue potentials      
• Acquire brands to extent reach to 
potential customers 
     
• Access to up-to-date technology      
• Open up new markets       
• Establish distribution networks      
• Learn from competitors       
• Acquire and enhance management 
and marketing skills necessary for  
competing with multinational 
enterprises on the global market 
     
• Become a global player      
• Diversify the business      
 
 
17) To which extent did/do the following factors influence your decision to choose 
the German market as a target market? 
 
 not at 
all 
to a 
minor 
extent 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• Technology expertise of German 
businesses 
     
• German brands and reputations 
(“Made in Germany”) 
     
• Geographic location       
• Education/Qualification of 
German personnel 
     
• Establishing a market presence 
in Germany 
     
• Infrastructure in Germany      
• Germany’s private consumer 
market 
     
• Germany’s industrial market      
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18) Please rate the following factors of Germany: 
 
 Very 
unsatisfactory 
unsatisfactory satisfactory good Very 
good 
• Legal issues, for 
example, setting up an 
enterprise  
     
• Education/Qualification 
of employees 
     
• Technological 
leadership 
     
• Telecommunication 
infrastructure 
     
• Transportation 
Infrastructure 
     
• Geographical location      
• Quality of products      
• Work ethos      
• Wage rates      
• Unions      
 
 
19) How do you gain knowledge about the German market?  
 
 Previous M&A of a German business   Market studies/reports 
 
 Ethnic Chinese friends/colleagues/associates who live in Germany  
  
 
 German Chamber or trade associations   Agents   
 
 Trade fairs       Personal visit 
 
 Previous activities (for example export)    Internet   
 
 Länder representative office     Trade fairs  
         
 Consultants       Other_________________ 
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20) Which one of the given market entry mode did/do you choose for the German 
market?  
 
Wholly-owned Subsidiary    Joint Venture  
 
 Trading Company      Mergers & Acquisitions 
(M&A)   
 
 Other_____________________________ 
 
 
Please continue the questionnaire according to the chosen market entry mode and 
disregard the questions pertaining not to your chosen mode: 
 
21.  M&A 
22.  Joint Venture 
23.  Wholly-owned Subsidiary 
24.  Trading Company 
 
 
21) Which factors are important regarding your market entrance strategy through 
the merger with or acquisition of a German small- and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME)? 
 
 not 
at all 
To a 
minor 
extent 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• The structural and managerial 
similarity of the German M&A target 
with a Chinese company 
     
• The German M&A targets are 
available at comparably low prices 
     
• The M&A brings access to the 
resources (distribution channel, 
brands, human resources, etc.) of a 
German business 
     
• The M&A assures a fast and easy 
market entrance 
     
• The M&A gave us local market 
knowledge, connections and business 
relationships  
     
• The M&A allows us to exert control 
over technological and managerial 
issues 
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22) Which factors are/were important regarding your market entrance strategy by 
JV? 
 
 not 
at all 
to a 
minor 
extent 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• To select suitable German 
partner(s) with extensive ties in the 
business environment 
     
• To gain access to the resources 
(distribution channel, brands, human 
resources, etc.) of a German 
business 
     
• JV-partner has technological 
leadership in his business field 
     
• To learn and adapt to the German 
way of doing business 
     
• To learn from German partner about 
the German market 
     
• To gain access to German market      
 
 
23) Please evaluate the importance of the following factors contributing to the 
choice of wholly-owned subsidiary for the German market: 
 
 not 
at all 
To a 
minor 
extent 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• The choice of a suitable legal 
enterprise form  
     
• The fast and easy access to the 
German market  
     
• The level of managerial control over 
local subsidiary/branch 
     
• The level of technological control      
• The use of local ethnic Chinese 
contacts 
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24) Please evaluate the importance of the following factors contributing to the 
choice of a Trading Company for the German market: 
 
 not 
at all 
To a 
minor 
extent 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• The choice of a suitable legal 
enterprise form  
     
• The fast and easy access to the 
German market  
     
• Learn about the German market      
• Establish a company base in 
Germany 
     
• The use of local ethnic Chinese 
contacts 
     
• Establish a network of contacts with 
distributors, customers, etc. 
     
 
 
25) Please evaluate the success-probability of these market entry modes in the 
German market: 
 
 Very bad bad moderate Rather 
good 
Very 
good 
• Wholly-owned Subsidiary 
(branch/subsidiary) 
     
• Joint Venture      
• M&A      
• Trading Company      
 
 
26) How satisfied are you with your chosen market entry mode? 
 
 very satisfied  satisfied  less satisfied  
 
 not satisfied  N/A  
 
27) Please rate the overall success of your market entry mode: 
 
 very successful  successful  less successful  
 
 not successful  N/A  
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28) What are the most common market entry errors in your opinion? 
     (You can select more than one statement) 
 
 Insufficient market analysis 
 
 Insufficient understanding of German culture 
 
 Insufficient preparation for conflicts with German  
     employees and business partners 
 
 Insufficient knowledge of German customer demands 
 
 Insufficient knowledge of operating costs in Germany 
 
 Other: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
29) Do your employees or business partners in Germany speak Chinese? 
 
  Yes   No   N/A  
 
 
30) Does the Chinese management, responsible for the operation in Germany, 
     speak German? 
 
  Yes   No   N/A 
 
 
 
31) Do you offer intercultural training courses for Chinese employees  
     working in/with Germany?  
 
 Yes   No   N/A  
 
 
32) Do you already have a website in German?  
 
 yes   no   N/A  
 
 
If No, please go to question 33; otherwise please continue with question 34. 
 
33) Do you plan to have a website in German?  
 
 yes   no   N/A  
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34) Are you planning to introduce Chinese-branded products to the  
     German market?  
 
 Yes   No   N/A  
 
 
35) If you would or are planning to introduce Chinese-branded products to the 
German market, do you think an adaptation of the product is necessary?  
 
 Yes   No   N/A  
 
 
36) For the German market, our company: 
 
         We don’t       We intend     We do 
        to 
 
 
Adapts the entire communication                      N/A 
package 
 
Adapts the marketing concept                      N/A 
 
Adapts the advertising strategy                      N/A 
 
Creates a customized German                      N/A 
ad campaign 
 
Adapts the product to conform to the                     N/A 
ecological standards 
 
Adapts the product to conform to                      N/A 
environmental regulations 
 
Adapts the product to conform to                      N/A 
ecological awareness 
 
Adapts the product to conform to the                     N/A 
legal rules and regulations 
 
Adapts our services to German                      N/A 
standards 
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37) Do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 not 
at all 
to a 
minor 
degree 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• Employees should not question the 
authority and integrity of their 
managers 
     
• Each manager is responsible for 
his/her team and employees 
     
• A manager is a person every 
employee looks to for guidance 
     
• The company head knows best how 
to lead the company and one should 
not disagree with him 
     
• Each person has its place in the 
company and has to know its 
obligations towards others 
     
 
 
38) To which degree: 
 
 not 
at all 
to a 
minor 
degree 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• Do you think are Chinese and 
Germans are able to work together 
without problems? 
     
• Do you adapt your products and 
services to the German market and 
environment? 
     
• Do you expect problems when 
dealing with Germans? 
     
• Do you think is one's culture relevant 
when doing business with people 
from other cultures? 
     
• Do you expect Germans to be able to 
deal with cultural differences 
between Chinese and Germans in 
everyday situations? 
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39) Do you personally know other ethnic Chinese individuals or organizations in 
Germany? 
 
  Yes   No   N/A  
 
40) Do you seek guidance and advice regarding business matters from other 
ethnic Chinese individuals or organizations in Germany? 
 
  Yes   No   N/A  
 
41) Do you think using contacts with other ethnic Chinese is useful for the 
internationalization of your business? 
  
  Yes   No   N/A  
 
42) In your opinion, are personal connections and relationships with other ethnic 
Chinese useful for entering the German market? 
 
 Yes   No   N/A  
 
43) Did/do you use personal contacts or relationships with ethnic Chinese 
individuals and organizations for expansion to Germany? 
 
 Yes   No   N/A  
 
If you answered “Yes”, please proceed to question 44, otherwise you are finished 
with the questionnaire. 
 
44) To which extent do connections or relationships to Germany-based Chinese 
play a role regarding the following factors? 
 
 not at 
all 
to a 
minor 
degree 
to a 
moderate 
extent 
to a 
great 
extent 
to a 
very 
great 
extent 
• Analysis of the German market      
• Gathering of information about the 
German market 
     
• Strategic planning of the market 
entrance in Germany 
     
• Preparation for market entrance in 
Germany 
     
• Financing of German operation      
• Choice of market entry mode       
• Successful market entrance in 
Germany 
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